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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Miles Wilkinson 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of History 
June 2019 
Creating Confidentiality: Physician-Patient Privilege and Medical Confidentiality in the 
United States, 1776-1975 
 
 
This dissertation examines the rise of physician-patient privilege in the United States. 
Owing to the Duchess of Kingston’s 1776 trial for bigamy, the privilege is not recognized in 
many common law jurisdictions, including federal courtrooms. Beginning in New York in 
1828, however, physician-patient privilege was gradually incorporated into the statutory 
codes of numerous states. At present, most American courtrooms observe some form of the 
privilege. Drawing upon medical and legal sources, especially professional journals, this 
dissertation places physician-patient privilege in its historical context, analyzing the ways in 
which developments within the medical and legal professions have shaped the evolution of 
the privilege. Understanding this history is essential in order to explain the history of 
privilege as policy—that is how physician-patient privilege became a widely accepted legal 
doctrine in the United States, why the privilege remains such an unevenly applied rule in 
American courts, and how law protects medical confidentiality today. But it is also sheds 
light on the intersections of two of America’s most powerful professions—medicine and the 
law—and carries implications to the broader history of professionalization. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Medical confidentiality mandates that doctors work to protect their patients’ secrets. 
 
But what happens when physicians are called upon to testify in a court of law? Upon 
questioning in the courtroom, are physicians ethically—or legally—justified in revealing their 
patients’ secrets? In the United States, the laws governing medical testimony in the 
courtroom are myriad and contradictory. In some courtrooms, doctors are forbidden from 
disclosing their patients’ secrets. In others, doctors risk being held in contempt of court if 
they withhold any information. New York’s statutory code protects almost all 
communications between doctor and patient. Massachusetts, on the other hand, requires 
physicians to submit to any and all questions. In California, physicians must reveal their 
patients’ secrets in criminal trials, but cannot in civil trials. At present, federal law is 
ambiguous on the subject.1 
These contradictions are a product of the unusual origins and uneven evolution of 
physician-patient privilege.2 This dissertation traces the history of physician-patient privilege 
 
 
1 On the law of Evidence today, see Kenneth C. Broun, McCormick on Evidence 7th edition (Eagan, MN: 
Thompson West, 2013). In criminal cases, federal courts operate under the Federal Rules of Evidence which were 
adopted in 1975 and do not include physician-patient privilege. In civil cases, federal courts operate according 
to the laws of the state in which the suit is adjudicated—physician-patient privilege is observed in those states 
that have privilege statutes and not observed in those states that do not have statutes. Federal Rules of 
Evidence, H.R. Rep. No 93-650, 93rd Congress, 1st Session 28 (1973), rule 501. 
 
2 To date, the most thorough treatment of this history has occurred in legal treatises, where legal scholars have 
traced the evolution of various privilege statutes over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Among these sources, my dissertation draws heavily upon John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law Including the Statutes and Judicial Decisions of All Jurisdictions of the United States vol. 4 
(1st ed., Boston, 1905); Clinton DeWitt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient (Springfield, Ill.: 
Charles C. Thomas, 1958); and Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: Evidentiary Privileges (3rd ed., New 
York: Wolters Kluwer, 2016). The best historical analysis of physician-patient privilege is Andreas-Holger 
Maehle, Contesting Medical Confidentiality: Origins of the Debate in the United States, Britain, and Germany (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2016). Angus Ferguson, Should a Doctor Tell? The Evolution of Medical 
Confidentiality in Britain (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013) offers an overview of similar developments in the United 
Kingdom. Legal examinations such as Daniel Shuman, “The Origins of Physician-Patient Privilege and the 
Professional Secret,” Southwestern Law Journal 39:2 (June 1985), 661-688 offer useful information on the 
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in the United States over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It explains 
how our current laws regulating medical testimony in the courtroom were cobbled together 
in response to a variety of disparate medical and legal developments—many predating the 
modern notions of privacy and patients’ rights often associated with the privilege today.3 
This is a story shaped by long mis-remembered court cases, sweeping movements to reshape 
American law, and attempts to professionalize the medical and legal professions.4 
This study is also an examination of two of America’s most powerful professions.5 
By analyzing the debates surrounding physician-patient privilege, my dissertation illuminates 
some of the means that lawyers and doctors have utilized to set their professions apart from 
other occupations. Nearly all forms of privileged communications have been justified on 
utilitarian grounds. If not for the protection afforded by privileged communications, the 
 
 
evolution of legal arguments for and against physician-patient privilege in America, but do not analyze the 
social context in which these statutes arose or their effects on the medical profession. 
 
3 Legal scholars Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first proposed a “right to privacy” in 1890, long after 
medical confidentiality laws had been enacted in many states. Over the course of the twentieth century, the 
Supreme Court gradually came to see privacy as a constitutionally protected right, ruling in 1965 that “zones of 
privacy” were guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. By this point, nearly all of the laws on physician-patient privilege 
were already in effect. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4:5 
(Dec., 1890), 193-220; Griswold v. Connecticut, US 479, 484 (1965); Leigh Ann Wheeler, How Sex Became A 
Civil Liberty (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy (New 
York: Basic Books, 1999); Sarah Igo, The Known Citizen: A History of Privacy in Modern America (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2018); and Deborah Nelson, Pursuing Privacy in Cold War America (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002). 
 
4 On the professionalization of medicine, this study draws most heavily upon Paul Starr, The Social 
Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry (New York: 
Basic Books, 1982); and William Rothstein, American Physicians in the Nineteenth Century: From Sects to Science 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972). On professionalization in general, see Bruce A. Kimball, 
The “True Professional Ideal” in America: A History (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995); Nathan O. Hatch 
ed., The Professions and American History (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Samuel 
Haber, The Quest for Authority and Honor in the American Professions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); 
and Thomas Haskell ed., The Authority of Experts: Studies in History and Theory (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1984). 
 
5 Kimball defines a profession as “a dignified occupation espousing an ethic of service organized into an 
association and practicing functional science.” Kimball, The “True Professional Ideal” in America, 16. See also John 
F. Dillon, “The True Professional Ideal,” American Law Review 28 (1894), 671. 
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argument goes, individuals would be reticent to disclose all relevant information to their 
physician or attorney. This, in turn, might hinder the physician’s ability to prescribe and treat 
his or her patient, and could lead to injury or death. Likewise, an attorney, without full 
knowledge of all relevant facts would be unable to provide useful advocacy for his or her 
client. Because of this, the logic follows, it is imperative to protect these relationships 
through evidentiary privilege. Implied in this protection, is the idea that the privileged 
relationship—whether physician-patient, attorney-client, or any of a number of other 
relationships that have been, at one point or another, granted the status of privilege—is 
deemed more essential than the fact-finding mission of the courts.6 
This makes privilege a powerful tool for those trying to prove the social value of 
their respective professions. Yet the medical and legal positions on physician-patient 
privilege were never fixed. Since the early nineteenth century, distinct groups of medical and 
legal scholars have embraced and rejected physician-patient privilege at different times in 
accordance with their larger agendas. At times, doctors viewed physician-patient privilege as 
a powerful indicator of professional status and the logical extension of medical ethics into 
the courtroom.7 At other points, however, many physicians came to view the privilege—and 
its restriction on their ability to exercise discretion in disclosing medical information—as a 
challenge to their professional autonomy. Similarly, legal scholars have, at times, embraced 
 
 
 
 
6 On the justification of privileges, see Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: Evidentiary Privileges 3rd ed. 
 
7 For discussion of these topics, this relies upon Robert Baker, Before Bioethics: A History of American Medical 
Ethics from the Colonial Period to the Bioethics Revolution (Oxford: University Press, 2013); Robert Baker, Arthur 
Caplan, Linda Emanuel, and Stephen Latham, The American Medical Ethics Revolution: How the AMA’s Code of 
Ethics Has Transformed Physicians’ Relationships to Patients, Professionals, and Society (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999); Albert R. Jonsen, A Short History of Medical Ethics (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008); and Donald E. Konold, A History of American Medical Ethics, 1847-1912 (Madison: The 
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1962). 
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physician-patient privilege as a tool to make the judicial process more legible, while, at 
others, disregarded it as an unwanted impediment to the judicial process.8 
Many scholars have asserted that the physician-patient privilege was first invoked 
during the Duchess of Kingston’s trial for bigamy in 1776. Because of the lasting influence 
of this case, Chapter 2, “Privilege and Professional Honour in the Duchess of Kingston’s 
Trial for Bigamy,” examines that trial in detail. Only by focusing on its specific 
circumstances can this powerful—yet misinterpreted—precedent be understood for what it 
really was: an appeal to the traditions of “professional honour” associated with the 
aristocracy, rather than an attempt to secure a special status for any and all medical 
testimony. 
The unique circumstances and timing of the case, however, allowed the judge’s ruling 
to be transformed into a lasting legal precedent that seemed to address modern notions of 
medical confidentiality. The trial took place in the midst of larger transformation of 
courtroom proceedings in which the advent of adversarial criminal trials, with separate 
attorneys representing both prosecution and defense, demanded the formation of 
standardized rules of evidence. Lord Mansfield, whose ruling has been cited since the trial 
itself as a rejection of physician-patient privilege, was at the head of this movement; his 
decisions on numerous other evidential issues had already formed crucial precedents that 
helped modernize English law. Consequently, as the notions of gentlemanly honor subsided 
and the influence of the medical profession increased, British legal scholars increasingly 
looked to the Duchess’s trial as a legal precedent, ascribing that well-remembered and well- 
 
 
 
8 On the evolution of the legal profession in the United States, see Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in 
American History (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Lawrence M. Friedman, A 
History of American Law (New York: Touchstone, 1973). 
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documented case with modern notions of medical confidentiality and medical ethics that it 
would not have had at the time. 
In the United States, the Mansfield precedent was broken in 1828, when physician- 
patient privilege was clearly and unambiguously incorporated into the New York legal code. 
Chapter 3, “Codification and the Origins of Physician-Patient Privilege,” weighs three 
different explanations for the origins of this law: 1) that medical societies successfully 
lobbied for the privilege; 2) that the privilege was the product a medico-legal expert 
consulted in revisions of the state’s medical code; and 3) that the law was the product of 
efforts to codify and streamline all aspects of New York’s legal code. Chapter 3 argues that 
the third explanation is the most compelling and suggest that physician-patient privilege first 
arose as a byproduct of legal codification itself. 
The decision of New York’s codifiers to incorporate physician-patient privilege into 
their new legal code had cascading implications. By 1875, nineteen states or territories had 
followed suit by enacting similar statutes, many of which copied verbatim from the original 
New York law. Chapter 3 also examines these early laws, linking the rapid spread of 
physician-patient privilege to codification movements elsewhere throughout the nation in 
the mid-nineteenth century. This emphasis on codification might help explain why no one— 
whether doctors, lawyers, or the general public—made much of physician-patient privilege at 
the time, even as all these laws were being adopted. This is because privilege was merely a 
tiny piece of a much larger and more controversial legal development. 
A close examination of nineteenth century legal texts reveals that privilege was 
seldom invoked in the courtroom. Until the late 1870s, only a few cases—all adjudicated in 
New York—appear in any of these sources. Chapter 4, “Early Privilege Cases,” focusses on 
these trials and highlights the lingering uncertainties that plagued privilege cases throughout 
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much of the nineteenth century. In these cases, the courts often contradicted one another as 
doctors, lawyers, and judges were all unsure as to how privilege was to be interpreted in the 
courtroom. Chapter 4 also examines the use of privilege in criminal abortion proceedings, 
where attempted applications of physician-patient privilege were not only more frequent 
than they were in any other type of case, but especially problematic. 
The next two chapters address the evolution of American medical ethics, showing 
that physicians increasingly took confidentiality seriously over the course of the 19th century. 
Chapter 5, “Confidentiality and Medical Ethics in the Nineteenth Century,” examines the 
rise of codified medical ethics and medical police that led doctors to embrace, and 
increasingly advocate, the spread of physician-patient privilege. The earliest legislation on 
physician-patient privilege came at point in time when the medical profession was especially 
weak and did not have the means to lobby or push for major legal changes—this was a 
period when the few medical licensing laws on the books were being stripped away and so- 
called “regular”—or mainstream, MD-educated—physicians were forced to compete on the 
open marketplace with homoeopaths, botanists, eclectics, and other types of healers. 
Distressed regular physicians sought ways to elevate their own status both within the 
fractured medical profession and in the eyes of the public. To this end, regular physicians 
formed numerous medical societies—and eventually in the 1840s, the American Medical 
Association (AMA). In these societies, they created codes of ethics designed to distinguish 
regular physicians from irregulars and members vigorously policed these codes. In doing so, 
physicians came to embrace medical confidentiality and especially physician-patient privilege. 
The AMA Code of Ethics, adopted in 1847, celebrated the fact that privilege was observed in 
some states. By the final decades of the nineteenth century, physicians were actively lobbying 
for the further spread of such laws in states where they did not exist. 
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Consequently, during the second half of the nineteenth century, doctors emerged as 
the foremost proponents of physician-patient privilege. Beginning in the 1880s, doctors 
openly campaigned to secure physician-patient privilege in numerous states, using medical 
societies and professional journals as instruments to rally support for proposed legislation. 
At the same time, however, the consensus that underpinned codified medical ethics gave 
way. Increasingly disillusioned with the ways in which medical policing was being conducted, 
many physicians rebelled against the American Medical Association’s Code of Ethics and hence 
against the statutory protection of medical confidentiality. Chapter 6, “Professionalization 
and Privilege,” examines the conflicted advocacy of doctors on both sides of this debate. 
Beginning in the 1870s, medico-legal developments produced a sudden spike in the 
number of cases where physician-patient privilege was invoked by one side or the other, thus 
raising the stakes for all sides in debates over how to deal with the issue. Chapter 7, 
“Privilege in the Turn of the Century Courtroom,” examines these cases and traces the ways 
in which they shaped the policy of physician-patient privilege. The rapid transformation 
brought new institutions and new types of litigation to which the privilege could not be 
easily applied. In particular, a dramatic rise in insurance, accident, and will cases proved 
especially difficult to adjudicate where the physician-patient privilege could be applied 
forcefully. As a result, legal critics began to challenge the spread of physician-patient 
privilege, arguing that it served as an unnecessary and untenable impediment to justice. 
Chapter 8, “Criticism and Reform in the Twentieth Century,” examines legal and 
medical responses to the proliferation of physician-patient privilege in the early twentieth 
century. By 1900, dissent within the medical profession had reached a boiling point. Doctors 
came to see physician-patient privilege and codified medical ethics as an unwelcome 
limitation on their professional autonomy. The AMA revised its Code of Ethics twice in first 
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two decades of the twentieth century, each time reducing its proscriptive powers. With the 
problematic applications of privilege in personal life insurance cases, injury litigation, and 
contested will disputes readily apparent, legal scholars mounted an all-out offensive against 
physician-patient privilege. 
The combination of these two developments—ethical conflicts within the medical 
profession and opposition from the legal profession—profoundly shaped the policy of 
physician-patient privilege in the twentieth century. In the face of criticism from both the 
medical and legal professions, the proliferation of physician-patient privilege abruptly came 
to an end. Since 1900, few jurisdictions have adopted physician-patient privilege. Instead 
many jurisdictions reversed course, amending their laws to limit the applications of the 
privilege. Finally, over the course of the twentieth century, legal reformers drafted a series of 
revised legal codes intended to simplify American evidence law. Many of the architects of 
these legal reforms were staunch critics of physician-patient privilege. Accordingly, the new 
Federal Rules of Evidence that were adopted in 1975 featured no mention of physician-patient 
privilege. Because of this, physician-patient privilege is not currently recognized in federal 
courtrooms. 
Over the course of the past two centuries, contradictory impulses—including the 
advocacy of numerous physicians and medical societies on one hand and the criticism of 
prominent doctors and legal scholars on the other—have prevented any formation of 
consensus on physician-patient privilege. This uncertainty surrounding medical 
confidentiality laws is a byproduct of the long and fractured history of physician-patient 
privilege in America. Understanding this history is essential in order to explain how 
physician-patient privilege became a widely accepted legal doctrine in the United States, why 
the privilege remains such an unevenly applied rule in American courts, and how law 
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protects medical confidentiality today. Understanding how we got to this point might also 
help future policy makers decide how to handle many of the same or related issues going 
forward. 
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CHAPTER II: PRIVILEGE AND PROFESSIONAL HOUNOUR IN THE 
DUCHESS OF KINGSTON’S TRIAL FOR BIGAMY 
 
Caesar Hawkins: I do not know how far any thing, that has come before me in a 
confidential trust in my profession should be disclosed, consistent with my 
professional honor. 
 
Lord Mansfield: …If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure he 
would be guilty of a breach of honour, and of great indiscretion; but to give that 
information in a court of justice, which by the law of the land he is bound to do, will 
never be imputed to him as an indiscretion whatever. 
 
Testimony from the Duchess of Kingston’s Trial for Bigamy, 1776 
 
 
Most legal sources maintain that physician-patient privilege was first invoked in 1776 
during the Duchess of Kingston’s trial for bigamy. When asked to reveal the intimate details 
of a longtime client before her peers in the House of Lords, the Duchess’s surgeon, Caesar 
Hawkins, bravely took a stand for the “honour of [his] profession.” Hawkins argued that 
medical men were entrusted with great secrets and to betray these secrets under any 
circumstances would damage the welfare of their patients and the honor of their profession. 
But the presiding judge, Lord Mansfield, was unsympathetic, stating, “If a surgeon was 
voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure he would be guilty of a breach of honour, and 
of great indiscretion; but, to give that information in a court of justice, which by the law of 
the land he is bound to do, will never be imputed to him as any indiscretion whatsoever.”1 
Documented in court cases and evidence manuals ever since, this brief aside by Lord 
Mansfield has long been cited as a foundational legal precedent that denies doctors any 
inherent claim to privileged communications. In 1792, Mansfield’s protégé Francis Buller 
 
1 The Trial of Elizabeth Duchess Dowager of Kingston for Bigamy, before the Right Honourable the House of Peers, in 
Westminster-Hall, in Full Parliament, on Monday the 15th, Tuesday the 16th, Friday the 19th, Saturday the 20th, and 
Monday the 22d of April 1776; on the Last of Which Days the Said Elizabeth Duchess Dowager of Kingston Was Found 
Guilty. Published by Order of the House of Peers. (London, 1776), 119-120. 
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became the first to invoke this ruling in the courtroom when he “lamented” that physicians 
could be compelled to testify. In the process, Buller unwittingly helped to secure the 
precedent established by his late mentor.2 Ten years later, Leonard MacNally quoted 
Mansfield’s conversation with Hawkins in his influential text, The Rules of Evidence on Pleas of 
the Crown.3 Numerous judges and legal scholars followed Buller and MacNally over the 
course of the nineteenth century and, in doing so, they transformed Mansfield’s ruling into a 
lasting legal precedent.4 Because of this precedent, physician-patient privilege is still not 
recognized under British common law nor in American Federal courts. 
Yet these sources have often overlooked the peculiar circumstances surrounding the 
Duchess’s trial. A close examination of the trial reveals that Hawkins’s attempt to invoke 
“professional honor” was not an appeal to widely practiced or universally recognized 
medical standards, but rather a suggestion that his standing at the top of the medical 
profession granted him privileges that would have been denied to other practitioners. In 
order to build a career as a wealthy and successful surgeon, Hawkins sought to distinguish 
himself from other, more humble practitioners. He relied upon his relationships with 
aristocratic clients to gain social status and adopted the values and styles of the fashionable 
elite. Hawkins took great care to comport himself according to the norms of gentlemanly 
honor—an unwritten and extralegal code that regulated aristocratic life.5 When called into 
 
2 Wilson v. Rastall, 99 T.E.R. 1866 (1792). 
 
3 Leonard MacNally, The Rules of Evidence on Pleas of the Crown (London: J Butterworth, 1802), 247-248. 
 
4 Rex v. Gibbons, 1 Car. & P. 97 (1823); Broad v. Pitt 3 C. & P. 518 (1828); Thomas Peake, A Compendium on 
the Law of Evidence (Philadelphia, 1812), 183; Samuel March Phillips, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence: First 
American Ed., from the Second London Ed. (New York, 1816), 104; Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise on the Law of 
Evidence and Digest of Proofs in Civil and Criminal Proceedings vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1834), 230. 
 
5 Donna T Andrew, “The Code of Honour and Its Critics: The Opposition to Dueling in England, 1700-1850,” 
Social History 5:3 (1980), 409-434; Donna Andrew, Aristocratic Vice: The Attack on Dueling, Suicide, Adultery, and 
Gambling in Eighteenth Century England (Newhaven: Yale University Press, 2013); V.G. Kiernan, The Duel in 
European History: Honour and the Reign of Aristocracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
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court to reveal the intimate details of one of these clients, Hawkins demurred, arguing that 
he, as an aristocratic gentleman, could not reveal secrets entrusted to him. Thus his appeal to 
“professional honor” was an attempt to secure the privileges of elite social status and to 
protect his personal relationship with the Duchess. It was not a claim that medical ethics 
mandated confidentiality in the courtroom.6 
The trial itself marked the climax of a decades-long marital drama that had long 
transfixed the British public with illicit affairs, secret marriages, slander, and accusations of 
bribery. For five days, the seat of Britain’s government was converted into a theater-in-the- 
round. More than four thousand spectators, including King George III, crowded into 
London’s Westminster Hall to witness the Duchess of Kingston’s trial. Aristocrats watched 
the proceedings from private boxes with their attendants. Others crammed into improvised 
bleachers that had been erected in the hall. Those who could not afford the steep price of 
tickets, followed the proceedings in the local papers, where the latest news from 
Westminster Hall often displaced reports of mounting tensions in America. 
The defendant—now going by her new and disputed title, the Duchess of Kingston—
had been born Elizabeth Chudleigh in 1720.7 Her father, the lieutenant-governor 
 
 
6 Several historians and legal scholars have recently reexamined this case: Danuta Mendelson, “The Duchess of 
Kingston’s Case, the Ruling of Lord Mansfield and Duty of Medical Confidentiality in Court,” International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 35 (2012), 480-489; Angus Ferguson, “The Lasting Legacy of a Bigamous Duchess: 
The Benchmark Precedent for Medical Confidentiality,” Social History of Medicine 19 (2006), 37-53; Angus 
Ferguson, Should a Doctor Tell?: The Evolution of Medical Confidentiality in Britain (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2013). 
 
7 There been numerous biographies of the Duchess of Kingston, many focusing on the most lurid details of 
her life in aristocratic society. Recent scholarship has reexamined the Duchess of Kingston and her trial as a 
means of analyzing gender relations in Georgian England. In detailing the life and trial of the Duchess of 
Kingston, this chapter draws upon the following accounts: Elizabeth Mavor, The Virgin Mistress: The Life of the 
Duchess of Kingston (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964); T.A.B. Corley, “Chudleigh, Elizabeth,” Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Gillian Russell, Women, Sociability 
and Theatre in Georgian London (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Betty Rizzo, 
Companions Without Vows: Relationships Among Eighteenth-Century British Women (Athens and London: University of 
Georgia Press, 1994); and Matthew Kinservik, “The Production of a Female Pen”: Anna Larpent’s Account of the 
Duchess of Kingston’s Bigamy Trial of 1776 (Lewis Walpole Library: Yale University, 2004). 
13  
of Chelsea Hospital, died in 1726 after squandering the family fortune speculating on foreign 
investments. Following her father’s death, Chudleigh, along with her mother and brother, 
left London for the family’s small Devonshire estate, where they lived in “genteel but 
straitened circumstances.”8 Chudleigh’s introduction to aristocratic society came at the age of 
twenty-three, when, with the support of a wealthy benefactor, she managed to secure a 
position as a maid of honor to Augusta, Princess of Wales. The position allowed Chudleigh 
to move in the highest circles of English society, but it also provided her with a much- 
needed £200 salary. 
In court, Chudleigh’s charm and beauty won her numerous suitors. She was said to 
be enamored of the Duke of Hamilton but elected to marry Augustus John Hervey, a naval 
lieutenant and the second son of a wealthy aristocratic family. The couple had only known 
each other for a few weeks when they were hastily wed in small parish church. The 
ceremony was conducted in secret so that Chudleigh could maintain her appointment as 
maid of honor to the Princess of Wales. The sole witnesses were three members of the 
bride’s family along with a servant, Anne Braddock, who would later provide damning 
testimony in in the Duchess’s trial.9 
By all accounts, this marriage was brief and loveless. Shortly after their nuptials, 
Hervey was shipped off to sea while Chudleigh resumed her life at court. Though the couple 
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seldom saw one another, Chudleigh gave birth to a child in 1747. By the time their son died 
the following year, it was clear that both Chudleigh and Hervey wanted out of the marriage. 
Divorce was out of the question, however, as it would have required the couple to 
acknowledge their illicit union and to provide evidence that Chudleigh had committed 
adultery. Instead, the couple opted for an informal separation, and each publicly denied that 
the union ever took place. 
At first, this arrangement caused few problems—Chudleigh began an affair with 
Evelyn Pierrepont, an extravagantly wealthy man and the Duke of Kingston-Upon-Hull 
while Hervey spent much of the next decade at sea. In the late 1750s, however, Augustus 
Hervey’s brother George fell ill. This left the once-impoverished Augustus Hervey next in 
line to the family fortune and the Countship of Bristol. And so, in February 1759, Chudleigh 
seized the chance to secure an aristocratic title for herself and sought out the parish priest 
who had officiated her wedding fifteen years earlier. In an incredible stroke of luck, “she 
found him on his deathbed and, with the advice of a pliant lawyer, persuaded the dying vicar 
to forge a parish register to record her marriage to Hervey.” Chudleigh’s scheme backfired, 
however, when the ailing George Hervey recovered. Not only did she fail to secure fortune 
or title, but “she never destroyed the register, a careless error she would rue in 1776.”10 
Though now official, their marriage remained a secret for another decade until 
Hervey, wishing to remarry, pressed for a divorce. With her private affairs thrust into the 
public eye, Chudleigh sued Hervey for falsely claiming marriage. Hervey, likely due to a 
£16,000 bribe from his former spouse, mounted little defense and the court ruled that the 
marriage had never taken place. With the legal issues seemingly put to rest, Chudleigh was 
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now free to remarry. In March 1769, “in a hasty and quiet ceremony in the duke’s dressing 
room,” Chudleigh married Evelyn Pierrepont, the Duke of Kingston. With this union, 
Chudleigh “had now achieved her ambition of becoming a peeress: she was both a duchess 
and one of the richest women in Europe.”11 
When Pierrepont died in 1773, he left his estate to his widow, the new Duchess of 
Kingston. The Duke’s nephew Evelyn Meadows, who had long assumed that he would 
inherit the Duke’s land and titles, was incensed and immediately began investigating 
Chudliegh’s marital status. Meadows managed to find several servants who had worked for 
Chudleigh over the years, including Anne Craddock, who had attended her first wedding. 
Meadows was also able to track down “the widow of Mr. Amis, the parson who married 
[Chudleigh] to Augustus Hervey… With her help, Meadows learned of the phony registry 
that Amis made and was able obtain it.” Meadows brought this evidence to the Grand Jury 
of Middlesex County, which indicted the Duchess for bigamy in December 1744.12 
The ensuing trial, set to take place in 1775, quickly captivated the British press. In an 
attempt to capitalize on the trial’s publicity, Samuel Foote, a popular comedian and 
playwright, authored A Trip to Calais, a satire that cast the Duchess as Kitty Crocodile, an 
allusion to Chudleigh’s “gift for tears,” or, alternately, Lady Betty Bigamy.13 Though never 
published, the play caused a controversy when Foote and the Duchess each published letters 
in several London newspapers. Over the course of several months they exchanged insults. 
While Foote often feigned ignorance at the source of the Duchess’s anger, Chudleigh 
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offered scathing critiques of Foote’s honor and manhood, calling him a “subservient vassal” 
and stating that she would not “prostitute the term manhood by applying it to Mr. Foote.”14 
Printed throughout the summer of 1775, the exchange heightened anticipation for the 
Duchess’s upcoming trial. Her antics outraged many who saw her insults as poor conduct 
for a woman of her status. Others, believing Foote’s play to be an indecent attempt to sully 
the reputation of a peer, wrote to the London papers in support of the Duchess.15 
After several postponements on behalf of the Duchess’s failing health, the trial began 
in April 1776. At her own request, the Duchess was tried as a Peer by the House of Lords, 
which meant that her jury would be comprised of fellow aristocrats and that she would be 
afforded unique privileges denied to those of a lower social standing.16 Most importantly, the 
Duchess, who had never convicted of any crime could plead the benefit of peerage— 
aristocrats convicted of any crime (other than treason or murder) were not be punished for 
their first offense. This was good insurance for the Duchess as it was common knowledge 
that she had been married twice: first to the naval lieutenant Augustus John Hervey and then 
to Evelyn Pierrepont, the Duke of Kingston. It was also a clever legal tactic, as, no matter 
how the court ruled, the Duchess would retain her status as peer. If the court ruled that she 
had never been married to Hervey, she would rightfully be the Duchess of Kingston. If, as 
was likely, the court found that the Duchess had been married to Hervey, her marriage to 
the Duke of Kingston would be annulled. Instead, the Duchess would become the Countess 
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of Bristol as Hervey had become the Earl of Bristol in 1775. Either title—Duchess or 
Countess—would enable the Duchess to claim the privilege of peerage and avoid 
punishment.17 
Although the outcome of the trial was never in doubt, the proceedings took on 
different meanings to various elements of British society. The public, whose opinion of the 
Duchess of Kingston had been shaped by decades of gossip and rumors, saw the trial as an 
indictment of the excesses of the aristocracy. To many, the Duchess of Kingston was most 
famous for her appearance at the Jubilee Ball in 1749, where she showed up half-naked in 
the costume of Iphigenia, Agamemnon’s daughter in Greek mythology, and pronounced 
herself, “ready for sacrifice.” In doing so, she caught the eye of King George II and earned 
herself a nickname— “Iphigenia”—that would stick for the rest of her life.18 The presiding 
lords, who intended the trial as a means to showcase the dangers of clandestine marriage, 
bigamy, and adultery, were keen to play up the Duchess’s numerous provocations. Many of 
the aristocrats in attendance, including two of the Duchess’s prosecutors, were embroiled in 
their own scandals. To these aristocrats, the Duchess of Kingston made an ideal “scapegoat 
for [their own] sexual indiscretions.”19 By putting the Duchess of Kingston’s honor on trial, 
they hoped “that her sacrifice would wash away their sins.”20 
The first two days of the trial were dedicated to matters of legal procedure, as 
attorneys for both sides argued whether the Duchess’s marital status—previously settled in 
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an ecclesiastical trial—fell under the jurisdiction of the House of Lords. After deciding they 
would hear the case, the Lords began hearing testimony from witnesses. Over the next two 
days, the court learned that the Duchess had previously been married to John Hervey and 
that the earlier ruling of the ecclesiastical court had been found in error. On the fifth day of 
the trial, after arguments had concluded, the Lords arose one by one. Each placed his right 
hand upon his chest, delivering the verdict: “guilty, upon my honor.” Only the Duke of 
Newcastle, who had formerly enjoyed a brief affair with the Duchess, deviated, stating 
“guilty erroneously, but not intentionally.”21 Though the court’s ruling stripped Chudleigh of 
her title as the Duchess of Kingston, recognition of her marriage to Hervey, who was now 
the Count of Bristol, allowed her to plead the privilege of peerage and avoid the typical 
punishment for bigamy, burning of the hand. Following the conclusion of the trial, the 
Duchess fled England for Calais. Though she retained most of her fortune, the Duchess 
spent much of the remainder of her life in self-imposed exile. 
Lost amidst the spectacle and controversy of the trial, another battle over honor— 
one that would have profound effects on the history of medicine and the law—went largely 
unnoticed. In the midst of the trial’s fourth day, Caesar Hawkins, a prominent surgeon and 
witness, was asked if he knew of any marriage between Chudleigh and Hervey. Not wanting 
to harm the Duchess’s defense, he responded, “I do not know how far any thing, that has 
come before me in a confidential trust in my profession should be disclosed, consistent with 
my professional honor.”22 Hawkins’s query to the presiding lords has been interpreted as the 
first invocation of physician-patient privilege in the history of English common law. 
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Accordingly, Lord Mansfield’s response—that Hawkins must answer all questions asked of 
him—has long been invoked by legal scholars as proof that medical practitioners cannot 
claim privileged communications.23 A close examination of Hawkins’s career and personal 
relationships, however, reveals that the surgeon never intended to claim medical 
confidentiality or argue on behalf of the medical profession. 
Caesar Hawkins, the Duchess’s surgeon and confidant was one of the most 
successful medical practitioners of his time. Born into a family of surgeons, he had learned 
the practice under the tutelage of his father. As a young surgeon, Hawkins cultivated a 
network of powerful clients and used their patronage to propel him to the top of his 
profession. He managed to convert his personal relationships into prestigious and lucrative 
appointments, most notably, surgeon to the Prince of Wales and sergeant-surgeon to King 
George II. He also maintained a prominent and lucrative practice at St. George’s Hospital in 
London. These positions allowed Hawkins to amass considerable wealth and social standing; 
in 1778, he was made a Baronet for his services to the crown. At the time of the trial, 
Hawkins had reached the apex of a long and distinguished career.24 
Hawkins’s successes came in spite of a gradual weakening of the status of the 
medical profession. Throughout the seventeenth century, the Royal College of Physicians, an 
elite cadre of medical practitioners, dominated medicine in London while apothecaries and 
surgeon-barbers formed the lower ranks of the medical profession. The hierarchical 
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structure of the medical profession was thrown into disarray in 1704, when William Rose, an 
apothecary, went to court and successfully challenged physicians’ attempts to regulate and 
control the profession. The court’s ruling confirmed the status of apothecaries and surgeons, 
while also opening the medical marketplace to outside influence; clergy, folk healers, and 
domestic medicine all offered formidable challenges to traditional medicine. At the same 
time, the availability of medical texts and the relative simplicity of many treatments meant 
that little knowledge or expertise separated professionals from informed laypersons.25 
For many practitioners, greater competition weakened their professional status and 
undermined the potential for collective action. The Rose Trial crippled the Royal College—a 
longstanding barrier that differentiated esteemed medical professionals from folk healers and 
other, more humble practitioners—leaving individual practitioners to fend for themselves. 
At the same time, a growing market for medical services and increased competition made 
doctors desperate to enhance their own name. Some used advertisements, catchy jingles, and 
slogans. Others turned to more dubious methods and hired actors to call for their services at 
opportune moments. Even more troubling, many practitioners garnered reputations for 
debauchery and sexual exploitation, further cementing the profession’s poor reputation. 
Pamphlets and cartoons mocked the inefficacy of physicians with quips like, “While the 
doctors consult, the patient dies.”26 Widespread criticism of physicians’ morality and 
competency meant that, in 1776, arguments on behalf of honor of the medical profession 
would have garnered little sympathy. 
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Nevertheless, a small group of practitioners flourished in the eighteenth century. 
William Hunter, a prominent physician, managed to pull in more than £10,000 per year, 
a salary equal to the income of a peer. Several other physicians made even more. In 
many cases, success depended upon practitioners’ ability to successfully cultivate 
networks of aristocratic patrons and to garner the respect of clients as social 
companions rather than patients. Richard Warren, the physician to the Prince of Wales, 
employed this strategy to great effect, as a contemporary observer noted: 
[Warren] added various literary and scientific attainments, which were most 
advantageously displayed by a talent for conversation that was at once elegant, easy 
and natural. Of all men in the world, he had the greatest flexibility of temper, 
instantaneously accommodating himself to the tone of feeling of the young the old, 
the gay and the sorrowful… no one ever had recourse to his advice as a physician, 
who did not remain desirous of gaining his friendship and enjoying his society as a 
companion.27 
 
Dressed in powdered wigs, satin coats, buckled shoes, and tricorn hats, wealthy 
physicians adopted the styles and mannerisms of the aristocracy. They bought vast 
estates, medals, paintings, manuscripts, and other expensive signals of social status. 
Likewise, they filled their gold canes with perfume to mask the odors of their 
profession. In seeking to incorporate themselves into aristocratic society, these 
physicians sought to dissociate themselves from the rest of the medical profession.28 
Accordingly, Caesar Hawkins’s position atop the medical profession stemmed 
from his ability to adopt the manners and styles of aristocratic society. His interactions 
with the Duchess of Kingston demonstrate the ways in which doctor-patient 
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relationships could be recast as friendships that conferred status and privilege on the 
surgeon. Hawkins first met the Duchess around the time of her brief marriage to 
Augustus Hervey. The surgeon attended to Chudleigh professionally and was present 
when she gave birth to her child. What was initially a professional relationship, however, 
quickly became a personal one in which the surgeon often served as confidant and 
messenger to both the Duchess and her former husband. Before the Duchess’s 
ecclesiastical trial, for example, Hervey entrusted Hawkins to pass messages between the 
two parties because he “thought [news of his desire for a divorce] would be less 
shocking to be carried by and received from, a person [the Duchess of Kingston] knew, 
than from any stranger.”29 Likewise, the avenues of communication between the 
Duchess and Hawkins often fell outside the normal confines of a physician-patient 
relationship. Chudleigh visited Hawkins’s home and passed messages to his wife. The 
breakdown of firm barriers between physician and patient was also evident in Hawkins’s 
testimony at the Duchess’s trial. Though Hawkins’s testimony confirmed some medical 
information, including the birth of a child, much of his testimony addressed the 
contents of private or ‘loose’ conversations.30 
Similarly, Caesar Hawkins’s views toward medical confidentiality embodied 
contradictions within the developing medical profession. In the late eighteenth century, 
medical practitioners were not always committed to maintaining patients’ secrets. In 
professional disputes between practitioners, physicians and surgeons frequently revealed 
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patients’ names and medical problems to the public.31 Just four years before Caesar Hawkins 
invoked “professional honor” in the Duchess’s trial, for example, he engaged in a public 
debate with Samuel Lee, a well-known surgeon and former colleague of Hawkins at St. 
George’s Hospital.32 In a letter published in the Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser, 
Hawkins, along with several other notable London surgeons, admonished Lee for 
improperly treating his patients’ ruptures. In the process, they unashamedly revealed both 
patients’ names and medical conditions.33 Four years later, Hawkins testified that he had no 
written records of the Duchess’s brief marriage and the birth of her son. He stated that he 
had long been in the habit of destroying documents that could reveal personal details of 
patients.34 The disparate treatment of patients in these two cases illustrates that Hawkins and 
other medical practitioners viewed confidentiality as a part of their personal relationships 
with specific clients. Certainly, not all patients’ secrets were worthy of protection. The 
cultivation of a network of elite clients, such as the Duchess of Kingston, however, required 
discretion and propriety on behalf of the practitioner. 
Thus, by asking to be absolved from testifying, Hawkins departed from the norms of 
his profession. In the eighteenth century, physicians frequently testified in civil and criminal 
proceedings without objection.35 Before the trial, for example, several physicians were called 
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in front of the House of Lords to answer questions about the Duchess’s failing health. Their 
testimony relayed information acquired through the practice of their profession; “[The 
Duchess’s] mental facilities have been injured,” they stated, “She is at present afflicted with 
an alienation of mind.”36 At the time, this revelation of the Duchess’s intimate medical 
details in front of the Duchess’s peers (and to the public by way of the London papers) was 
uncontroversial. Unlike Hawkins, none of the physicians apparently viewed their indiscretion 
as a slight upon their professional honor. 
Because the testimony of physicians and surgeons was frequent and uncontroversial, 
Hawkins surely knew that claims to privilege on the basis of his profession would have been 
met with little sympathy. Thus, Hawkins’s attempts to secure privileged communications, a 
powerful indicator of status that had never been granted to a medical practitioner, suggest 
both the importance of his personal relationship to the Duchess and a strong assertion of his 
own social standing. The patronage and friendship of important clients, such as the Duchess 
and King George III, placed Hawkins amongst England’s social elite and served as the 
source of his professional honor. Called into the courtroom to reveal the intimate secrets of 
one of these invaluable clients, Hawkins likely felt as though his precarious standing among 
the aristocracy was under attack. While Hawkins could not claim privilege as a medical 
practitioner, he hoped that his status as an aristocrat might offer him the privileges of 
gentlemanly honor. Accordingly, Hawkins’s claims to professional honor were not based 
upon the idea that physicians were obligated to protect the intimate secrets of their patients. 
Instead, Hawkins argued that the standing of his patients gave him specific privileges that 
would have been denied to many other practitioners. 
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In this way, Hawkins’s appeal to “professional honor” mirrored other claims to 
confidentiality that arose during the trial. Immediately after Hawkins, the prosecution called 
Sophia Fettiplace, a former friend of the Duchess, to the bar. Fettiplace asked to be excused 
from answering questions that might tarnish her relationship with the Duchess, stating, 
“Unless your Lordships require it of me as a witness of justice, I should wish to be excused.” 
Like Hawkins, Fettiplace was of a lower social standing than the presiding lords. The Lord 
High Steward refused Fettiplace’s request, requiring her to answer all questions.37 
Next, the prosecution called Lord Barrington. Again, the witness was a close friend 
of the Duchess and wished to be excused from divulging information revealed to him 
through private, personal conversations. Barrington argued, “If anything has been confided 
to my honor, or confidentially told to me, I do hold… that as a Man of Honor, as a Man 
regardful of the Laws of Society, I cannot reveal it.”38 Though this appeal, with its references 
to personal honor, mirrored those made by Hawkins and Fettiplace, it was met with greater 
sympathy from the presiding lords. “I think that it would be improper in the noble lord to 
betray any conversations,” the Duke of Richmond responded, “I submit to your Lordships, 
that every matter of fact, not of conversation, which can be requested, the noble Lord is 
bound to disclose.”39 
Against Mansfield’s suggestion, the lords decided to adjourn to discuss the matter. 
After a lengthy discussion of courtroom proprieties and evidentiary procedure, the lords 
returned to the courtroom, again compelling another witness to answer all questions asked 
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of him.40 Though Barrington’s arguments did not convince the lords to relieve him of his 
duties to testify in court, he seemingly managed to convince both sets of attorneys. Neither 
was willing to press Barrington to disclose information learned in confidence, and he was 
allowed to leave the courtroom after answering several harmless questions.41 In each of these 
three cases—Hawkins, Fettiplace, and Barrington—the witness desired to withhold 
information from the court that might incriminate the Duchess on the grounds that 
revealing the Duchess’s secrets would constitute a violation of their honor. 
Honor, in eighteenth-century Britain’s hierarchical society, referred to the social 
recognition afforded to one’s social standing or rank. To lexicographer Samuel Johnson, the 
word was synonymous with “dignity, high rank,” or “title.”42 Men and women of a certain 
rank or status were expected to abide by a set of norms that comprised the ‘code of 
honour’—an informal set of rules that regulated aristocratic life.43 William Paley, a prominent 
priest and philosopher described this code of honor as: 
a system of rules constructed by people of fashion and calculated to facilitate their 
intercourse with one another and for no other purpose. Consequently nothing is 
advertised to by the law of honor, but what tends to incommode this intercourse.44 
 
Historian Donna Andrew has argued that codes of honor were widely accepted both within 
and outside genteel society. Even if the public did not abide by the same laws as the 
aristocracy, English society maintained that aristocrats needed to follow a set of norms that 
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could and often did conflict with the rule of law.45 In duels, for example, notions of honor 
led combatants to maim and sometimes kill one another in defiance of the law. Though 
illegal, these transgressions were rarely prosecuted.46 Likewise, in the courtroom, the 
assertion that individuals were bound to the norms and standards of honor marked a 
challenge to legal conventions. By invoking honor, Hawkins, Fettiplace, and Barrington all 
argued that their status within the English aristocracy precluded them from submitting to 
questioning that might prove harmful to the reputation of their peers. 
The strength of these claims varied, however, and the court’s response to witnesses 
marked an evaluation of each witness’s respective social standing. While Lord Mansfield 
clearly believed that honor had no place in the courtroom—he pushed to deny all three 
witnesses’ claims to privileged communications—his fellow Lords seemed to disagree, 
allowing Barrington to leave the courtroom without tarnishing his honor. Of a lower social 
standing, attorneys from both sides were especially reluctant to challenge Barrington’s 
honor, indicating that Barrington’s title commanded deference from his inferiors. Hawkins 
and Fettiplace, however, occupied more tenuous positions. Neither held an aristocratic title. 
Though they moved among the most prestigious men and women in English society, both 
would have been perceived as outsiders. Within the context of a trial in the House of Lords, 
it is hardly surprising that their claims to honor—a privilege of fashionable elites—were 
rejected. 
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In the midst of the trial’s fifth and final day, William Berkley, Augustus Hervey’s 
attorney, was called to testify. Like Hawkins, Fettiplace, and Barrington before him, Berkley 
asked to be absolved from testifying: 
My Lords, what knowledge I had of this business arose from my being attorney to 
Lord Bristol, and I must leave it to your Lordships, whether I ought to be 
examined as for Lord Bristol consistent with Honour to myself and the duty I owe 
to him.47 
 
While Berkley, like other witnesses, framed his request around notions of honor, his appeal 
differed in an important way from earlier requests by alluding to an established legal 
precedent that applied specifically to attorneys. Dating back to the late sixteenth century, 
attorney-client privilege had been an accepted custom in English courtrooms. Berkley was 
thus drawing upon centuries of legal practice maintaining that attorneys could not be 
required to testify against the interests of their clients.48 Instead of suggesting that he should 
be relieved of his legal obligations based upon his adherence to a personal code of honor, 
Berkley merely asked if the law would allow him to testify. In response, Mr. Wallace, 
attorney for the defense, replied that he called Berkley to the bar only to testify to a brief 
conversation with another key witness and did not intend to discuss his relationship with 
Hervey.49 After hearing claims from both the witness and attorney, Mansfield responded, 
the protection of attorneys is as what is revealed to them by their client, in order to 
take their advice or instruction with regard to their defense… [yet] this is no secret 
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of the client, but is a collateral fact…and it has been often determined, that as to 
fact, an attorney or counsel has no privilege to withhold evidence.50 
 
Here Mansfield’s rhetoric differed markedly from his responses to earlier requests for 
privileged communications. Instead of immediately dismissing the claim, he acknowledged 
the privilege but maintained that it did not apply in this instance. Berkley was only allowed to 
answer questions regarding his conversations with Anne Craddock, another witness, and did 
not reveal confidential information entrusted in him by his client, Augustus Hervey.51 
Modern legal scholars might suspect that the first mention of physician-patient 
privilege would resemble this exchange between Mansfield and Berkley, the attorney—a 
careful and measured evaluation of legal principles, seeking to define the limits of established 
privileges. Yet the differences are telling. The appeal of Hawkins, the physician, did not draw 
upon the established expectations of his profession. Instead, Hawkins had based his claims 
on the tradition of gentlemanly honor and aristocratic privilege. 
And yet, a close examination of the trial transcripts reveals some of the reasons 
contemporary legal scholars began to see the case as a binding legal precedent that denied 
physician-patient privilege. Though Hawkins sought to be absolved from revealing the 
Duchess’s marital status, a fact he learned through private conversation and that was already 
public record, his invocation of “professional honor” used language that could easily be 
adapted to cover modern notions of medical confidentiality. Likewise, Mansfield’s 
response— “if a surgeon was to voluntarily reveal these secrets, to be sure he would be 
guilty of a breach of honor, and of great indiscretion; but to give that information in a court 
of justice, which by the law of land he is bound to do, will never be imputed to him as any 
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indiscretion whatsoever”52—emphasized a conflict between Hawkins’s legal and professional 
duties. Though neither Mansfield nor Hawkins would have distinguished between Hawkins’s 
practice as a surgeon and his personal relationship to the Duchess (the two would likely have 
been seen as one and the same), Hawkins also testified to facts revealed through the course 
of his professional duties. At one point, he was asked by the prosecuting attorney, “did you 
ever attend to the [Duchess’s] child in the course of your profession?” Hawkins responded 
affirmatively, confirming the birth of a child through the Duchess’s marriage to Augustus 
Hervey.53 Removed from the historical context of the courtroom, the initial exchange 
between Hawkins and Mansfield, with references to “professional honor” and the 
conflicting obligations of surgeons, would seem to address medical practitioners’ duties of 
confidentiality. Likewise, the admission of evidence learned through the service of a 
surgeon’s profession without objection would have supported this reading of the exchange. 
Over the next several decades, this interpretation of Mansfield’s ruling gradually 
became the accepted legal precedent on physician-patient privilege. The unique nature of the 
Duchess’s trial and Lord Mansfield’s commanding figure provide clues as to why this ruling 
has been readily accepted into the legal canon. By the late eighteenth century, precedent had 
become the predominant source of law for Mansfield and other royal court judges.54 
Administering law based upon precedent required finding relevant cases and evaluating the 
accuracy of documentation. Well-versed in legal history and aware of some of the major 
transformations taking place in contemporary law, Mansfield often used his position on the 
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King’s Bench to render high profile verdicts and rulings on procedural issues, knowing that 
these rulings would often become the standard procedure in future trials. As a legal scholar, 
Mansfield was deeply committed to modernizing the common law; to establishing rules that 
would increase its predictability; and to ensuring that these rules and precedents were applied 
evenly across myriad jurisdictions.55 
Mansfield’s remarks in pre-trial proceedings reveal that he viewed the Duchess’s trial 
as a means of setting legal precedent that would have lasting impact. While pre-trial 
discussions focused primarily upon the location of the trial and whether the House of Lords 
had the appropriate authority to try the Duchess, Mansfield and the other presiding lords 
were acutely aware of the unique circumstances surrounding the trial. The rarity of trying 
peers in the House of Lords along with the spectacle surrounding the affair meant that every 
ruling in the trial—whether the appropriate jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts, the location 
of the trial, or the admissibility of evidence—would be subject to public scrutiny and could 
potentially form the basis for precedent.56 The lords were not the only people interested in 
the trial for its potential to set legal precedent. In the months before the trial, a number of 
legal scholars published letters in the London papers arguing that the prosecution of the 
Duchess was illegal and represented a dangerous challenge to the authority and autonomy of 
Britain’s ecclesiastical courts, which had already ruled on the Duchess’s marital status.57 
Others worried that the trial might challenge the legality of divorces in England.58 
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Well-preserved cases, such as the Duchess’s trial, have often served as important 
sources of legal precedent. Because of the unique nature of the trial, few cases from the 
eighteenth century remain as well preserved in historical records. As a prominent and 
controversial figure in English society, the Duchess of Kingston’s trial prompted numerous 
publications such as Gentleman’s Magazine and The Lady’s Magazine to publish abridged 
versions of the trial transcript. Often, these periodicals emphasized the drama and spectacle 
of the trial, making note of the fashion of the Duchess and other British aristocrats.59 
Popular periodicals, however, were not the only publications that published trial transcripts. 
The House of Lords also published a 178-page account of the proceedings in 1776. Unlike 
the abridged versions in popular periodicals, this transcript was likely intended for an 
audience of legal scholars and contained detailed accounts of the court’s proceedings.60 
Francis Hargrave incorporated the House of Lords’ transcript into his five-volume collection 
of state trials. In addition to a collection of notable trials, Hargrave included a lengthy 
appendix that linked established evidentiary procedures to specific cases. In the appendix, 
Hargrave quoted Mansfield’s comments to Hawkins as precedent to show that surgeons had 
no legal claim to confidentiality and could be compelled to testify in court.61 Reprinted 
several times throughout the late-eighteenth century, Hargrave’s collection demonstrates that 
legal scholars almost immediately began to use the Duchess’s trial as an important source for 
legal precedent. 
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This process fits neatly into the larger history of the radical transformation of legal 
procedure that took place during the eighteenth century. During this period, the advent of 
adversarial criminal trials with attorneys representing both prosecution and defense led to 
the formalization of rules for the admissibility of evidence.62 Legal treatises on evidence 
provided legal scholars with a formalized set of rules for courtroom proceedings. By 1800, 
early evidence manuals like Leonard MacNally’s The Rules of Evidence on Pleas of the Crown 
routinely cited Mansfield’s ruling in the Duchess’s trial as evidence that medical practitioners 
had no claims to confidentiality in the courtroom.63 Frequently mentioned in legal treatises, 
the legal implications of this brief conversation were greatly amplified over the next few 
decades. In his 1793 treatise, A Digest of the Law of Actions and Trials at Nisi Prius Isaac 
Espinasse stated, 
And this privilege of not being compellable to divulge secrets professionally 
disclosed to them, is confined to attorneys and counsel only, and does not extend 
to persons of other professions: For where on the trial of the Duchess of Kingston, 
Sir Caesar Hawkins the surgeon was called to speak to some matters wherein he 
had been employed by the Duchess, and objected to speak to them, he was ordered 
by the court, they holding that he had no such privilege.64 
 
Here Espinasse espoused the broadest possible interpretation of the precedent—the 
unsuccessful attempt of a surgeon to secure privileged communications meant that, apart 
from lawyers, no professionals could claim privilege. These examples indicate that by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, Mansfield’s brief response to Caesar Hawkins had been 
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transformed from a discussion of a specific practitioner’s social standing into a binding 
precedent that limited privileged communications to lawyers alone. 
At the same time, many of the issues that had been central to the original 
conversation gradually disappeared from view. By referring to Hawkins with the honorable 
title, “Sir,” these legal scholars downplayed the notions of gentlemanly honor that had been 
central to the brief exchange between Mansfield and Hawkins. In the courtroom, Caesar 
Hawkins—not yet a Baronet—was viewed as a surgeon, meaning Hawkins occupied a much 
less honorable position than the lords who filled the courtroom. In the historical records of 
the trial, however, Hawkins’s knighthood would likely have placed his honor beyond 
reproach. This subtle change in the historical record of the trial allowed the conversation to 
be given new meanings. Without codes of honor as a powerful subtext, the conversation 
could easily be recast as an attempt by Hawkins to gain new privileges for an entire 
profession. Under this interpretation, Hawkins was not denied privilege because of his social 
standing, but because the medical profession could not successfully articulate its need for 
privileged communications. 
In 1776, neither Mansfield nor Hawkins could have predicted that their brief 
conversation would have such a lasting impact. Over time, their words have been removed 
from their historical context and ascribed with new meanings; the notions of gentlemanly 
honor that were central to the case of have been replaced with more modern notions of 
medical ethics. This ability to be recast around contemporary debates has helped ensure the 
trial’s historical legacy. Some legal scholars have recently begun to reexamine the use of the 
Duchess’s trial as legal precedent, arguing that its use in modern law is based upon a 
misinterpretation of Hawkins and Mansfield’s arguments during the trial.65 While these 
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scholars’ assertion that neither was speaking to medical confidentiality in the modern sense is 
correct, the common law precedent established by this brief aside was a product of the 
unique historical circumstances surrounding the Duchess’s trial. In Britain, this legal 
precedent has long proven a difficult obstacle to overcome, and there remains no formalized 
physician-patient privilege.66 In the United States, legal interpretations of the Duchess’s trial 
have relegated battles over medical confidentiality to the state level, where many states have 
enacted statutes to codify physician-patient privilege. Even today, the Duchess of Kingston’s 
case continues to shape the contested boundaries between medicine and the law 
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CHAPTER III: CODIFICATION AND THE ORIGINS OF PHYSICIAN- 
PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
 
No person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be allowed to disclose 
any information which he may have acquired in attending to any patient, in a 
professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to 
prescribe as a physician, or do any act for him, as a surgeon. 
 
Revised Statutes of New York, 1828 
 
 
Through the first two decades of the nineteenth century, no common law 
jurisdiction recognized physician-patient privilege. Like their British counterparts, American 
courts followed the precedent established in the Duchess of Kingston’s trial with regard to 
physician-patient privilege. Mansfield’s ruling was widely regarded as “an enduring 
precedent.”1 The Connecticut Supreme Court, for example, twice ruled that privileged 
communications were granted to attorneys and attorneys alone.2 But in 1828, as part of a 
sweeping revision of the state’s legal code, the New York legislature enacted a statute that 
barred doctors and surgeons from revealing their patients’ secrets in court. With this 
addition to the state’s laws, New York became the first jurisdiction to extend medical 
confidentiality into the courtroom—thereby initiating a spread of privilege statutes that 
would continue throughout the rest of the nineteenth century. By 1905, thirty different states 
or territories had followed New York’s example and incorporated similar statutes into their 
own newly revised legal codes.3 
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Somewhat surprisingly, however, the spread of privilege statutes went largely 
unnoticed in the medical journals and medical textbooks of the day—unnoticed even in 
treatises on medical jurisprudence. Likewise, legal scholars took little note of these new laws, 
and, until the latter half of the nineteenth century, physician-patient privilege was, in fact, 
seldom exercised in the courtroom. If privilege remained an arcane and seemingly 
inconsequential legal doctrine even after New York and other states recognized it, why, then, 
did New York adopt physician-patient privilege in the first place? And why did state after 
state follow New York’s lead, adopting similar statutes throughout the mid-nineteenth 
century? 
Until 1828, medical witnesses in the United States were, in theory, governed by the 
precedent established in the Duchess of Kingston’s trial for bigamy. The matter was seldom 
considered in American courtrooms, however, and the few instances in which medical 
confidentiality was invoked in the courtroom demonstrated that American courts were often 
unable to reach a consensus on the issue. In Sherman v. Sherman, a 1793 divorce case, a doctor 
was forced to testify despite his objection that “all he could testify came to his knowledge in 
confidence.” Legal scholars have cited this case as proof that the precedent established in the 
Duchess of Kingston’s trial “would probably have been acknowledged as a common law 
principle in every American court.”4 Other sources suggest, however, that some courts were 
willing to grant physicians privileged communications. The Medical Society of the State of 
New York’s System of Ethics claimed that, in 1800, the Pennsylvania courts barred the 
disclosure of medical secrets in the courtroom on the grounds that these communications 
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were analogous to privileged communications between priest and penitent.5 And yet none of 
these references appeared in nineteenth-century evidence manuals or became lasting 
precedents.6 
Instead, American legal scholars continued to look to England, where only a few 
judicial decisions addressed the topic of physician-patient privilege. Wilson v. Rastall, the first 
and most frequently cited of these British decisions, was adjudicated in 1792. A bribery suit 
brought before the King’s Bench, the case featured no medical testimony. Yet in the court’s 
decision, Justice Buller, a protégé of Lord Mansfield, delivered a brief aside that reiterated 
the precedent established by his late mentor: 
There are cases to which it is much to be lamented that the law of privilege is not 
extended; those in which medical persons are obliged to disclose the information 
which they acquire by attending in their professional characters. This point was 
very much considered in the Duchess of Kingston’s case, where Sir C. Hawkins, 
who had attended the Duchess as a medical person made the objection himself, but 
was overruled, and compelled to give evidence against the prisoner.7 
 
Part of a lengthy monologue on attorney-client privilege, these few lines were the first to 
invoke Mansfield’s ruling in a court of law, showing that, within a few decades of the 
Duchess’s trial, the historical meaning of the brief exchange between Mansfield and Hawkins 
had drastically changed. The conversation was no longer about gentlemanly honor. Instead, 
Buller’s speech articulated what has become the modern reading of the trial—that Mansfield 
denied Hawkins’s claims of physician-patient privilege, establishing a precedent for all 
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common law jurisdictions. In Buller’s brief description of the trial, the exchange between 
Hawkins and Mansfield was stripped of its historical context and imbued with new values. 
What was originally a minor aside in a very controversial case suddenly became “much 
considered” and was preserved one of the trial’s lasting legacies. Ironically, Buller’s lament 
that privileged communications ought to be extended to medical practitioners helped secure 
this new reading of the Duchess’s trial, reaffirming the notion that issues of privileged 
communications had been central to the Duchess’s case. Buller’s remarks were then cited, 
along with Mansfield’s ruling, in Rex v. Gibbons and Broad v. Pitt.8 
Nineteenth-century legal scholars typically cited these cases as a source of binding legal 
precedent that limited privileged communications to lawyers and lawyers alone.9 In 1804, 
Thomas Peake’s A Compendium on the Law of Evidence cited Mansfield to argue that “[the] rule 
of professional secrecy extends only to the case of facts stated to a legal practitioner, for the 
purpose of enabling him to conduct a cause; and therefore… the statement… of a patient to 
his physician [is] not within the protection of the law.” 10 Similarly, Samuel March Phillips’ A 
Treatise on the Laws of Evidence cited both Mansfield and Buller to show that “privilege extends 
to the three enumerated cases of council, solicitor, and attorney, but it is confined to those 
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cases alone.”11 In this way, evidence manuals lifted brief asides from justices Mansfield and 
Buller and transformed them into enduring legal precedents.12 
In the decades following the American Revolution, New York, like the rest of the 
union, struggled with questions of how to adapt British common law to the realities of the 
new republic. Some questions challenged the fundamental principles of American society— 
how would property relationships designed to function within a feudal, mercantilist society 
need to be reworked to function in an increasingly democratic and capitalist nation?13 Others 
were more practical. New York’s constitution specified that all British statute law as well as 
all relevant common law decisions would remain in effect. The state’s constitution carved 
out an exception, however, for all laws and decisions deemed “repugnant to the 
constitution.” These were to be “abrogated and rejected.” Which laws and decisions were to 
be enforced and which were to be tossed out remained largely unanswered into the early 
nineteenth century.14 
These enduring questions were further complicated by the New York’s rapid growth. 
 
Between 1800 and 1820, the state’s population tripled. New York City emerged as the 
nation’s preeminent commercial center after the Erie Canal opened in 1825. The canal also 
facilitated rapid growth in the state’s interior. In boomtowns like Rochester and Buffalo and 
throughout the surrounding countryside, an emergent middle class seized opportunities to 
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improve their social and economic status. Populated by new immigrants and Yankee 
migrants from New England, the region became known as the “burned-over-district” for the 
numerous religious revivals that swept over it. This combination of religious zeal and 
economic prosperity made the region fertile ground for various reform movements. Some 
looked outwards, advocating sweeping changes—the abolition of slavery, women’s 
suffrage— in the hopes of producing a more just society. Others isolated themselves from 
the outside world, striving for “perfection” within the enclosed confines of utopian 
communities.15 
Likewise, the New York legislature worked at a furious pace to regulate the state’s 
booming economy—in one legislative term, for example, the state passed some three- 
hundred forty-three new laws. One cumulative effect of all of this legislation, however, was 
to create a sprawling, often-contradictory body of laws. By the 1820s, the New York statutes 
were catalogued in nineteen different, privately published volumes, some of which 
approached one thousand pages. At the same time, an additional thirty volumes recorded 
relevant common law decisions and another seven volumes on chancery law were in 
circulation.16 For lawyers and legislators faced with sorting through this morass of obscure 
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and often-contradictory laws, it could be difficult to determine which statutes and which 
rulings applied to specific cases. 
In order to bring clarity to the New York law, the state legislature commissioned 
three separate revisions of the state code.17 Each round of revisions only added more 
uncertainty, however, and in 1821 the New York legislature called a convention to 
completely rewrite the state constitution. Gathering in Albany, delegates to the convention 
trimmed away sections of the state’s code that were outdated or, in some cases, “repugnant” 
to the principles of American democracy. Still, the vague language of New York’s new 
constitution did little to resolve the complications surrounding the state’s law.18 And so, in 
1824, the state legislature commissioned a three-man committee to “alter the phraseology” 
of the state’s legal codes and increase the legibility of the state’s statutory law.19 The 
legislature asked attorneys Benjamin Butler and Erasmus Root, as well as the prominent legal 
scholar James Kent, to examine the state’s laws. Root and Butler accepted, but Kent 
declined. In his place, the legislature appointed John Duer, one of New York’s foremost 
private attorneys.20 
While the state legislature commissioned multiple revisions of New York’s statutory 
code, a small cadre of lawyers began to call for more drastic reforms. To these reformers, the 
problems facing New York were emblematic of larger, structural problems with the 
common law system. Inspired by the British legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham as well as the 
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French Code Napoleon, these reformers believed that codification, the process of collecting 
and restructuring the law into singular legal code, offered a means to eschew the mysteries of 
a common law system based on tradition and precedent in favor of a simpler, more 
accessible legal code.21 Codifiers argued that the common law was too complicated for a 
fledgling democracy as, in many cases, Americans did not have the knowledge necessary to 
represent their interests in court. Moreover, the common law, with its reliance on arcane 
precedents and traditions, added numerous unnecessary steps to the judicial process, making 
the legal system both slow and expensive. The only solution to these problems, codifiers 
argued, was to replace the entire common law system with a new set of codes and statutes.22 
Codification also offered the promise of Americanizing a legal system still tied to 
traditions and legal precedents established in Great Britain. To William Sampson—a New 
York attorney, an Irish-Catholic refugee, and one of the most vocal advocates of 
codification—the common law was a “pagan idol” imposed by British tyrants. Americans, 
Sampson argued, “should have… laws suited to [their] condition and high destinies.” With 
codified laws, the United Sates would “no longer [be] forced into the degrading paths of 
Norman subtleties, nor [be forced] to copy from the models of Saxon barbarity, but taught 
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to resolve every argument into principles of natural reason, universal justice, and present 
convenience.”23 In this way, codification tapped into a growing democratic sentiment in the 
1820s, offering a utopian overhaul of the American legal system. Through codification, 
Sampson and others argued, the law would “advance with a free and unimpeded step 
towards perfection... [It would] be separated from the rubbish and decay of time and 
stripped of the parasitical growths that darken and disfigure it.”24 If the proclamations of the 
most ardent reformers are to be believed, codification was, as one legal scholar put it, 
nothing short of “a democratic movement for access to justice—for reforming the legal 
system so that laypersons could not only understand, but operate the machinery of law.”25 
These reformers found powerful allies within the New York government. Governor 
DeWitt Clinton quickly emerged outspoken advocate of codification. In 1825, he 
successfully lobbied to expand the ongoing revisions of the New York legal code. Clinton 
empowered the revisory committee to consolidate laws relating to the same subject, to 
expunge expired or outdated legislation from the state code, and to suggest new laws to the 
 
23 William Sampson, “Showing the Origin, Progress, Antiquities, Curiosities, and the Nature of the Common 
Law,” Anniversary Discourse Before the Historical Society of New York (Dec. 6, 1823) quoted in Norman W. 
Spaulding, “The Luxury of the Law: The Codification Movement and the Right to Counsel,” Fordham Law 
Review 73:3 (2004), pp. 983-996, at 986. 
 
24 Ibid. 
 
25 Spaulding, “The Luxury of the Law,” 985. This view was first championed by Charles Warren in A History of 
the American Bar (Boston, 1911), 508-532. Warren’s thesis found numerous champions throughout the twentieth 
century, including Roscoe Pound who argued that this period represented a “formative era of American Law.” 
Other scholars, such as Robert Gordon have more recently challenged this thesis, however, arguing that 
codification often failed to achieve the lofty goals set by Sampson and other reformers. Gordon highlights the 
fact that, while codifiers made up a vocal subset of the bar in New York and elsewhere, there remained a larger 
contingent of moderate and conservative lawyers who were either indifferent to or outright opposed to 
codification. To Gordon, the American legal profession, “a notoriously conservative profession” steeped in 
common law tradition, was never going to fully adopt codification in the early nineteenth century. Robert W. 
Gordon, “The American Codification Movement,” Vanderbilt Law Review 36 (1983), pp. 431-458, quote at p. 
433. Others have shifted the focus on the codification movement toward later developments, most notably the 
advocacy of New York attorney David Dudley Field. See, for example, Friedman, A History of American Law, 
391-411; or Kellen Funk, “Equity Without Chancery: The Fusion of Law and Equity in the Field Code of Civil 
Procedure, New York 1846-76,” The Journal of Legal History 36:2 (2015), 152-191. 
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state legislature. By entrusting the committee with these unprecedented powers, Governor 
Clinton sought nothing short of a complete overhaul of New York’s legal system—Clinton 
boldly asserted to the assembled legislature that he hoped to create “[a new] complete code 
founded on the salutary principles of the common law, adopted to the interests of commerce 
and the useful arts, the state of society and the nature of our government, and embracing 
those improvements which are enjoined by enlightened experience.” Governor Clinton 
hoped codification would “free [state] laws from uncertainty, elevate a liberal and honorable 
[legal] profession, and utterly destroy judicial legislation, which is fundamentally at war with 
the genius of republican government.”26 
Not everyone on the committee shared Governor Clinton’s lofty ambitions. 
 
Uncomfortable with the new powers entrusted to the committee, Erasmus Root resigned. 
His replacement, Supreme Court reporter Henry Wheaton served for a year before he too 
resigned. To fill the seat opened by these resignations, the state legislature turned to John C. 
Spencer, a promising young New York lawyer who had previously served in both congress 
and the state legislature. A longtime friend of Dewitt Clinton, Spencer shared the governor’s 
unwavering belief in codification. Spencer’s views on the subject were likely shaped in part 
by his father, Ambrose Spencer, who had long served as a judge in a New York Supreme 
Court and was “well known for his efforts to construct what might be called an American 
common law on the basis of state court rulings.” Throughout his legal career, Ambrose 
Spencer “often overrode English precedents in favor of what seemed to him to be 
commonsensical decisions appropriate to the circumstances of the new republic.”27 
 
26 Charles Z., Lincoln, ed. Message from the Governors, Comprising Executive Communications to the Legislature… 11 
vols. (Albany, 1909), II:90, quoted in Cook, The American Codification Movement, 138. 
 
27 Mohr, Doctors and the Law, 80. 
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A tireless worker, John Spencer quickly took control of the committee where he put 
his political connections to use, drafting numerous laws and working tirelessly to secure their 
passage through the state legislature.28 Seizing this unique opportunity, the revisers used the 
“liberal application” of their powers to completely rewrite the New York Statutory Code. 
The committee compiled all of the states’ disparate statutes into a single volume, which was, 
in turn, split into five categories: the first dealt with issues of “internal administration and 
civil polity of the state;” the second contained “substantive laws relating to property 
domestic relations and private rights;” the third covered “the state’s judicial machinery and 
civil procedure;” the fourth outlined the New York’s criminal law statutes; and the fifth 
included “all public laws of a local and miscellaneous character.” These statutes were 
delivered “in simple and concise declaratory statements” and each category was presented 
individually to the state legislature.29 The new Revised Statutes made numerous substantive 
changes to New York’s laws, reforming the state’s electoral process, making early abortion 
illegal, and radically reshaping the state’s property and inheritance laws. In general, New 
York’s legal profession greeted this project with enthusiasm. While the legislature balked at a 
few specific provisions, the majority of the Revised Statutes were accepted with little 
controversy.30 In the category pertaining to criminal law, the revisers included a new statute: 
No person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be allowed to 
disclose any information [in court] which he may have acquired in attending to any 
patient, in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable 
him to prescribe as a physician, or do any act for him, as a surgeon.31 
 
 
28 Ibid., 79; Cook, The American Codification Movement, 140-150. 
 
29 Cook, The American Codification Movement, 133. 
 
30 Ibid., 142-143. The organization of the Revised Statutes was based on the organization of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries. 
 
31 Revised Statutes of the State of New York (Albany, 1828), 409. 
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The law was met with little objection from the state legislature, which quickly enacted the 
statute. 
Without a transcript of the debate on the legislature floor, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether the lawmakers understood the historical significance of this specific statute.32 
Historians and legal scholars have advanced several theories to account for this 
unprecedented legislation. Some hypothesized that the revisers were influenced by British 
legal scholarship; others suggested that prominent New York physicians managed to 
successfully push for adoption of the statute.33 Yet, as one historian writes, “the exact 
circumstances of the introduction of this statute are not known.”34 Any attempt to uncover 
these circumstances must begin with an examination of the revisers’ published notes. 
The revisers were well aware that their new law regarding physician-patient privilege 
challenged accepted legal precedents. As with all of their potentially controversial provisions, 
the committee kept careful notes, justifying their actions in case of potential opposition 
within the legislature. In their notes, the revisers provided the legislature with a lengthy 
argument in favor of the new statute. They began by citing Wilson v. Rastall, stating, “[Justice] 
 
 
 
32 Mohr, Doctors and the Law, 79; Cook, The American Codification Movement, 140-150. Unfortunately, most 
legislative records from the New York were destroyed in a 1911 fire. 
 
33 Clinton DeWitt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 
1958), 15. DeWitt would go on to hypothesize, “admittedly the revisers were influenced to some extent by the 
comment of Mr. Justice Buller in Wilson v. Rastall. It seems likely, too that a compelling, if not paramount 
consideration was the desire to give the medical profession the same protection which the legal profession 
enjoyed.” In Contesting Medical Confidentiality, the most thorough historical examination of the debate 
surrounding medical confidentiality in the United States, Andreas-Holger Maehle echoed DeWitt, stating, “the 
exact circumstances of the introduction of this statute are not known… Justice Buller’s statement in the case of 
Wilson v. Rastall and a wish to grant the medical profession the same privilege as the legal profession in keeping 
communications with clients confidential seem to have been relevant.” Maehle added a second hypothesis 
stating, “the position of the Medical Society of the State of New York probably played a role here” (11-12). 
Likewise, Wigmore had little to say on the origins of the New York statute, merely stating, that “in New York 
in 1828 came a statutory innovation, establishing a privilege.” Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence 1st ed., v. 4, 3347- 
3348. 
 
34 Maehle, Contesting Medical Confidentiality, 11-12. 
48  
Buller (to whom no one will attribute a disposition to relax the rules of evidence) said it was 
‘much to be lamented’ that [medical communications were] not privileged.” The statute was 
modeled upon attorney-client privilege and passed alongside a companion statute that also 
privileged to communications between priest and penitent. Yet the revisers saw the need to 
privilege medical communications as more pressing than the need to privilege 
communications between attorney and client: 
The ground on which communications to counsel are privileged, is the supposed 
necessity of the full knowledge of the facts, to advise correctly, and to prepare for the 
proper defense or prosecution of a suit. But surely the necessity of consulting a 
medical adviser, when life itself may be in jeopardy, is still stronger. And unless such 
consultations are privileged, men will be incidentally punished by being obliged to 
suffer the consequences of injuries without relief from the medical art, and without 
conviction of any offence. 
 
Moreover, the revisers feared that physicians, if torn between conflicting obligations, 
would choose to protect their patients in any event, disobeying the courts in the process: 
Besides, in such cases, during the struggle between legal duty on the one hand, and 
professional honor on the other, the latter, aided by a strong sense of the injustice and 
inhumanity of the rule, will, in most cases, furnish a temptation to the perversion or 
concealment of truth, too strong for human resistance. 
 
Given the support of prominent legal scholars and physicians’ desire to protect their 
patients, the revisers urged the state legislature to adopt the privilege immediately. The 
revisers concluded, “In every view that can be taken of the policy, justice or humanity of 
the rule, as it exists, its relaxation seems highly expedient.” They also suggested that the 
proposed law was “so guarded that it can not be abused by applying it to cases not 
intended to be privileged.”35 
Still, the Reviser’s Notes do not completely illuminate the reasons a few New York 
lawyers suddenly felt the need to entrust doctors with unprecedented legal privileges. One 
 
35 Commissioners on Revision of the Statutes of New York (Albany, 1836), III, 737. 
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possibility is that a small group of influential New York physicians managed to convince the 
revisers to enact a statutory guarantee of physician-patient privilege. Five years before the 
New York State Legislature enacted the United States’ first medical confidentiality law, the 
Medical Society of the State of New York (MSSNY) had openly called for physician-patient 
privilege in its System of Ethics. Comparing physicians to Catholic priests, the System of Ethics 
suggested that physicians were obliged to maintain patient confidences even in a court of 
law. Written by several prominent physicians, this document may very well have informed 
the committee’s decision to enact physician-patient privilege.36 
Moreover, the revisers sought the council of the MSSNY’s president, Theodoric 
Romeyn Beck, for guidance on the revised code’s application to medical policy. Beck, an 
Albany physician, was already recognized as the nation’s foremost scholar of medical 
jurisprudence, and as one of Albany’s most prominent citizens, he was also well acquainted 
with the members of the revising committee, especially John C. Spencer. Beck and Spencer 
had both attended Union College, graduating one year apart. Each was a close friend of 
Governor Clinton. Historian James Mohr has demonstrated that Beck worked closely with 
the revisers—none of whom were experts on medical issues—to revise New York’s medical 
laws.37 Though much of the communication between Beck and the revisers was likely 
conducted in private, excerpts from Beck’s personal correspondence reveal the extent to 
which Beck was involved in the process of revision: 
Albany, Sept. 11, 1828 
 
I have prepared various Sections against medical malpractice according to your 
 
 
36 Medical Society of the State of New York, System of Ethics (New York, 1823); Baker, Before Bioethics, 112-123. 
This document would prove influential in the history of American medical ethics and will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
 
37 Mohr, Doctors and the Law, 78-83. 
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Suggestions, particularly the improper use of instruments, capital operations in 
surgery, selling poisons &c. which when examined by Mr. Butler I will have edited and 
sent to you. In the mean while I want you to prepare the public and particularly the 
Legislature, by communications in the different newspapers, by extracts from 
approved writers on such subjects, and by such other means as occur to you, for a 
favorable examination and discussion upon our provisions. I have neither the time nor 
ability to do it. 
 
Yours very respectfully, 
J. C. Spencer 
 
 
To Mohr, this “letter makes clear the fact that Beck was given a reasonably free hand to try 
to insinuate into the proposed legal code any medically related provisions he wanted.”38 At 
the same time, Spencer entrusted his friend and colleague to curry the favor of state 
legislators, suggesting that Beck was actively involved in nearly every phase of the process. 
Furthermore, the law itself as well as the justification presented in the Revisers’ Notes 
expounded upon many of the themes present throughout Beck’s work. And Mohr makes a 
compelling argument that Beck was responsible for another new section of the code, a 
section that criminalized the performance of early term abortions. But was he also 
responsible for inserting the statute guaranteeing physician-patient privilege into the revised 
code? 
 
A closer examination of Beck’s publications provides no evidence physician-patient 
 
privilege, unlike early abortion, was an issue that concerned him. The initial 1823 edition of 
Elements of Medical Jurisprudence, Beck’s seminal work, featured little discussion of the duties 
facing medical witnesses. In 1828, Beck addressed the Medical Society of the State of New 
York on the subject of medical testimony in the courtroom, but again did not mention 
 
 
38 Ibid., 81. A small collection of Beck’s correspondence is preserved at the New York Public Library. While 
this letter is all that remains linking Beck to the revision process, it is safe to assume, given the responsibilities 
given to Beck here, that Beck played an active role in the process. 
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privileged communications.39 Thus, while Beck might have been involved, he never publicly 
advocated in favor of physician-patient privilege before the law was passed. Moreover, in 
later editions of Elements of Medical Jurisprudence, Beck did mention the precedent established 
in the Duchess of Kingston’s trial, but failed to mention New York’s medical confidentiality 
law.40 
Beck’s silence on the subject of medical privilege makes it impossible to argue that 
the first law extending medical confidentiality into the courtroom was the work of the 
medical profession. This was not a simple oversight on Beck’s part, but rather, paradigmatic 
of the field of medical jurisprudence as a whole. No surviving student notebooks on medical 
jurisprudence from the early nineteenth century “contained instruction about how 
information being conveyed to the students was supposed to be presented in actual courts of 
law.”41 Likewise, Beck’s silence also rules out the possibility that the MSSNY successfully 
lobbied for the inclusion of physician-patient privilege in the Revised Statutes. If the society 
was responsible for this legislation, then surely Beck, as the MSSNY’s president and 
foremost expert on medico-legal issues, would have known about the new law. 
Instead, the Revisers’ Notes suggest that the New York statue was prompted by 
nineteenth-century legal scholarship. The language in the revisers’ notes echoed the language 
of earlier court cases and legal manuals rather than medical texts. The revisers specifically 
referred to physicians’ “professional honor”—language lifted from the Duchess of 
Kingston’s trial for bigamy. Likewise, the reviser’s cited Justice Buller’s aside in Wilson v. 
 
 
39 Theodric Romeyn Beck, Elements of Medical Jurisprudence (Albany, 1823); Theodric Romeyn Beck, “Annual 
Address Delivered before the Medical Society of the State of New York, February 6, 1828,” Transactions of the 
Medical Society of the State of New York (Albany, 1828). 
 
40 Theodric Romeyn Beck and John B. Beck, Elements of Medical Jurisprudence 5th ed., vol. 2 (Albany, 1835), 661. 
 
41 Mohr, Doctors and the Law, 94. 
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Rastall and the legal scholar Samuel March Phillips. They did not cite any physicians or 
medical experts. Likewise, the revisers justified their changes to the New York code, by 
comparing physician-patient privilege to attorney-client privilege, not priest-penitent 
privilege as the MSSNY had done. Moreover, while much of the legislation proposed by 
Beck was placed in the medical section of the code, New York’s privilege statute was 
included in the state’s evidentiary code, a topic on which neither Beck nor the MSSNY were 
likely to have been consulted. 
Furthermore, the revisers would have had their own reasons to take issue with the 
common law position on physician-patient privilege. To the proponents of codification, 
judicial decisions like Lord Mansfield’s ruling on physician-patient privilege were symptoms 
of two of the major problems plaguing the judicial system. First, as unelected officials, judges 
were afforded too much power to interpret and enforce the laws. Second, the common law, 
which depended upon the interpretation of legal precedent, was virtually incomprehensible 
to laymen. Replacing this arcane legal doctrine with a precise and proscriptive law would 
have solved each of these dilemmas. In their efforts to compress New York law into one 
coherent volume, the revisers often replaced the language of early statues with text pulled 
from “judicial exposition” and “professional criticism” where they believed it made the law 
more coherent.42 Given the reasoning offered in the Reviser’s Notes, it is likely that the 
revisers, influenced by the frequent recording of Justice Buller’s lamentation in Wilson v. 
Rastall in nineteenth-century evidence manuals, simply believed physician-patient privilege to 
be an uncontroversial and commonsensical correction of a trivial legal matter.43 
 
42 Cook, The American Codification Movement, 148. 
 
43 In this respect, American codifiers differed markedly from their intellectual forebears in Britain. Bentham 
was vehemently opposed to evidentiary privileges. For Bentham and his influence on the law of privilege see 
Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: Evidentiary Privileges, 176-191. Beyond the Revisers’ Notes the codifiers left behind 
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Whatever the motivations of the New York revisers, their statute quickly influenced 
other states to follow suit.44 Missouri passed a law guaranteeing physician-patient privilege in 
1835. Mississippi enacted a statute the following year.45 By 1840, both Arkansas and 
Wisconsin had enacted statutes. Significantly, each of these states—like New York—passed 
their statutes guaranteeing physician-patient privilege as part of larger processes of 
codification, often using New York as an example. 
For the most part, these laws echoed the language of New York’s statutory 
provision. In Missouri, the legal code stated that no physician “shall be required or allowed 
to disclose” patients’ confidences. Though the states’ revisers added the word required to the 
statute, this minor alteration did little to change the effect or intent of the law.46 Mississippi 
 
 
 
 
 
little writing on the subject of physician-patient privilege. However, William Sampson successfully made the 
case for a priest-penitent privilege in court before then-New-York-City-Mayor DeWitt Clinton in 1813. William 
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44 Again, Maehle, Clinton, and Wigmore have provided the most thorough accounts of this phenomena, but 
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Contesting Medical Confidentiality, 11-15; Clinton, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient, 15-18; and 
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adopt physician-patient privilege. Frederick J. Stimson, “Privileged Communications to Physicians,” 
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45 The Mississippi Statute offers an excellent example of the challenges in tracing the origins and 
transformation of some of these early statutes. The law appears in the state’s Revised Statutes of the State of 
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46 The Revised Statutes of the State of Missouri, Revised and Digested by the Eighth General Assembly…With the Constitutions 
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adopted the New York statute word-for-word. Other states made minor alterations. 
Moreover, the revisers of later codes often had connections to New York’s legal 
establishment. The revised codes of both Michigan and, later, Arizona, for example, were 
both written by William Thompson Howell, an attorney who had practiced in New York.47 
Elsewhere physician-patient privilege was 
proposed, but not enacted. In the 1830s, the 
Massachusetts State Legislature debated a 
 
 
Table 1: Physician-Patient Privilege 
(through 1850) 
privilege statute identical to New York’s 1828 
law as part of a larger codification movement. 
When attempts to codify Massachusetts law 
stalled, however, the proposed privilege statute 
was scrapped and quickly forgotten.48 
Only Wisconsin and Arkansas made 
changes that affected the potential applications 
of the privilege in court. Each of these states replaced the New York statutory prohibition 
on disclosing patients’ secrets with a weaker provision that merely prevented doctors from 
being compelled to reveal their patients’ secrets. For example, the Wisconsin statute read: 
No Person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be compelled to 
disclose any information which he may have acquired in attending any patient in a 
professional capacity and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe 
for such patient as a physician or do any act for him as a surgeon.49 
 
 
47 Alfred Lucking, “Privileged Communications to Physicians,” Physician and Surgeon: A Professional Medical Journal 
20 (Detroit and Ann Arbor: 1898), 493-496; John S. Goff, “William T. Howell and the Howell Code of 
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49 The Revised Statutes of the State of Wisconsin… to which are Prefixed the Declaration of Independence and the Constitutions 
of the United States and the State of Wisconsin (Southport, WI: 1849), 526. 
State/Territory Date Enacted 
New York 1828 
Missouri 1835 
Mississippi 1836 
Arkansas 1838 
Wisconsin 1839 
Michigan 1846 
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Legal scholars have attributed this change in language to the authors’ desire to limit the 
power of the privilege.50 In time, doctors would come to embrace these statutes as their 
language left decisions about the admissibility of medical secrets open to the interpretation 
of physicians. The Wisconsin statute would later serve as model as physicians lobbied for 
new privilege laws in the late nineteenth century.51 
In the 1840s, further legal developments in New York facilitated the spread of 
physician-patient privilege. The state adopted a new constitution in 1846. One of provisions 
of this new constitution called for the “appointment of three commissioners to revise, 
reform, simplify and abridge the rules and practice, pleadings, form and proceedings of the 
courts of record of this state.”52 Like earlier codification movements, the newly appointed 
revising committee sparked controversy in the state’s legal establishment. Horrified by the 
expansive powers entrusted in the committee, several commissioners resigned before 
completing their task. When the dust had settled, David Dudley Field, a young New York 
attorney who would quickly rise to prominence as America’s foremost proponent of 
codification, headed the committee.53 
Like Spencer two decades earlier, Field was committed to simplifying and improving 
New York’s legal system. He took issue with the lack of uniformity in the ways cases were 
brought and pleaded before the state’s courts, arguing that the state’s myriad common law 
precedents should be replaced with a uniform and easily accessible code of procedure. In 
 
 
50 John B. Sanbourn, “Physician’s Privilege in Wisconsin” Wisconsin Law Review 1 (1922), 141-146. 
 
51 See, for example, Horatio Wood’s proposal for Pennsylvania statute “Editorial: Professional Secrets and the 
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52 Laws of the State of New York (1848), c. 379. Quoted in Friedman, A History of American Law, 293. 
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1848, Field and his colleagues presented the New York State Legislature with a revised Code 
of Civil Procedure. Modeled upon the French civil code, Field’s Code of Civil Procedure 
took issue with the complexity and confusions of the common law as well as the jargon and 
Latin that underpinned nineteenth-century legal procedure. He posited, for example, that the 
new Code of Civil Procedure should replace “habeas corpus” with a “writ of deliverance 
from prison.” Even more than the revisions of the 1820s, the Field code, as one legal 
historian wrote, was “a colossal affront to the common-law tradition.”54 While the state 
legislature rejected some of Field’s most radical proposals, the bulk of Field’s Code was 
accepted into law in 1848.55 
Field’s Code did not change New York’s medical confidentiality law. The 1848 
revisions did, however, spark a new wave of codification that brought similar statutes to still 
more jurisdictions, especially in the western United States. Compared to the older eastern 
states, the American west featured a young, progressive bar, greater exposure to civil law, 
and less rigidly established common law traditions—characteristics that made these states 
especially receptive to codification. California adopted Field’s Code in 1851, adopting 
physician-patient privilege in the process. Other western states followed California’s lead 
with identical statutes. In the following decades, Iowa, Minnesota, Indiana, Ohio, 
Washington Territory, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Kansas all adopted the code. By the turn of 
the century the Dakotas, Idaho, Arizona, Montana, Wyoming, North Carolina, South 
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Carolina, Utah, Colorado, Oklahoma, and New Mexico had all adopted Field’s Code of Civil 
Procedure.56 
Some of these jurisdictions, like Missouri and Wisconsin had already adopted 
physician-patient privilege. In those states, the existing statutes were incorporated into the 
new Code of Civil Procedure. In many more jurisdictions, however, physician-patient 
privilege was adopted as part of Field’s Code. Among others, California, Kansas, and Indiana 
adopted physician-patient privilege in this manner. At the same time, however, numerous 
states rejected the Field’s controversial code altogether. Much of the eastern seaboard 
remained what one legal scholar termed, “common law states.” Rejecting codification, these 
“older states, particularly of English origin, [stuck] to the common law, and never 
attempt[ed] to define it, rarely even to improve it by statute.” These states remained bound 
to the precedent established in the Duchess of Kingston’s trial for bigamy.57 
The middle of the nineteenth century brought more legislation on physician-patient 
privilege than any time before or since. Between 1828 and 1870, seventeen states or 
territories enacted statutory guarantees of medical confidentiality. While all of these statutes 
have been amended and changed numerous times since the nineteenth century, these early 
statutes form the basis for modern physician-patient privilege. With the exception of 
Mississippi, none of these statutes was ever repealed. Instead, the effects of these early 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 Ibid.; Mildred Coe and Lewis W. Morse, “Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field 
Code,” Cornell Law Review 27:2 (February 1942), 238-245. For more on the similarities and differences between 
various codification movements, see Kellen Funk’s online project, kellenfunk.org, which features the most 
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Figure 1: Field Code of Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
statutes continue to shape the intersections between medicine and the law today. By and 
large, privilege is observed where it was adopted in the nineteenth century and is not 
observed in the few Southern and New England states that did not adopt it. Moreover, by 
adopting privilege via statute, these laws had the effect of cementing the absence of privilege 
in federal courts which remain to the present time still tied to the common law precedent. 
A thorough review of these early statutes reveals that physician-patient privilege first 
emerged as an inadvertent byproduct of numerous codification movements. Though there 
were small variations between individual statutes, by and large, all of these laws shared a 
common language that had been inherited from earlier legal scholarship. More importantly, 
each statute was enacted as part of a larger scheme of codification. Physician-patient 
privilege appeared in jurisdictions where codification was most popular and remained absent 
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Figure 2: Privilege in the Nineteenth 
Century 
 
 
 
 
where codification failed to take hold. By the latter half of the century, the dividing line that 
would characterize later debates over physician-patient privilege had been set. Western 
States, most of which embraced Field’s Code of Civil Procedure, almost all guaranteed 
medical confidentiality in the courtroom. Eastern States, on the other hand, remained 
reluctant to enact physician-patient privilege. 
And yet, many of these developments went unnoticed in their time. Throughout 
much of this period, both doctors and lawyers viewed the privilege as a legal issue and, as 
such, it was often overshadowed by other legal developments. For legal scholars, 
codification carried so many pressing implications that physician-patient privilege seemed 
trivial by comparison. At the same time, doctors—seldom trained in how to carry 
themselves in the courtroom—often failed to notice slight changes in states’ evidentiary 
codes. Nevertheless, medical developments gradually led a small cadre of physicians to 
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embrace physician-patient privilege. In time, these doctors would recast the privilege not as a 
legal issue but rather as an issue of medical professionalization and, in doing so, they would 
bring physician-patient privilege into the public eye. 
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CHAPTER IV: EARLY PRIVILEGE CASES 
 
A medical attendant is ordinarily without privilege even as to the communications 
confidentially made to him by his patient. In the United States, however, statutes, in 
several jurisdictions, have been passed conferring this immunity, which statutes 
virtually prohibit physicians from disclosing information the derive professionally 
from their relations to their patient. 
 
Francis Wharton, A Commentary on the Law of Evidence in Civil Issues, 1877 
 
 
When Jane Elizabeth Johnson filed for divorce on Saturday June 16th, 1832, she 
expected the proceedings to move quickly even though, at the time, New York’s divorce 
laws were among the most rigid in the nation. Adultery was the only grounds upon which 
the courts would dissolve a marriage and, in some cases, even that was not enough. Shown 
any signs of condonation—if the aggrieved spouse had briefly forgiven or merely failed to 
leave their unfaithful partner— the courts were unlikely to grant a divorce.1 Still, the case 
against her husband, Enos, was strong. 
The couple had married seven years earlier. Shortly after their nuptials, Jane, a native 
of England, emigrated with her new husband to New York City, where Enos’ father ran a 
thriving grocery business. Despite the family’s affluence, Jane found life in New York lonely 
and difficult. Enos proved to be a terrible companion, berating and insulting his wife at 
every turn. When Jane fell ill, he was nowhere to be found. A regular at some of New York’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 On the law regarding divorce, see: Lawrence M. Friedman, “Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical 
Perspective,” Oregon Law Review 63 (1984), 649-670; Henrik Hartog, Man and Wife in America: A History 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women, Marriage, and 
Property in Nineteenth-Century New York (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); and Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: 
A History of Marriage and the Nation (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2000), esp. 47-55. 
According to the presiding judge in Jane Johnson’s case, “A voluntary cohabitation of a wife with her husband 
with full knowledge of an act of adultery committed by him, is legal evidence of condonation or a forgiveness 
of the offence, and bars suit for divorce.” Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Wend. 637 (1835). 
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seedier establishments, Enos was frequently unfaithful. He twice contracted venereal disease 
as a result of his affairs.2 
In 1832, in front of the New York Chancery Court, Jane’s lawyers laid out the case 
against Enos.3 They called numerous witnesses who recounted the “opprobrious epithets 
and insulting language” he directed toward his wife. Another witness placed Enos in the 
third-tier seats of a local theater—a known hub for prostitution. Enos’ physician testified 
that Enos had come to him seeking treatment for venereal disease and “that [Enos] Johnson 
acknowledged to him [that] he had contracted the disease in adulterous intercourse.” Finally, 
Jane took the stand. She corroborated the testimony of each witness and stated that she and 
Enos “had not lived together as man and wife” for two years. Unsurprisingly, the court ruled 
in Jane’s favor, dissolving her marriage to Enos and enabling her to return to family and 
friends in Manchester.4 
Jane’s victory was fleeting, however, as Enos immediately appealed the Court’s 
decision. A second trial was booked for 1834. Again, the case came before the New York 
Chancery Court. This time, Enos’ attorneys took aim at the evidence presented in the first 
trial. They argued that, based on New York’s 1828 law barring medical testimony from the 
courtroom, the testimony of Enos’ physician should never have been accepted as evidence. 
Furthermore, Enos’ attorneys, while admitting to some infidelities on the part of their client, 
 
 
2 John Littell, Family Records or Genealogies of the First Settlers of the Passaic Valley (And Vicinity) above Chatham (1852), 
192; England, Cheshire, Marriage Bonds and Allegations, 1606-1900, database, FamilySearch 
(https://familysearch.org/ark:/61903/1:1:F1SN-F5Y : 8 December 2014), Enos Ward Johnson, 09 Aug 1825; 
citing, Cheshire Record Office, Chester; FHL microfilm. 
 
3 The New York Court of Chancery was the state’s top court of equity and one of the preeminent courts in the 
Early Republic. The Court of Chancery was abolished in 1846 and its jurisdiction was passed to the New York 
Supreme Court. 
 
4 Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Edw.Ch. 439 (1832); Johnson v. Johnson, 4 Paige 460 (1834); and Johnson v. Johnson, 
14 Wend. 637 (1835). 
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pointed out that Jane had briefly continued living with Enos after these affairs took place. 
Thus, they argued, Jane’s actions constituted a condonation of Enos’ various sins and, 
therefore, no divorce should be granted. While the same court had ruled in Jane’s favor two 
years earlier, the Chancery Court, now ignoring the testimony of Enos’ physician, sided with 
Enos, rejecting Jane’s petition for a divorce. Jane and her lawyers then appealed to the New 
York Court for the Correction of Errors, the highest court in the state.5 And so, the 
following year, the New York courts were asked again to weigh the implications of the 
state’s law privileging communications between physician and patient.6 
Throughout this process, it became apparent that few people had any idea how to 
interpret this new statute. In the first trial, when Enos’ physician, Dr. Smith, was asked 
whether his patient suffered from venereal disease, he had initially declined to answer. Court 
records show, however, that either the presiding judge or Jane’s lawyers told Dr. Smith that 
he must divulge this information. Neither Enos’ lawyers nor Dr. Smith objected, and the 
physician then testified that Enos had come to him to receive treatment for venereal disease 
and that he had contracted this disease as the result of his numerous infidelities. Enos’ 
council first invoked privileged communications in the appeals process. This had been 
enough to sway the presiding judges—the same justices who had earlier compelled Dr. 
Smith to testify—that this evidence should be thrown out.7 
 
 
 
 
5 The Court for the Correction of Errors was the appeals court for both the New York Chancery Court and the 
Court for the Correction of Errors. Proceedings were held in front of the New York Senate. State Senators 
served as justices along with wither members of the State Supreme Court or the New York Chancellor, 
depending on the jurisdiction from which the appeal was made. Like the New York Court of Chancery, the 
Court for the Correction of Errors was abolished in 1846. 
 
6 Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Edw.Ch. 439 (1832); Johnson v. Johnson, 4 Paige 460 (1834); and Johnson v. Johnson, 
14 Wend. 637 (1835). 
 
7 Ibid. 
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Since the outcome of the case hung so clearly on Dr. Smith’s testimony, the court 
devoted much of the proceedings to a discussion of the various implications of New York’s 
privilege statute. The most pressing question was whether the privilege belonged to the 
“witness” (Dr. Smith) or to the “party” (Enos). To answer this query, the presiding justices 
compared physician-patient to privilege attorney-client privilege. Ultimately, based on 
established governing the use of attorney-client privilege, they ruled that “privilege is 
undoubtedly that of the party and not of the witness.” Because of this, the justices reasoned, 
physician-patient privilege was not applicable in this situation. In the first trial Dr. Smith 
resisted questioning that might reveal embarrassing and incriminating information about his 
client. According to the New York Courts, he had no right to do so, as only Enos and his 
lawyers could invoke the privilege. Because Enos’ lawyers did not object to this line of 
questioning, Dr. Smith’s testimony was accepted on the court record. With this evidence, the 
courts finally ruled in Jane’s favor. Three and a half years after she first petitioned for 
divorce, she was finally rid of Enos.8 
Johnson v. Johnson was the first case to test New York’s privilege statute, and it marked 
the beginning of a decades-long process through which the courts came to define physician- 
patient privilege. When the New York legislature adopted physician-patient privilege in 1828, 
it gave little instruction as to how this new statute was to be interpreted. The law itself was 
comprised of a single sentence and the vague language of the statute left many important 
questions to be decided by the courts: What did “duly authorized” mean? Who could be 
considered a physician or a surgeon? In an era when licenses were not required to practice 
medicine, were unlicensed practitioners covered by the privilege? What about dentists, 
 
 
8 Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Wend. 637 (1835). 
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nurses, or chiropractors? What communications were to be considered of “a professional 
character” or “necessary”? Who could invoke the privilege? Was the privilege absolute? Or 
could it be waived? Did the privilege continue to protect the deceased?9 
With little instruction from the legislature, each of these questions would have to be 
decided by the courts. In this respect, New York was hardly exceptional. Statutes adopted in 
other jurisdictions—many of them based on the New York law—were similarly vague. Over 
the course of the nineteenth century, state courts would rule on each of these issues, 
establishing a series of precedents that would make the privilege into a formidable protection 
of patients’ confidences. This process was incredibly slow, however, as physician-patient 
privilege was seldom invoked in the courtroom. Until the mid-1870s, only a few privilege 
cases were brought before the New York courts. In each, the proceedings were characterized 
by lingering uncertainty as few people—whether doctors, lawyers, or judges—had any idea 
how the state’s new statute regulating medical testimony was to be implemented in the 
courtroom. 
Hewit v. Prime, the second privilege case to appear before the New York courts 
was first adjudicated in 1835. Hewitt, the plaintiff in the suit, alleged that his neighbor, 
Prime, had seduced and impregnated his underage daughter. Hewit’s daughter was 
called before the Essex circuit court to testify, recounting how “she was persuaded by 
the defendant to swear the child upon some person other than himself, on this 
promising that if she would do so, he would marry her, and that she accordingly made 
oath before a justice… that the child with which she was pregnant was begotten by 
 
9 The law read: “No person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be allowed to disclose any 
information which he may have acquired in attending to any patient, in a professional character, and which 
information was necessary to enable him to prescribe as a physician, or do any act for him, as a surgeon.” 
Revised Statutes of the State of New York, 409. 
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Benjamin Flanagan, a fictitious person.” Due to a technicality, however—Hewit’s 
daughter’s testimony was improperly taken by the court—this testimony carried little 
weight in the courtroom.10 
And so, the trial’s verdict hinged upon the testimony of a second witness. A practicing 
physician testified that that Prime had “repeatedly applied to him for drugs to produce an 
abortion, and upon one of those occasions told him that the female gotten with child was 
the plaintiff’s daughter.” The defendant’s counsel “objected to the physician’s testifying to 
any thing that was said by the defendant when applying for medical advice, whether such 
advice was for himself or another; but the objection was overruled.” With this information 
taken into the record, the court ruled in Hewit’s favor, finding Prime guilty of seduction. 
Prime appealed to the New York Supreme Court, arguing that this information had been 
taken in error. Like the Essex circuit judge, however, the Supreme Court justices were 
unsympathetic, stating: 
The witness, (the physician,) I think, was not privileged. It is very doubtful whether 
the communication made to him by the defendant can be considered as consulting 
him professionally, within the meaning of the statute; and it is certain that the 
information given was not essential to enable him to prescribe for the patient if the 
daughter of the plaintiff should be considered a patient in respect to the 
transaction. 
 
With this, the New York Supreme Court upheld Prime’s conviction. While little is known of 
individual actors is the cases, the trial was preserved in numerous evidence manuals where it 
was frequently cited to show that that physician-patient privilege did not protect patients 
seeking abortions nor did it protect physicians who provided these services in violation of 
state law.11 
 
10 Hewit v. Prime, 21 Wend. 79 (1839). 
 
11 Ibid. The case appeared in numerous nineteenth-century legal treatises. See, for example, Francis Wharton, A 
Commentary on the Law of Evidence in Civil Issues vol.1 (Philadelphia, 1877), 582. 
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At the time, the very idea of criminal abortion remained a relative novelty. Anti- 
abortion laws evolved rapidly over the course of the nineteenth century and, in many ways, 
mirrored the evolution of physician-patient privilege. At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, the legal status of abortion was governed by common law precedent, which 
recognized fetal life at quickening— “the first perception of fetal movement by the pregnant 
woman herself.” This “generally occurred near the midpoint of gestation, late in the fourth 
or early in the fifth month… Before quickening, actions that had the effect of terminating 
what turned out to have been an early pregnancy were not considered criminal under the 
common law in effect in England and the United States in 1800.” “After quickening, the 
expulsion and destruction of a fetus without due cause was considered a crime, because the 
fetus itself had manifested some semblance of a separate existence: the ability to move. The 
crime was quantitively different from the destruction of a human being, however, and 
punished less harshly.”12 
Between 1821 and 1841, numerous states enacted statutes that “made certain kinds 
of abortions explicit statute offenses rather than leaving the common law to deal with 
them.”13 In the same 1828 code revisions that first introduced physician-patient privilege, for 
example, the New York Legislature also added two statutes that effectively criminalized 
abortion after quickening. These laws were intended primarily as a means of protecting 
women from what was then a dangerous medical procedure. Under the New York Criminal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Mohr, Abortion in America, 3-4. 
 
13 Ibid., 20. 
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Code, anyone who performed an abortion—but not the woman herself—could be held 
criminally liable and charged with second-degree manslaughter.14 
These early laws were markedly different from later anti-abortion laws. In the mid- 
nineteenth century, numerous technological advances—including the invention of the 
stethoscope, which allowed the detection of the fetal heartbeat, as well as microscopic 
studies that revealed important stages in embryonic development—led many to question the 
use of quickening as a basis for determining fetal life. From the 1850s onwards, regular 
physicians, led by the Boston gynecologist and obstetrician Horatio Storer, campaigned to 
outlaw all abortions from the point of conception onward. These doctors were motivated in 
part growing moral sentiment that increasingly equated late-term abortion with infanticide. 
At the same time, however, “the regular physicians’ crusade for stricter abortion laws opened 
up the possibility for them to regain authority in questions of social policy—something they 
had lost with the repeal of medical licensing laws earlier in the century.”15 To this end, the 
anti-abortion campaign was wildly successful. “Between 1860 and 1880… at least 40 anti- 
abortion statutes of various kinds were placed upon state and territorial lawbooks… 
[including] over 30 in the years from 1866 through 1877 alone.”16 
As abortion laws became stricter over the course of the nineteenth century, the need 
for medical evidence in abortion trials increasingly came into conflict with physicians’ ethical 
 
14 Ibid., 26-32. 
 
15 Maehle, Contesting Medical Confidentiality, 66. See also, Mohr, Abortion in America, 147-225. On the repeal of 
medical licensing laws see Owen Whooley, Knowledge in the Time of Cholera: The Struggle over American Medicine in the 
Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 59-72; Starr, The Social Transformation of American 
Medicine, 58-59; Rothstein, American Physicians in the Nineteenth Century, 63-84; James C. Mohr, Licensed to Practice: 
The Supreme Court Defines the American Medical Profession (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 
9-21. 
 
16 Mohr, Abortion in America, 200. On abortion policy, see also Leslie Reagan, When Abortion Was a Crime: 
Women, Medicine, and Law in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Baker, Before 
Bioethics, 169-173. 
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duty to maintain confidentiality as well as the growing number of privilege statutes in effect 
throughout the United States. In time, the courts came to reexamine the precedent 
established in Hewit v. Prime. In the 1886 trial of an alleged abortionist, the New York courts 
ruled the testimony of the accused physician inadmissible because this evidence “tended to 
convict [his patient] too of crime or to cast discredit and disgrace upon her,” contradicting 
the precedent established in Hewit v. Prime.17 
These issues came to the fore again three years later in 1889 when a New York man 
was charged with manslaughter. The accused, a married man, had been having an affair and, 
when his lover became pregnant, he assisted her in procuring an abortion. In the procedure, 
the woman “introduced a catheter with a wire in her womb, and after she had introduced it 
far enough to hurt her, [the man] blew in it.” When the woman fainted, the man called upon 
a local physician who rushed to the scene but was unable to save her. The man confessed to 
the physician what had happened, even admitting that he had conducted the procedure once 
before. In the courtroom, the physician recounted all he had seen and heard. With this 
damning testimony, the defendant was found guilty. On appeal, however, the New York 
Supreme court ruled “that the statute [privileging communications between physician and 
patient], both in its letter and spirit protects the confidence thus reposed in the physician and 
forbids him to betray it.” With this, the physician’s testimony was thrown out and the 
conviction was overturned.18 
For practicing physicians, the lingering uncertainty surrounding physician-patient 
privilege and its applicability in abortion trials was a major point of concern. On one hand, 
 
17 People v. Murphy, 101 N.Y. 126 (1886). For more on privilege in nineteenth-century abortion cases, see 
Holger-Maehle, Contesting Medical Confidentiality, 68-74. 
 
18 People v. Brower, 53 Hun. 217 (1889); Holger-Maehle, Contesting Medical Confidentiality, 70. 
70  
privilege had the potential to derail criminal abortion proceedings by denying the courts 
essential medical testimony. In 1888, at the annual meeting of the American Medical 
Association, “Iowa physician H.C. Markham argued that as long as there were no changes in 
the professional relies regarding the giving of evidence in abortion cases, little success could 
be expected in their prosecution.” To Markham, “the penalties aimed at abortionists had 
hardly any deterrent effect. Rather, the ‘party inciting the act’ (that is, the pregnant woman or 
her husband or partner) had to be made to ‘fear the consequences.’ Medical Evidence in 
court about the abortion was therefore crucial.”19 
On the other hand, the numerous variations between differing privilege statutes 
along lingering uncertainties as to how these statutes left many physicians in a precarious 
situation. In 1899, when a Massachusetts physician was charged for “being an accessory after 
the fact to a criminal abortion,” the Journal of the American Medical Association railed against the 
different laws in various jurisdictions: “In some localities it may come to be perilous to treat 
[abortion] cases as they occur without reporting all suspicious appearing facts to the 
authorities, while a mile or two different such revelation would bring liability to heavy 
damages if not a criminal prosecution. The Massachusetts physician referred to may or may 
not have been cognizant of a criminal act and guilty of concealing it, but in New York he 
could not have done otherwise than keep this knowledge to himself.”20 
By the turn of the century, the uncertainty surrounding physician-patient privilege in 
abortion trials had become a rallying issue for many physicians, who began to campaign for 
 
 
 
19 Maehle, Contesting Medical Confidentiality, 68-69; H.C. Markham, “Foeticide and Its Prevention,” Journal of the 
American Medical Association 9 (1888), 806. 
 
20 “Medical Confidences,” Journal of the American Medical Association 33 (1899), 1431 quoted in Holger-Maehle, 
Contesting Medical Confidentiality, 71. 
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new statutes and uniform laws between jurisdictions.21 In the meantime, physicians 
developed numerous, often contradictory, strategies to deal with the uncertainties they faced. 
One medico-legal scholar suggested that “doctors should state abortion cases hypothetically 
without disclosing the interested parties to an appropriate law officer to obtain specific 
advice. If the advice was that they were not bound to disclose, they should keep silent. They 
should not approach a legal officer for advice, however, if they were not prepared to give 
evidence when told that they had a duty to disclose.”22 Another author recommended that 
physicians “obey the injunction of the Hippocratic oath” and refuse to testify in any 
abortion cases unless a judge ordered them to do so.23 As these abortion cases illustrate, the 
law regarding privilege communications remained unsettled throughout much of the 
nineteenth century despite the rapid spread of new statutes that barred medical testimony 
from the courtroom. 
Adding to the confusion was a dearth of information on physician-patient privilege. 
 
Neither the new statutes nor the influential precedents established in eighteenth century 
Britain appeared in the legal literature of the day. The first American treatise on the law of 
evidence, Zephaniah Smith’s short 1810 tract, A Digest of the Laws of Evidence in Civil and 
Criminal Cases made no mention of the common law precedent established in the Duchess of 
Kingston’s trial.24 Later treatises published in the 1830s offered no mention of the New York 
 
 
 
 
 
21 Sturgis, “Correspondence: To the Philadelphia Medical Times,” 339. 
 
22 Holger-Maehle, Contesting Medical Confidentiality, 71. 
 
23 William C. Tait, “The Physician’s Obligation to Secrecy,” American Medicine 4 (1902), 267 quoted in Holger- 
Maehle, Contesting Medical Confidentiality, 71. 
 
24 Zephaniah Smith, A Digest of the Laws of Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases (Hartford, 1810). 
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statute nor of any of the other laws protecting medical confidentiality in the courtroom.25 
The fourth American edition of Samuel March Phillips’s A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, 
published in 1839 was the first to offer any mention of the New York statute, but this text 
did not mention any of the other laws on the books. By then, Missouri, Mississippi, 
Arkansas, and Wisconsin had also adopted similar legislation.26 None of these treatises cited 
any relevant case law. 
Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the most frequently cited text on the 
law of evidence was Simon Greenleaf’s landmark work, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence. First 
published in 1842, the text found frequent use as a courtroom reference as well as a law 
school textbook. The treatise was republished sixteen times over the next fifty years. Writing 
on its influence in 1896, one legal commentator remarked, “the professional approval of 
[this] work was [so] immediate and constant,” that “in the opinions of every Court for the 
last fifty years occur references to its sections; and even of the errors that are to be found in 
its pages, it may often be said that they have become law in many jurisdictions because they 
were put forth in these pages.”27 
An otherwise comprehensive work that covered a wide range of topics related to the 
law of evidence, including obscure common law precedents and minute developments in the 
statutory codes of each state, the text had little to say about physician-patient privilege. In 
the first edition of Greenleaf’s landmark treatise, the subject was covered in one brief 
 
 
25 See, for example: Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence 5th American ed., vol. 2 
(Philadelphia, 1834), 228-232. 
 
26 Samuel March Phillips, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 4th American Ed. (New York, 1839), 279-283. 
 
27 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 16th ed. vol. 1 (Boston, 1899), v-vi. New editions of A 
Treatise on the Law of Evidence were published in 1842, 1844, 1846, 1848, 1850, 1852, 1854, 1857, 1858, 1860, 
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sentence: “Neither is this protection [privileged communications] extended to medical 
persons in regard to information, which they have acquired confidentially by attending in 
their professional characters.” To this, Greenleaf added a brief note. He cited the Duchess 
of Kingston’s trial and several other British decisions; the text of the New York statute; 
Missouri’s 1835 statute; and the recently settled case, Johnson v. Johnson. Greenleaf did not 
mention the laws on the books in Wisconsin, Mississippi, or Arkansas. Nor did he mention 
the recent New York case, Hewit v. Prime, which would be frequently cited in late-nineteenth 
century cases.28 
Later editions of Greenleaf’s A Treatise on the Law of Evidence offered little more on 
the subject of physician-patient privilege. The second edition added a reference to the 1839 
case Hewit v. Prime. The third and fourth editions added no new information. The fifth 
edition, published in 1850, featured the first references to physician-patient privilege statutes 
in Wisconsin and Michigan—laws adopted in 1839 and 1846, respectively. Iowa’s statute was 
mentioned in the 1852 edition. The seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and 
thirteenth editions added no new text. Not until the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth 
editions—published in 1883, 1892, and 1899 respectively—did the book feature any 
substantive discussion of physician-patient privilege.29 
By the 1870s, physician-patient privilege began to be regularly referenced in legal 
treatises, but seldom discussed at length. By this point Francis Wharton had joined 
Greenleaf among the nation’s preeminent scholars of the law of evidence. Like Greenleaf, 
 
 
 
 
 
28 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 1st ed. vol. 1 (Boston, 1842), 283-284. 
 
29 Ibid. 
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however, Wharton’s magnum opus, A Commentary on the Law of Evidence in Civil Issues, offered 
only a cursory summary of the state of privileged communications in the United States: 
A medical attendant is ordinarily without privilege even as to the communications 
confidentially made to him by his patient. In the United States, however, statutes, in 
several jurisdictions, have been passed conferring this immunity, which statutes 
virtually prohibit physicians from disclosing information the derive professionally 
from their relations to their patient. The privilege of the statute may be waived by 
the patient. But it does not apply to testamentary inquiries; and in any view does 
not protect consultations for criminal purposes. Whether by the Roman common 
law, a physician is privileged as to matters confidentially imparted to him by a 
patient, has been much discussed; and the tendency is to assert the inviolability of 
such secrets. 
 
This section was appended with seven notes. The first cited the Duchess of Kingston’s 
trial along with two, more recent British decisions as proof that there was no physician- 
patient privilege under common law. This brief section constituted the only mention of 
physician-patient privilege in Wharton’s two-volume, 1,506-page study of American 
evidence law, indicating that the issue was hardly a major concern for the average 
practicing lawyer.30 
Given the lack of textual information on the subject, it is hardly surprising that 
physician-patient privilege was seldom invoked in the courtroom. Only three cases 
adjudicated before the 1870s—all occurring in New York—appear in any of these 
sources.31 Johnson v. Johnson was the first and most frequently cited of these decisions. 
Legal sources often referenced the Court for the Correction of Errors’ 1835 decision as 
evidence that privilege was intended to protect the patient and that only the patient, and 
not the physician, could invoke the privilege. Likewise, Hewit v. Prime was frequently 
 
30 Francis Wharton, A Commentary on the Law of Evidence in Civil Issues vol. 1 (Philadelphia, 1877), 581-582. 
 
31 Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Wend. 637 (1835); Hewit v. Prime, 21 Wend. 79 (1839); and People v. Stout, 3 Park. 
Cr. 670 (1858). Johnson v. Johnson and Hewit v. Prime were both frequently cited cases that established 
important and lasting precedents. People v. Stout, on the other hand, received only a brief reference in 
Wharton’s Commentary on the Law of Evidence in Civil Issues vol. 1., 581. 
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cited to give evidence that privilege could not be applied to abortion trials. Aside from 
these few cases, however, privilege remained a relatively inconsequential and seldom 
used legal doctrine in spite of the rapid spread of new statutes throughout the 
nineteenth century. 
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CHAPTER V: CONFIDENTIALITY AND MEDICAL ETHICS IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 
“…Secrecy and delicacy, when required by peculiar circumstances, should be strictly 
observed; and the familiar and confidential intercourse to which physicians are 
admitted in their professional visits, should be used with discretion, and with the 
most scrupulous regard to fidelity and honour. The obligation of secrecy extends 
beyond the period of professional services; —none of the privacies of personal and 
domestic life, no infirmity of disposition or flaw of character observed during 
professional attendance, should ever be divulged by him except when he is 
imperatively required to do so. The force and necessity of this obligation are indeed 
so great, that professional men have, under certain circumstances, been protected in 
their observance of secrecy by courts of justice.” 
 
AMA Code of Ethics, 1847 
 
 
In 1831, several doctors wrote to the American Journal of Medical Sciences asking, “are 
there certain questions which a medical man in a court of justice may refuse to answer?” It 
was a novel question—such issues were seldom discussed in the medico-legal literature of 
the day—and Isaac Hays, the journal’s editor, was at a loss as to how to answer this query. 
Hays examined a variety of different sources including records of the Duchess of Kingston’s 
trial for bigamy and Wilson v. Rastall and came to the conclusion that “that medical persons 
have no privilege whatsoever, not to disclose circumstances revealed to them professionally,” 
failing to note that, in New York, such communications were expressly barred by statute.1 
This makes it all the more surprising that a decade later Hays would go on to become 
one of the most vocal champions of physician-patient privilege. In the 1840s, Hays took the 
lead in the drafting of the American Medical Association (AMA)’s Code of Ethics—a 
document that championed physician-patient privilege as the logical extension of physicians’ 
duty to preserve confidentiality. Here, Hays wrote, “Secrecy and delicacy, when required by 
peculiar circumstances, should be strictly observed… The force and necessity of this 
 
1 “Medical Jurisprudence,” The American Journal of the Medical Sciences (May 1831), 523-524. This exchange was 
reprinted the following year in the Western Journal of the Physical and Medical Sciences (1832), 289-291. 
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obligation are indeed so great, that professional men have, under certain circumstances, been 
protected in their observance of secrecy by courts of justice.” This chapter examines the 
nineteenth-century developments in medical ethics that led to this important turning point in 
the history of medical confidentiality and physician-patient privilege. 
Hays was not alone in overlooking the early spread of physician-patient privilege. 
 
While codification brought physician-patient privilege to numerous states in the early 
nineteenth century, few scholars took note of the changes taking place. To the legal 
profession, physician-patient privilege was merely a minor consequence of a larger 
phenomenon. Lawyers and legal scholars were justifiably more concerned with the broad 
implications of codification than one specific piece of evidentiary law. At the same time, 
doctors, also preoccupied with matters of greater significance, often failed to take notice of 
this seemingly minor medico-legal development. 
For much of the early nineteenth century, the medical profession remained 
conspicuously weak—a result of widespread antimonopoly sentiment as well as legitimate 
frustrations with substandard medical care that was often harsh and painful.2 Faced with 
challenges from irregular practitioners, the weakening of medical licensing laws, and the 
erosion of American medical education, so called regular practitioners spent much of the 
mid-nineteenth century testing new methods to bolster the standing of their fledgling 
profession. These physicians founded numerous medical societies, lobbied for new licensing 
laws, and established rigorous ethical codes as means to discipline wayward practitioners and 
wrest control of the profession from their sectarian rivals.3 Gradually, medical societies such 
 
2 Rothstein, American Physicians in the 19th Century, 26-62; John Harley Warner, The Therapeutic Perspective: Medical 
Practice, Knowledge, and Identity in America, 1820-1885 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
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as the Medical Society of the State of New York (MSSNY) and the AMA began to see 
privileged communications as a powerful indicator of professional status. While the legal 
profession had led the push for physician-patient privilege during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, physicians would emerge as the most vocal advocates of physician- 
patient privilege during the last half of the century.4 
Just as physician-patient privilege found few practical uses in the early nineteenth 
century courtroom, the new laws enacted in the 1820s and 1830s remained conspicuously 
absent from the medical literature of the day. While legal treatises increasingly took note of 
the growing body of statute law, medico-legal texts offered little clarification of questions 
regarding privileged communications. Throughout this period, Theodric Romeyn Beck 
remained the preeminent authority on medico-legal subjects. Beck’s magnum opus, Elements 
of Medical Jurisprudence, first published in 1823, went through numerous editions, serving as 
both textbook and desktop reference for generations of American physicians. Considered by 
many to be the seminal medico-legal work of its time, the book compiled medico-legal 
writing into one comprehensive volume, featuring sections on disparate issues such as 
“Doubtful Sex,” “Infanticide,” or “Persons Found Dead.” In each, Beck offered practical 
advice to would-be medical witnesses, instructing them how to diagnose insanity or detect 
feigned illnesses. As a practical guide for physicians, Elements was revolutionary. Yet the first 
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edition featured little discussion of evidentiary procedure or the duties of medical witnesses.5 
This lack of interest in courtroom procedure was characteristic of the medico-legal 
field as a whole. Though Beck and other medico-legal scholars wrote profusely throughout 
the early nineteenth century, their scholarship focused primarily upon practical matters and 
the professional relations between doctors and lawyers and often neglected the medico-legal 
implications of the physician-patient relationship. For medico-legal scholars, the most 
pressing contemporary medico-legal issues included forensic toxicology and the diagnosis of 
insanity. Medico-legal journals were littered with countless articles that detailed new ways to 
detect poisons and numerous articles debating sometimes-conflicting definitions of insanity.6 
Likewise, medical schools offered little instruction on the duties of physicians in the 
courtroom. As historian James Mohr has found, “none of the surviving student notebooks 
from the first two decades of the nineteenth century contained instruction about how the 
information being conveyed to students was supposed to be presented in actual courts of 
law.”7 
Moreover, even when medico-legal texts did focus on medical testimony in the 
courtroom, they neglected to mention the growing body of statute law protecting medical 
confidentiality in the courtroom. Despite Beck’s role in the 1828 revision of New York’s 
legal code, Beck failed to mention the state’s new privilege statute in later editions of Elements 
of Medical Jurisprudence and in a speech before the Medical Society of the State of New York 
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on the subject of medical testimony in the courtroom.8 In fact, it was not until the mid-1840s 
that any medico-legal text even mentioned physician-patient privilege, and, until the 1860s, 
the vast majority of medico-legal treatises neglected to cover the subject.9 Given the lack of 
information on the subject, it is hardly surprising that physicians failed to take note of the 
earlies privilege statutes. 
Though the medical profession remained blind to the growing spread of physician- 
patient privilege throughout much of the early nineteenth century, this does not mean that 
doctors took matters of confidentiality lightly. Rather, during this period, physicians slowly 
came to embrace medical confidentiality as one of the foundational principles of medical 
ethics—itself an important piece of their larger efforts professionalize and reform American 
medicine. Physicians routinely swore oaths that they would maintain patients’ confidences at 
all costs and, throughout the nineteenth century, adopted numerous ethical codes that 
championed medical confidentiality as one the primary tenets of the physician-patient 
relationship. 
Physicians portrayed these oaths as part of a long-standing tradition that dated back 
millennia to the original Hippocratic oath. In truth, these links were quite tenuous. The 
modern history of physicians’ oaths began in earnest at the University of Edinburgh where, 
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from the early 1730s, every physician graduating from the University of Edinburgh Medical 
School swore: 
[I A.B. do solemnly declare that I will] practice physic cautiously, chastely, and 
honourably; and faithfully to procure all things conductive to the health of the 
bodies of the sick; and lastly, and never, without great cause to divulge anything 
that ought to be concealed, which may be seen or heard during professional 
attendance.10 
 
In the history of medical ethics, the Edinburgh Oath proved to be nothing short of 
revolutionary, especially for later American doctors. Before the Edinburgh Oath, graduating 
physicians had been forced to swear different oath, the Sponsio Academica, which mandated 
that physicians’ primary allegiances would always be to the crown and the church.11 Under 
this arrangement doctors would have had little reason and no justification to withhold 
medical secrets in a court of law. The Edinburgh Oath, on the other hand, asserted that 
doctors’ foremost duties were to their patients. With this shift came an implication that 
physicians’ duties to their patients could conflict with their obligations to the state and the 
courts.12 
This shift did not always bring immediate changes in medical practice. Doctors 
continued ethically suspect practices such as flyting, in which physicians would publish short 
treatises defaming rival practitioners and, in the process, often violate the confidences of 
their patients. Nevertheless, the Edinburgh Oath proved extremely influential in the United 
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States. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries there were very few American 
medical schools. The most prominent American physicians were often educated overseas— 
almost all of them in Edinburgh where, unlike Oxford and Cambridge, lectures were 
delivered in English. When American physicians founded their own medical schools, they 
often modeled these programs upon their experiences in Edinburgh. John Morgan and 
William Shippen modeled America’s first medical school, The College of Philadelphia (now 
the University of Pennsylvania) after the University of Edinburgh. Likewise, in 1767, Samuel 
Bard created an Edinburgh-style medical college at King’s College (Now Columbia).13 This 
meant that, by the early nineteenth century, the vast majority of college-educated American 
doctors would have all sworn some version of the Edinburgh Oath, vowing to maintain the 
confidences of their patients.14 
For the most part, these physicians took their commitments to medical confidentiality 
seriously. By the early nineteenth century, incidents of flyting were increasingly rare. Medical 
texts frequently attested to the importance of medical confidentiality. In a widely published 
essay, Benjamin Rush, the primary architect of the heroic medicine that dominated regular 
practice in the United States throughout much of the nineteenth century, argued that the 
physician-patient relationship “imposes an obligation of secrecy upon [the physician] and 
thus prevents his making public what he cannot avoid seeing or hearing accidentally in 
intercourse with the [patient’s] family.”15 Moreover, as the actions of Caesar Hawkins in the 
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Duchess of Kingston’s trial and Enos Johnson’s physician in Johnson v. Johnson indicate, 
doctors were acutely aware of the potential dangers—to honor, reputation, and business— 
that could arise out of any carelessly revealed secrets. Increasingly, well-educated doctors 
viewed medical confidentiality as one of the central tenets of the physician-patient 
relationship even if they did not know about specific statutes that extended this 
confidentiality into the courtroom. 
And yet, although some early nineteenth-century doctors argued vehemently in favor 
of medical confidentiality, there is little reason to believe that their position was 
representative of the medical profession as a whole. Esteemed physicians like Benjamin 
Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, would have had little in common with the 
average practitioner. While writings on medical ethics and confidentiality circulated amongst 
a small circle of physicians, the vast majority of practitioners would have had little exposure 
to these ideas. 
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, medical education was informal and 
poorly organized. Medical schools, especially outside of the New York and Philadelphia, 
were expensive and few. To earn a degree, medical students were required to attend two 
four-month terms, often in successive years. Depending upon the location and prestige of 
the school, medical students could expect to pay between $150 and $300 per term. In 
addition to these fees, students would need to furnish the costs of travel, room, and board. 
For those who could bear the costs, options were still sparse. In 1810, the United States 
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contained just six medical schools. With the exception of the University of Maryland, all 
were clustered in the Northeast. By 1830, the number of medical schools had grown to 
thirteen. All but three, however, were located in New York, Philadelphia, or New England. 
Students from outside the northeast would have to move to urban centers, far from home.16 
For many practitioners, such expenses and hassles were unnecessary. Throughout 
the early nineteenth century, most American physicians were field-trained, developing their 
skills through apprenticeships with established local physicians. The typical apprenticeship 
lasted three years. Fees were negotiated between physicians and apprentices but averaged 
$100 per year (including room and board). For many established physicians, apprentices 
served as a source of cheap labor. In addition to their studies, apprentices carried out 
numerous menial household chores. Likewise, with few pharmacists or apothecaries, the 
physician’s apprentice was frequently tasked with the gathering of necessary roots and herbs 
as well as the grinding and mixing of drugs. In lieu of a diploma, the mentor furnished the 
apprentice with a certificate upon completion of his apprenticeship.17 
Though numerous medical societies enacted provisions to control the quality of 
medical education, standards of education were erratic and, often, unenforceable. As medical 
schools proliferated in the early nineteenth century, the quality of these schools varied 
drastically. While some of the more prestigious medical schools maintained rigorous 
standards, others were merely diploma mills, churning out graduates regardless of their 
competency. Apprenticeships were even more difficult to regulate, as medical societies could 
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do little to disciple substandard or opportunistic educators. By leaving medical education to 
local, informal arrangements, this system created a diverse medical landscape in which 
therapeutic and ethical practices varied greatly from region to region.18 
At the same time, nineteenth-century doctors faced numerous challenges from 
outside the profession. Thompsonian botanists, hydropaths, and, later, homeopaths and 
eclectics, all purported to offer alternatives to regular medicine. Though regular physicians 
considered each of these sects to be quacks, regulars could cite little evidence to show that 
their treatments were more effective. Furthermore, in many places, especially the small 
towns and rural outposts of the west, the boundaries between doctors and other 
practitioners were often poorly defined. Midwives and other non-physician healers 
conducted many services that have since been controlled by the medical profession. 
Likewise, folk medicine, home remedies, and patent medicines proliferated throughout the 
first half of the nineteenth century. Until well into the nineteenth century, family members 
or lay healers carried much of the nation’s primary care within the household.19 Throughout 
much of the period, the medical profession remained mired in a series of intra-professional 
disputes that weakened the professional status of physicians throughout the country. Even if 
doctors had actively pursued physician-patient privilege, their appeals would have carried 
little weight. 
Nevertheless, nineteenth-century physicians found several means to improve the 
status of the medical profession. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, wealthy, well- 
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educated physicians increasingly formed medical societies in the nation’s urban centers. In 
1780, Boston physicians founded the Massachusetts Medical Society. Likewise, in 
Philadelphia, a small group of wealthy doctors founded the College of Physicians in 1787. 
New York had several short-lived medical societies in the late eighteenth century before 
New York City physicians created the Medical Society of the State of New York (MSSNY). 
All of these societies were exclusive organizations that limited membership to only the 
wealthiest and most prestigious physicians. To join Philadelphia’s College of Physicians, a 
doctor needed to be elected by the society’s current members. This was so rare that, between 
1787 and 1849, only 180 physicians were selected to join the exclusive organization. If a 
physician were elected to join the College of Physicians, he would then be expected to pay a 
membership fee of $26.66 and annual dues of $4—prices well out of reach for the average 
practitioner. The Massachusetts Medical Society was similarly exclusive. Its charter limited 
membership to seventy physicians, which effectively barred all but the most prestigious 
Boston physicians.20 
Initially, these societies largely eschewed ethical regulation. Because of their exclusive 
nature, members were assumed to be gentlemen of considerable honor. Instead, these 
organizations used other means to limit medical practice to a small and exclusive group of 
physicians. One of their favorite tools was the enactment of medical licensing laws. Between 
1780 and 1812, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Maryland, New York, and 
Rhode Island all granted licensing authority to state medical societies. Yet, for the most part, 
this legislation lacked any means of enforcement. State medical societies were allowed to 
issue licenses, but, with the exception of New York, no state mandated any punishment for 
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unlicensed practitioners. Moreover, these licensing laws proved short-lived. By the end of 
the 1830s, most had been repealed.21 
As the medical profession grew in the early nineteenth century, medical societies 
became more inclusive. From 1781 to 1801 the Massachusetts Medical Society admitted 95 
members. In 1803, when the organization lifted its membership cap, 55 new members were 
admitted. Similarly, the MSSNY reorganized in 1806 so that the society, which was once 
limited to New York City physicians, now served the broader County of New York. 
Moreover, while many exclusive societies like Philadelphia’s College of Physicians remained 
prestigious organizations open to only the medical elite, physicians founded larger state and 
county medical societies that professed represent greater portions of the medical profession. 
By 1800, most of the northeastern states had a statewide medical society. Forty years later, 
nearly every state in the union had its own medical society.22 
As medical societies became more inclusive, these organizations took it upon 
themselves to regulate doctors’ activities. In the early nineteenth century, physicians regularly 
complained that unscrupulous practitioners were undercutting their fees, limiting their ability 
to make an honest living. In an attempt to solve this problem, many medical societies 
imposed fee bills on their members that mandated the going rate for medical services, the 
charges for distance traveled, and as well as differing rates for rich and poor clients. Almost 
all regular medical societies instituted fee bills as a necessary condition for membership. 
These restrictions proved hard to enforce, however, as many fee bills only applied to 
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members of regular medical societies. In the face of widespread competition, physicians in 
urban areas and other regions with numerous irregular practitioners were often forced to 
disregard these restrictions altogether.23 
This led physicians to seek out other forms of regulation and to impose harsher 
sanctions upon the practitioners who violated the mandates of their local medical society. To 
do this, medical societies developed what were known as codes of medical police, which 
might be thought of as lists of rules that all members of the society were theoretically obliged 
to obey. Upon admission into a medical society, physicians typically swore an oath to abide 
by those rules and regulations. Societies often mandated that their members refrain from 
using secret nostrums or patent medicines. Most prohibited consultations with irregular 
practitioners. Codes of medical police relied upon a system of restorative justice to discipline 
wayward practitioners. Doctors who violated these codes were threatened with censure and, 
in extreme cases, expulsion from the medical society. If one member of a medical society 
believed that another had violated one of the society’s rules, the offending practitioner 
would be called before a disciplinary committee, which would mete out the necessary 
punishment. 24 
In 1808, the Boston branch of the Massachusetts Medical Society became the first 
American medical society to adopt a code of medical police. A decade later, “the 
Connecticut Medical Society published a concise version of the Boston Medical Police that was 
adopted by innumerable municipal, county, and state medical societies from Augusta, 
Georgia (1822) to Cincinnati, Ohio (1821) to Dover, New Hampshire (1849) and so on 
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down the alphabet. Until 1823, the only codes issued by American medical societies were 
Boston-style, or more commonly, Connecticut-style codes of medical police.”25 
The MSSNY was one of these societies. From 1808 to 1822, members of the medical 
society observed a code of medical police, which like other early codes of medical police, 
dealt solely with “physicians’ fees and their conduct toward each other,”—as distinguished 
from their conduct toward patients or the larger society around them. As the New York 
code evolved over time, the society’s bylaws were amended in response to various 
challenges. In time, however, MSSNY physicians gradually came to view their code of 
medical police as unenforceable. Like earlier fee bills, the code of medical police dealt only 
with relations between members of their own specific medical society and could not be used 
to discipline the professional behavior of non-members, much less the state’s numerous 
irregular practitioners. 
Consequently, when the MSSNY code was due to be revised in 1822, the appointed 
revisers, physicians John Steele and James Manley, convinced their peers that revising the 
code of police would not advance the society’s goals. They argued that the MSSNY needed a 
new approach altogether, and their fellow members agreed. Felix Pascalis, a New York City 
physician, joined Steele and Manley to form a committee that immediately began to draft a 
new code of ethics, rather than a revised code of unenforceable regulations. In 1823, Manley, 
Steele, and Pascalis presented System of Ethics to the MSSNY. The document was adopted 
with overwhelming support from the society.26 
System of Ethics marked an important turning point in the history of American medical 
 
 
 
 
25 Baker, Before Bioethics, 104. 
 
26 Baker, Before Bioethics, 112-113. 
90  
ethics. Whereas earlier codes of medical police had been focused upon the mundane realities 
of everyday practice— “consultations, inferences, fees, and quackery”—Manley, Pascalis, 
and Steele had more lofty ambitions. They added “three new sections notably absent from 
medical police: a section on the personal character of physicians, a section on the 
specifications of medical police/ethics in practice, and a section on forensic medical police 
dealing with the role of the physicians in the courts.”27 While the new document maintained 
many of the intra-professional restrictions of the society’s earlier code of medical police, 
System of Ethics incorporated numerous restrictions on physician-patient interactions that 
were notably absent from earlier codes of medical police.28 
Many of these new ideas—most notably the section on personal character and the 
section on medical ethics—were drawn from a careful study of eighteenth-century moral 
philosophy, especially the works of Thomas Percival. The committee found in Percival’s 
influential text Medical Ethics, the inspiration and justification for their radical expansion of 
their earlier code of medical police. To Percival, medical ethics constituted “a form of 
‘professional ethics’, which states a physician’s moral duties toward three other parties: 1) his 
patients, 2) his brethren, and 3) the public.” This was notably different from earlier codes of 
medical police, which had addressed, as historian Robert Baker phrased it, only “one item… 
a practitioner’s duties to his fellow practitioners.”29 
By addressing physicians' relationship to society at large, codes of ethics constituted a 
stronger means of influencing the medical profession as a whole. While adopted by 
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individual medical societies, codes of ethics purported to apply to all practitioners regardless 
of their affiliation with local or state medical societies. Nathaniel Davis, the future president 
of the American Medical Association summarized the difference between codes of medical 
police and codes of ethics as follows: “A Code of Ethics for our profession must partake… 
of the nature of a moral essay, developing principles or guidance equally applicable to all 
places and times, instead of a few simple rules applicable to the members of some particular 
society.”30 Unlike earlier modes of ethical policing, which pertained only to relations amongst 
medical practitioners, codes of ethics also aimed to control relations between physicians and 
patients—some codes of ethics even included mandates to patients as well as physicians. 
In adopting the first code of medical ethics, the MSSNY faithfully upheld the basic 
principles of Percival’s Medical Ethics. The committee did deviate from Percival’s text in 
several crucial ways, however, including in its treatment of medical confidentiality. In Medical 
Ethics, Percival had argued that doctors should be wary of “false tenderness or misguided 
conscience” and that no practitioner should let these errors lead him into “withholding any 
necessary proofs” in a court of justice. To Percival, when called into court, a physician was 
required “not to conceal any part of what he knows, whether interrogated particularly to that 
point or not.”31 On the other hand, the MSSNY’s new code explicitly mandated that 
physicians should maintain medical confidentiality at all times: 
A great reserve, and even secrecy respecting the deliberations of a consultation is 
indispensable. No communication is to be made to the patient or friends but by 
unanimous order and consent; because, whatever opinions are emitted, become 
subject to frequent alterations or interventions from mouth to mouth, and may 
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become a source of contradiction perhaps injurious to some of the physicians in 
attendance.32 
 
The authors argued that it was “a matter of justice, necessity and propriety that the business 
of a surgeon should always be considered of a confidential nature.” Moreover, System of 
Ethics suggested that physicians’ duties to their patients superseded their obligations to the 
law and that medical confidentiality should be observed in the courtroom: “Even secrecy in 
certain circumstances, as will be explained hereafter, is the privilege of the faculty, and 
inviolable even in a court of justice.” 33 
System of Ethics abandoned the language of earlier professional regulations by seeking 
to cast doctors as the benevolent protectors of their patients—and their secrets. In the 
section on “Forensic Medicine,” the authors likened the physician to a Catholic priest, 
“which admits of no disclosures except in cases of treason and murder.” Doctors were privy 
to a patient’s most intimate secrets “such as… the judgment and treatment of syphilitic and 
gonorrheal disease; the able or disabled state of a person, in limb or constitution; the fallacy 
of virginity and other circumstances.” Honorable physicians were bound to resist revealing 
any secret that might confer “a degree of shame.” Women’s secrets were especially in need 
of protection. Under the new System of Ethics, doctors were not allowed to disclose, “whether 
an apparent pregnancy can be real; the gestation and birth of a child; [or] its parentage, 
colour, and age.”34 
Published in New York several years before the state adopted its medical 
confidentiality statute, System of Ethics may have influenced Spencer and the other revisers to 
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incorporate physician-patient privilege into New York’s statutory code, a possibility 
discussed earlier.35 Regardless of whether the MSSNY’s System of Ethics influenced the 
revisers of the New York code, however, the text had a profound impact on the history of 
medical ethics in the United States. According to historian Robert Baker, “the MSSNY 
System of Ethics reasserts physicians’ oath-sworn duty to prioritize the welfare of the patient 
by obligating physicians to an absolute duty of confidentiality. Courts may probe for the 
physician’s opinion about infanticide, bastardy, paternity, virginity, sexually transmitted 
diseases, or malingering, but the physician’s duty to his patients, like a priest’s duty to protect 
the secrets of the confessional, overrides his obligation to testify on these issues before a 
court of law.”36 In these respects, the document served as an early model for later ethical 
codes, including the AMA Code of Ethics. 
As the condition of the medical profession continued to deteriorate even further in 
the 1830s and 1840s, doctors increasingly came to regard codes of medical ethics, like that of 
the MSSNY, as invaluable tools to secure the advancement of the medical profession. In the 
1830s numerous medical societies enacted similar ethical regulations of their own, many of 
which included provisions mandating medical confidentiality.37And at the local level, many 
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confessional, the society required doctors appearing as expert witness in court to remain silent about matters 
such as questionable pregnancy and paternity, venereal disease, alleged disabilities, virginity and other 
circumstances that were linked with ‘a degree of shame’ and ‘never mentioned but with an engagement to 
secrecy.’ The 1828 New York statute permitted physicians and surgeons to adhere to this code.” Maehle, 
Contesting Medical Confidentiality, 12. 
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regular physicians viewed these codes as unequivocal successes. Yet these codes were 
incapable of addressing many of the problems plaguing medicine on the national scale. 
Quacks and irregular practitioners thrived in the nation’s de-regulated medical marketplace, 
and medical education continued to decline as increased competition led medical schools to 
relax standards in attempts to gather a greater share of the available student fees. 
These developments greatly troubled regular physicians who saw their inability to 
control the medical profession as an existential threat. In May of 1845, delegates from 
medical societies across the country convened in New York City to address the problems 
facing medical education. While the convention debated several resolutions to reform 
medical education, the physicians in attendance could not agree on any single measure. 
As the convention stalled, Isaac Hays, a Philadelphia physician and the editor of the 
nationally prominent The American Journal of the Medical Sciences, voiced the novel suggestion 
that those assembled should “institute a National Medical Association… [to develop] a uniform 
and elevated standard of requirements for the degree of M.D., [that] should be adopted by 
all the Medical Schools… and [also standards for] a suitable preliminary education and [a 
national] code of Medical Ethics.”38 With this, the 250 delegates in attendance quickly moved 
beyond their stated goal of educational reform, committing themselves instead to sweeping 
reforms designed to reshape the entire medical profession.39 
The following year, physicians convened in Philadelphia to draft a constitution for 
the organization that would become the American Medical Association. Among the first 
 
 
 
38 American Medical Association, “Minutes of the Proceedings of the National Medical Association, Held in 
the City of New York, in May 1846” in Minutes of the Proceedings of the National Medical Association, Held in the City 
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orders of business was to draft a formal code of ethics to be followed by all AMA members. 
To this end, the organization commissioned a committee of several physicians including 
Isaac Hays and his fellow Philadelphian John Bell. The pair of Philadelphia physicians 
quickly took the lead in drafting a new code of ethics for the nascent medical society, which 
they “created… by supplementing… [an] edition of Percival’s Medical Ethics with material 
from various other codes.”40 The resulting document was split into three sections, each a 
“reformulation of Percival’s code of ethics as a formal social contract.”41 The first section 
dealt with “the duties of physicians to their patients, and of the obligations of patients to 
their physicians.” The second covered “the duties of physicians to each other, and to the 
profession at large.” The third and final section outlined “the duties of the profession to the 
public, and of the obligations of the public to the profession.”42 In each, Hays and Bell 
faithfully adapted Percival’s Medical Ethics—with its emphasis on gentlemanly honor— to the 
realities of American medical practice.43 One matter on which Bell and Hays diverged from 
Percival was on the subject of confidentiality. Whereas Percival believed physicians had an 
obligation to answer any and all questions asked of them in the courtroom, Hays, Bell, and 
 
 
 
 
40 Baker, Before Bioethics, 140. On the origins of the code, Hays stated: “On examining a great number of codes 
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their peers in the AMA believed that a doctor’s obligation to maintain confidentiality 
necessarily extended into the courtroom. 
Moreover, by the late 1840s, physicians were increasingly aware that some states’ 
statutory code forbade the disclosure of medical secrets. In the 1845 American edition of 
William A. Guy’s Principles of Medical Jurisprudence, a popular British medico-legal treatise, the 
volume’s editor Dr. Charles A. Lee called attention to these statutes, citing an exchange with 
James Kent, the immensely influential New York legal scholar who had been briefly involved 
in the codification movement that introduced New York’s 1828 statute: 
Union Square, Nov. 3d, 1843. 
 
Dear Sir, —The question you state to me can be satisfactorily answered so far as 
respects the law of this state. 
 
By the Revised Statutes, Vol. II. p.406, Sec. 73, “No person duly authorized to 
practice Physic or Surgery, shall be allowed to disclose any information which he 
may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character, and which 
information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a 
physician or to do any act for him as a surgeon. 
 
The protection is complete. The physician is not allowed to disclose such 
information, whether willing, or not willing. 
 
Yours respectfully, 
James Kent 
 
These passages marked the first time that any of these early statutes appeared in the 
medico-legal literature of the day.44 
Lee, however, was not content to merely recount the state of the law in New York. 
Rather, he issued a challenge to his peers in the medical profession: “We believe it to be the 
moral right, and the duty of medical men, to refuse to disclose, in a court of justice, secretes 
 
44 William Augustus Guy, Principles of Medical Jurisprudence: with so much or anatomy, physiology, pathology, and the 
practice of medicine and surgery as are essential to be known by lawyers, coroners, magistrates, officers of the army and navy, ect. 1st 
American ed. (New York, 1845), 16-17. Some copies of the book were also titled, Principles of Forensic Medicine. 
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intrusted to them in professional confidence, and we have always acted on such belief.” 
Speaking on behalf of his profession, Lee argued that this moral duty greatly exceeded any 
obligation to the courts might place upon them: “If physicians become the repositories of 
secrets, under the full conviction, on the part of society, of our moral and professional 
obligations to hold them sacred,—secrets which otherwise never would have been revealed,- 
-who can believe that there is an earthly power which ought to wring them from us, or 
which can, if we rightly understand out privileges and duty? If private confidence is thus to 
be broken upon every imaginary necessity, where is the end of the mischievous 
consequences that would arise, especially at this day, where every trial is published to the 
world through the medium of the public prints?” 45 
To Lee, the need for a medical privilege far outweighed the need for attorney-client 
privilege. "The Lawyer is shielded from the obligation of revealing the secrets of his client, 
on the ground that it is necessary he should be acquainted with the real facts in the case, for 
the purpose of conducting the defense, and because life and property are at stake. But we 
ask,” wrote Lee on behalf of physicians, “if character and reputation are not often of equal 
value, and whether either of the former could be enjoyed without the possession of the 
latter? So also it may be observed, that the patient communicates freely with his physician 
for the purpose of judgment; no circumstances whatever, will warrant their publication to 
the world.”46 
Instead of Percival, Lee grounded his defense of physician-patient privilege in the 
work of another eighteenth-century moralist, John Gregory, a long-time instructor at the 
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University of Edinburgh, who had taught numerous American physicians including 
Benjamin Rush and Samuel Bard. Unlike Percival, Gregory saw the need for medical secrecy 
as absolute, especially “where women are concerned.” “There are certain circumstances of 
health,” Gregory argued, “which, though in no respect connected with her reputation, every 
woman, from the natural delicacy of her sex, is anxious to conceal, and in some cases the 
concealment of these circumstances may be of consequence to her health, her interest and 
her happiness.”47 Lee concluded by citing the Hippocratic Oath, stating “It would not be 
amiss if the celebrated oath of Hippocrates were still administered to every medical graduate, 
on receiving his diploma.”48 
Isaac Hays and John Bell took Lee’s challenge to heart. The American Medical 
Association’s Code of Ethics echoed Lee’s and the MSSNY’s broad definition of medical 
confidentiality, stating: “The obligation of secrecy extends beyond the period of professional 
services;—none of the privacies of personal and domestic life, no infirmity of disposition or 
flaw of character observed during professional attendance, should ever be divulged by [the 
physician] except when he is imperatively required to do so.” To regular physicians, this was 
not simply a matter of self-policing. The authors of the code explicitly linked these ideals to 
the growing number of statutes that guaranteed confidentiality in the courtroom: “The force 
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sacred and secret within my own breast. If I faithfully observe this oath, may I thrive and prosper in my 
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and necessity of this obligation are indeed so great that professional men have, under certain 
circumstances, been protected in their observance of secrecy by courts of justice.”49 
On this and other points, the AMA Code of Ethics captured an emerging consensus 
among members of the regular medical profession. When Bell and Hays presented the 
document to their peers in Philadelphia, the Code was unanimously adopted by the AMA. 
This marked an important turning point in the history of American medical ethics. In the 
ensuing decades, the AMA Code of Ethics would become one of the defining statements of 
the regular medical profession. Regulars would use the Code as an invaluable tool to mark the 
differences between themselves and other irregular practitioners. For many, codified medical 
ethics served as one of the strongest arguments in favor of a regular monopoly over medical 
practice, partly because regular physicians were expected to follow strict rules and maintain 
an air of gentlemanly honor, while others did not. At the same time, the document was also a 
powerful statement of professional autonomy. In professing a standard set of rules and 
assuming control over the punishment of any violations of these rules, regular physicians 
staked a claim to the control and regulation of the medical profession—regular physicians 
would both set and enforce the rules to be followed by the entire medical profession. 
For those reasons, the code of ethics also marked a pivotal point in the history of 
physician-patient privilege. The formal recognition of physician-patient privilege by what 
would become the nation’s most powerful medical society was the culmination of a decades- 
long process in which physicians came to view privilege as both an essential part of the 
physician-patient relationship and a useful tool for advancing the status of the medical 
profession. In the ensuing decades, the same doctors that championed the AMA Code of 
Ethics would publicly advocate for the spread of physician-patient privilege. To these 
 
49 AMA, “Code of Ethics” (1847). 
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physicians, privilege was the logical extension of the AMA Code and its emphasis on 
gentlemanly honor. It was also a powerful signal that the ethics and values of the regular 
physicians carried beyond the medical profession, as it suggested that the physician-patient 
relationship could be more important than the fact-finding mission of the courts. 
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CHAPTER VI: PROFESSIONALIZATION AND PRIVILEGE 
 
Indiscretion, weakness, fear, sin, all seek the family physician as a father confessor. He 
holds the honor of the patient and the character and social standing of families in his 
hands. He knows what is unknown in the family itself. In every relation of human life 
the doctor holds, and holds sacred, the secret history of many families; and carries to 
the grave with him knowledge which would revolutionize the life of whole 
communities. 
 
David Cheever, “Privileged Medical Communications,” 1904 
 
 
On December 4, 1880, the Philadelphia Medical Times issued a call to arms. In 
Pennsylvania courtrooms, attorneys and priests were afforded the benefits of privileged 
communications, but doctors were not. To the journal’s editor, the well-respected 
Philadelphia physician Horatio C. Wood, this glaring omission was a matter of professional 
pride. “Is not the relation between physician and patient as delicate and as important as that 
between lawyer and client?” He asked, “Are not the revelations known to be necessary for 
the ills of the body as worthy of recognition of the law as those believed to be necessary for 
the cure of the ills of the soul?”1 
These were rhetorical questions. Wood took for granted that the Pennsylvania 
doctors who read his journal would share his sentiments. Throughout the mid-nineteenth 
century, physician-patient privilege had spread quietly throughout the West and Midwest. By 
1880, nineteen states or territories had enacted statutes guaranteeing medical confidentiality 
in the courtroom.2 Yet, aside from New York, much of the eastern United States remained 
bound by the common law precedent established in the Duchess of Kingston’s trial for 
 
1 “Editorial: The Secrets of the Consulting Room,” Philadelphia Medical Times and Register 11 (December 4, 1880): 
147. 
 
2 A list of statutes enacted before 1882 was compiled in Gartside v. The Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance 
Company, 76 Mo. 446 (1882). At the time, the states with privilege statutes were: (in the order in which statutes 
were adopted) New York, Missouri, Arkansas, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, California, Kansas, Nebraska, 
Dakota, Oregon, Arizona, Minnesota, Indiana, Nevada, Wyoming, Utah, Montana, and Idaho. Mississippi’s 
early privilege statute had disappeared from the state code by this point. 
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bigamy: doctors would not be granted privileged communications in the courtroom and 
could be forced to reveal their patients’ secrets. To Wood and many other physicians, the 
absence of physician-patient privilege was deeply troubling because it threatened to 
undermine doctors’ relationships with their patients and because it challenged their sense of 
professional honor. 
As physicians, especially those practicing in the Northeast, sought to bring their 
states’ laws into agreement with their own views on medical ethics, they continued practices 
that had long proven successful in other policy arenas—they lobbied legislators and courted 
legal scholars. At the same time, however, the lobbying efforts of Wood and his peers 
departed from their predecessors in several important ways. Packed into omnibus bills 
alongside numerous other revisions to the evidentiary codes, the numerous privilege statutes 
enacted throughout the mid-nineteenth century received little fanfare. Until 1880, few 
medical journals had even discussed physician-patient privilege. Beginning in the early 1880s, 
however, journals ran frequent articles discussing the professional benefits and, sometimes, 
the hazards of physician-patient privilege. By publishing open appeals for legislative action in 
medical journals, doctors thrust discussion of physician-patient privilege into the public eye. 
This chapter examines the medical literature on physician-patient privilege that 
emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was a turbulent time for 
the medical profession. Institutional changes and technological developments radically 
reshaped medical practice and challenged its fundamental relationships—both between 
physicians and their patients as well as between physicians and their peers. Many doctors 
began to question well-established therapeutic practices, replacing traditional assumptions 
about disease and healing with modern “strategies grounded in experimental science that 
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objectified disease while minimizing differences among patients.”3 The rise of Homeopathy 
and Eclecticism brought still more challenges to regular physicians’ hegemony over the 
medical profession.4 In response, regular physicians mobilized to enact strict licensing laws 
as a means to drive homoeopaths and other irregular practitioners out of the medical 
profession.5 
As the medical profession changed, so did the discourse on physician-patient 
privilege. In medical journals and medico-legal treatises, doctors made explicit links between 
medical confidentiality and larger developments within the profession. For some regular 
physicians confidentiality and, more broadly, medical ethics offered an invaluable tool that 
could be wielded against their sectarian rivals. At the same time, however, a small cadre of 
physicians challenged the AMA’s rigid definitions of medical ethics. Some even suggested 
ethical policing should be abandoned altogether. 
Prior to Wood’s public call to arms over the issue of physician-patient privilege, 
other physicians had been active behind the scenes. In his popular 1860 medico-legal 
treatise, John Elwell, for example, had named several prominent doctors to show that 
“physicians, as a class, have never given up the idea that they were entitled to the immunities 
and privileges enjoyed by the attorney, and that their patients were worthy of the same 
protection as that meted out by the courts to the client of the attorney.”6 Drawing upon this 
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tradition, Wood believed that “individual effort by doctors throughout the state” would be 
the key to securing favorable legislation in Pennsylvania. He prodded his fellow practitioners 
to “make it a point to see personally, or, if this be impossible, to write urgently to, your 
representatives in the two legislative bodies, and pledge them if possible.”7 
Wood did not lack familiarity with the lobbying process. The editor and his peers 
were members of a generation of medical practitioners who had witnessed both numerous 
challenges and profound gains in medical professionalization. Throughout the mid- 
nineteenth century, the regular medical profession had weathered challenges from several 
irregular sects—first from Thompsonian botanists who challenged the regulars’ monopoly 
on medical services, then from homeopaths and eclectics who aimed to upend the 
hegemony of the regular profession. For many physicians, medical ethics, embodied by the 
American Medical Association’s Code of Ethics, served as one of the defining characteristics of 
regular medicine. Regular physicians viewed members of rival sects as morally irresponsible 
because of their seemingly dangerous therapeutic practices, but also because of their failure 
to abide by the same ethical codes and standards. Given that regular practitioners could not 
prove their therapeutics were any safer than those of their sectarian rivals, medical ethics 
served as a crucial tool in their efforts to maintain control of the medical profession. Regular 
physicians used the rhetoric of medical ethics to push state legislatures to enact strict 
legislation and portrayed tough licensing laws as an answer to the dangers of sectarian 
medicine.8 
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To Wood and his colleagues, the fate of regular medicine rested on its ability to work 
cooperatively with legislators. Just as Wood extolled his colleagues to push for physician- 
patient privilege, his journal also led a campaign to re-enact medical licensing laws in 
Pennsylvania.9 With both licensing and privilege, Wood and his peers in the regular 
profession sought take control over the regulation of medicine. As Wood put it, the goal of 
each campaign was to ensure that “the Medical Profession can, if it will, mould legislation in 
regard to itself.”10 
Wood’s proposed statute mirrored other laws already on the books in those states 
where earlier codification had recognized physician-patient privilege. And like most of those, 
the language of his proposed bill was modeled directly upon the original New York statute. 
Wood’s proposed law made only one minor alteration to the language of the law. Like the 
physician-statutes already on the books in Wisconsin, Arkansas, and several other states, 11 
Wood amended the New York statute to read: 
No person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery shall be allowed or compelled to 
disclose any information which he may have acquired in attending to any patient in his 
professional character, and which information was necessary for him to prescribe for 
such patient as a physician, or do any act as a surgeon. 
 
Wood urged influential physicians to use their personal connections to influence lawmakers 
in order to pass this bill through the state legislature.12 
While these methods had long proven successful, Wood’s proposed law drew some 
unlikely criticism. Only two months after Wood’s editorial, the journal and its editor felt the 
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need to respond to a letter that “assault[ed] the position assumed by this journal.”13 
Authored by the prominent New York physician Frederick Sturgis, the letter stated bluntly 
that physician-patient privilege constituted “a gross injustice to all concerned.” Sturgis 
argued that the New York law “converts the family physician into a wolf in sheep’s clothing” 
and suggested that Wood’s proposal would do the same. As proof of this claim, Sturgis cited 
the New York law’s applications to his specialty, the treatment of venereal disease, citing a 
recent article in the New York Medical Record. He recounted a case in which a young man, 
suffering from syphilis, brought his bride-to-be to a doctor to be cured of a minor ailment. 
Horrified that the unknowing bride might soon be infected, the doctor “took occasion 
privately to remonstrate very emphatically with the young man, informing him of the evil 
consequences that were sure to follow.” The young man, however, stated that there was 
nothing to be done: “the invitations are out, and I cannot withdraw.” In the end, Sturgis 
lamented, the doctor’s “remonstrance was unheeded, and now the most beautiful young lady 
the physician had ever seen is suffering with syphilis in a severe form.” 14 
New York’s confidentiality laws, Sturgis argued, left the physician powerless to stop 
the spread of disease; “thus, through ignorance on the part of the lady, criminality on the 
part of the man, and ‘professional obligations’ on the part of the medical adviser, was this work 
accomplished.” By recounting the case, Sturgis had effectively inverted the rhetoric often 
employed by pro-privilege physicians like Wood. To Sturgis, instead of protecting the 
patient, physician-patient privilege sealed the doctor’s lips and prevented him from acting in 
 
 
 
 
13 “Editorial: Professional Secrets and the Law,” Philadelphia Medical Times and Register, February 26, 1881, 337. 
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the interests of his clients and society. Rather than protect the physician’s honor and elevate 
the profession, the law transformed the law-abiding physician into a “scoundrel.”15 
Sturgis’s fears were only made worse by the spread of medical licensing laws. All of 
the statutes guaranteeing physician-patient privilege specified that the law applied only to 
practitioners that were “duly authorized to practice physic or surgery.” Increasingly, as 
licensing laws and the regulation of medical education became more onerous, this phrase 
meant that the law was applied only to licensed, regular physicians. Homeopaths and 
eclectics, as well as the numerous quacks who practiced on the peripheries of the medical 
profession, were exempt from the law. If, as Sturgis believed, the law restricted the 
physician’s ability to serve his patients, its effects were even more harmful because it “gags 
the mouth of the reputable physician, but permits the gabble of the charlatan.”16 
Horatio Wood responded to Sturgis in a brief editorial published alongside the letter. 
 
He countered Sturgis’s claim that the law might do harm to the physician’s honor, stating 
that although “occasions would arise in which the law would work hardship, or, possibly, 
injustice… these cases must be few.” More importantly, Wood recast the proposed law as a 
protection of the physician-patient relationship rather than a hindrance. He argued, “the 
present code [without a statute]… attempts to make the doctor a legal spy on those who 
come to him… and report every case of abortion, ect., which comes to his knowledge.” 
Unmoved by Sturgis’s arguments, Horatio Wood maintained his position that medical 
secrets should be beyond reproach. He did, however, alter the language in his proposed 
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legislation. Wood struck the word “allowed” from the proposed statute, effectively leaving 
the decision of whether or not to disclose medical testimony to the discretion of the 
physician.17 This gesture signified that the law’s intent was, first and foremost, the protection 
of physicians’ independent discretion and honor as distinguished from the protection of the 
patient’s confidence.18 
Ultimately, the journal’s efforts proved unsuccessful. Either Wood was unable to 
convince his peers of the need to enact a statute, or the state Legislature refused to 
cooperate. Though the Pennsylvania Legislature would eventually enact a statute in 1895 
guaranteeing physician-patient privilege in some cases, the law that went into effect bore 
little resemblance to the bill Wood had proposed. The new legislation applied only to civil 
cases and was restricted by the addition of several limiting clauses. It was hardly the ironclad 
guarantee of professional privilege that Wood had proposed in 1880. Instead, legal scholars 
and reformers would later tout Pennsylvania’s 1895 statute as a model of the kind of 
moderate and flexible legislation that left the admissibility of evidence in the courtroom to 
the discretion of judges.19 
Viewed solely within the context of the rapid expansion of physician-patient 
privilege, the journal’s failure seems rather surprising. This brief exchange between two 
prominent physicians, however, echoed larger discussions taking place within the medical 
profession. Just a few decades earlier, Sturgis’s position would have been anathema to the 
values of regular medicine. The fathers of early American medicine—often Edinburgh- 
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educated physicians like Samuel Bard and Benjamin Rush—had long held the maintenance 
of a patient’s confidences to be one of the most sacred duties of a physician even when they 
themselves did not practice it. Likewise, the founders of the AMA had been reliable 
champions of physician-patient privilege. 
Furthermore, the regular medical profession had taken matters of confidentiality very 
seriously at least through the 1870s. In 1869, for example, the New York Academy of 
Medicine (NYAM), expelled James Marion Sims, arguably the most famous gynecological 
surgeon in the world, for violating a patient’s confidentiality. Sims had invoked the ire of his 
fellow physicians when he published a letter in the New York Times detailing the health of 
one of his patients, the Shakespearian actor Charlotte Cushman. Aimed at clarifying 
uncertainty and quelling public speculation over the actor’s health, Sims’ letter stated bluntly 
that Miss Cushman “had had for some time a little indurated gland that gave her great 
medical anxiety.” 20 To his peers, Sims’s letter constituted a grave violation of professional 
ethics. The NYAM’s Committee of Ethics censored Sims for violating two tenets of the 
AMA’s Code of Ethics. In their letter, they claimed Sims had not only revealed the secrets of a 
patient, but also had violated the AMA’s prohibition on advertising by publicly declaring 
himself to be Cushman’s physician. With the evidence published in the New York Times, Sims 
could hardly muster a solid defense. The NYAM Committee of Ethics “declared that the 
charges against Dr. J. Marion Sims are fully sustained.” As punishment, Sims was to be 
“reprimanded by the president of the Academy” and forced to apologize. Not wanting to 
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subject himself to the indignity of apologizing to the society, Sims refused, at which point, 
he was expelled from the NYAM. 21 
Seemingly minor by modern standards, the punishment is indicative of the ways in 
which nineteenth century physicians thought about medical ethics. To his peers, Sims’s most 
egregious crime was not the violation of his patient’s confidences, but rather publicly defying 
the standards of professional medicine. Accordingly, the punishment was intended to offer 
justice to the victims of the indiscretion—Sims’s fellow practitioners—not his patient, 
Charlotte Cushman. Within the small community of nineteenth-century medicine, the 
punishment was daunting. Rather than face the humiliation of public reprimand and a forced 
apology, Sims, arguably the most famous surgeon in the United States, fled to Europe.22 
As this brief episode demonstrates, nineteenth-century physicians took ethical 
standards and policing very seriously. For the regular profession of the mid-nineteenth 
century, doing so was essential to their survival. Prior the development of bacteriology and 
scientific medicine in the last decades of the nineteenth century, regular physicians could not 
convincingly argue that their therapeutics were any more effective than the therapeutics their 
sectarian rivals. This meant that medical ethics—especially when sanctioned by the state, as 
in the case of physician-patient privilege—proved to be one of the only legitimate arguments 
regular physicians could make to justify their claims to a monopoly over the profession. Bans 
on advertising and secret medicines only applied to regular physicians and served as a means 
of differentiating these doctors from members of rival sects. Likewise, promises of 
confidentiality, especially when supported by statutory law, helped distinguish ethical, regular 
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medicine from its competitors. According to regulars, irregular quacks and charlatans were 
not bound to any oath or code of conduct and instead callously gambled with their patients’ 
lives in pursuit of greater profits. Patients who consulted with regulars, in contrast, could 
count on them to protect their confidences. 
Over the course of the last few decades of the nineteenth century, however, the 
regular position began to change. The debate between Wood and Sturgis was not an isolated 
incident, but rather serves as a powerful example of a gradual breakdown in regulars’ united 
commitment to their stated code of medical ethics. During the 1880s and 1890s, similar 
arguments played out in numerous medical journals as physicians debated physician-patient 
privilege in several states. In these debates, physicians served as both advocates and critics of 
the privilege. Supporters of physician-patient privilege embraced mid-nineteenth-century 
notions of medical ethics. They saw practitioners’ relationships with their clients as the 
fundamental building block upon which the medical profession was built. To these 
physicians, the practitioner was responsible first and foremost to his patient; all other 
relationships—to fellow practitioners, to society, and even the law—were secondary and 
could not be advanced at the expense of individual patients. Critics of the privilege, on the 
other hand, held that some relationships were more important than the physician’s relations 
with specific patients, emphasizing that medical practitioners had a duty to protect the health 
and morality of the public even if that meant betraying the confidences of individual 
patients. 
For proof, critics repeatedly cited the moral quandary that often faced physicians in 
venereal cases, the same kind of case cited by Sturgis. Within those cases physicians could 
find all of their often-conflicting obligations: their duty to protect women as respectable 
gentlemen, their responsibility to maintain the darkest secrets of their patients, and their 
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obligation to protect the public by preventing of the spread of disease. Sturgis and other 
critics cited cases in which husbands selfishly risked infecting their wives with syphilis and 
other contagious diseases, despite the warnings of their physicians. To critics, medical 
confidentiality bound the doctors’ tongues, enabling the spread of disease and vice. Though 
these instances were likely very rare—the literature of numerous contemporary legal scholars 
demonstrated that the privilege was most often applied to insurance and personal injury 
suits—critics found them especially troubling.23 
Proponents of medical confidentiality and physician-patient privilege were no less 
hyperbolic. For many of these physicians, their obligation to secrecy stemmed from 
something deeper than the AMA Code of Ethics or statutory law. Daniel Strock, the architect 
of a proposed New Jersey statute, attributed doctors’ respect of patient’s confidences to “the 
innate sense of honor that is so conspicuous a component of the character of the true 
physician.”24 Likewise, Louis Gompertz, a Connecticut physician, suggested that many 
physicians would merely violate the law if it compelled them to betray their patients’ secrets: 
“there are among us, not a few who would be tempted to risk judicial censure or punishment 
rather than make public, without the patient’s consent, the information acquired in 
confidence from him.”25 To many, such physicians were not only victims of an unjust system 
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that pitted doctor’s ethical duties against the mandates of the court but also heroes worthy of 
praise. In 1893, Austin Flint, a noted physician who served as president of the NYAM and 
the AMA, wrote that any penalties arising out of physicians’ refusal to divulge medical 
secrets in the courtroom would only serve as testament “to the honor of the profession and 
to humanity.”26 
Others gave long-winded odes to Hippocrates, linking contemporary medico-legal 
issues to supposedly ancient traditions. Strock began his “Plea for the Physician on the 
Witness Stand” by stating: “It was Hippocrates about 2,500 years ago, who put in concrete 
form the rules of medical practice that had been observed, no doubt even for ages before his 
time.” In doing so, the advocates of physician-patient privilege glossed over millennia of 
medical developments. From ancient Greece to nineteenth-century America, they argued, 
doctors had always maintained the same relationship to their patients: “the medical 
profession of civilized countries have preserved inviolate the secrets learned in the 
performance of their duties.”27 To Samuel C. Busey, the president of the Medical Society of 
the District of Columbia, the various privilege statutes adopted throughout the nineteenth 
century were to be celebrated as they added “force and fiat to the decree of the medical 
profession, which has always and everywhere throughout the civilized world resisted 
compulsory disclosure in open court.”28 
During the final decades of the nineteenth century, major advancements in scientific 
medicine promised new therapeutic practices and engendered increased popular support for 
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regular medicine. At the same time, the development of the hospital as the primary location 
of medical practice opened new avenues for regulars to control the medical profession. In 
certain fields— including obstetrics, gynecology, ophthalmology—therapeutic advancements 
and the restructuring of medical practice enabled some practitioners to specialize in certain 
procedures. Occurring across the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, 
each of these developments supported regulars’ claims to a monopoly over the medical 
profession. They underpinned regulars’ attempts to reform medical education, to enact strict 
licensing laws, and to expel irregulars from professional organizations.29 
As regular physicians found new arguments to support their control over the medical 
profession, some began to see medical ethics as a restriction on the freedoms of physicians 
rather than as a protection. Few physicians embraced this position as wholeheartedly as 
James Marion Sims. Disgraced in the early 1870s for his violations of medical ethics, Sims 
found new life in the ensuing decade as an ardent critic of ethical policing. By the late 1870s, 
Sims had so successfully rehabilitated his image that he was elected President of the 
American Medical Association. He did not, however, win this position through conciliation 
with the AMA’s most ardent supporters of medical ethics. Instead, Sims retrenched his 
position as a critic of medical ethics. To Sims, the rapid transformation of American 
medicine in the late nineteenth century had rendered the Code of Ethics obsolete. In his 1876 
Presidential address, he characterized the Code as “a dead letter” and “an instrument of 
torture and oppression [for] prosecuting a fellow [AMA] member.”30 Though Sims failed, as 
president, to substantially alter the Code, other physicians quickly adopted the cause. In New 
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York, dispute over the Code’s prohibition on collaboration with irregular practitioners led to 
the formation of a rival national medical association. Its founder boldly claimed that the 
offshoot society would contain “no medical politics and no medical ethics.”31 
Debate over medical ethics plagued the AMA throughout the rest of the nineteenth 
century, eventually forcing the organization to revise its Code of Ethics. In 1903, the AMA 
retitled the document, Principles of Medical Ethics. In most cases, the revisers maintained the 
language of the original, though they limited its proscriptive capacities by removing any 
reference to penalties for violations of its core principles. More importantly, the election of a 
vocal critic of ethical policing as president of the AMA and the revision of the society’s Code 
of Ethics signaled a major shift in physicians’ views on medical ethics. Increasingly, physicians 
embraced what historian Robert Baker has termed laissez-faire medical ethics—the notion 
that decisions regarding what practices are ethical should be left to individual practitioners. 
Though the revised document maintained a guarantee of patients’ secrets, the debates over 
medical confidentiality and physician-patient privilege that occurred throughout the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century were profoundly influenced by this new rhetoric. Critics 
of physician-patient privilege embraced laissez-faire medical ethics, arguing that physicians 
were often faced with contradictory ethical mandates and that no overarching ethical code or 
law could address these dilemmas adequately.32 
Proponents of the privilege were influenced by these larger debates as well. The 
physicians who argued vehemently in favor of physician-patient privilege were alike in 
several ways. All were ardent regulars. Often, these physicians came of age during the 1850s 
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and 1860s, at the height of sectarian medicine. Like Horatio Wood, they came almost 
exclusively from the highest ranks of the medical profession. Daniel Roberts Brower, a 
noted psychologist and the primary architect of a proposed Illinois statute, for example, held 
multiple teaching positions in several different medical schools and served as a consulting 
physician at several Chicago hospitals. Throughout his long and successful career, Brower 
published numerous articles on nervous and mental disorders, served terms as the president 
of the Chicago and Illinois State Medical Societies, and accumulated three law degrees.33 
Likewise, Daniel Strock urged his colleagues in New Jersey to adopt a statute guaranteeing 
physician-patient privilege while serving as President of the Camden County Medical Society 
and the New Jersey Sanitary Association.34 As leaders of the profession, these physicians 
often had enough personal clout to influence both legislators and their fellow physicians. 
Day-to-day realities of medical practice led others to retain a commitment to 
physician-patient privilege. At a meeting of the Medico-Legal Society of Chicago, four 
different physicians attested that they or a peer had been forced to reveal patients’ secrets in 
court. For Dr. R. W. Bishop, compelled testimony cost him his client and a sizeable check. 
All four physicians heartily supported Dr. Brower’s proposed statute, and the proposal was 
put before the Illinois legislature.35 
Defenders of the privilege remained strong enough through the turn of the twentieth 
century to secure additional legislative victories. Between 1860 and 1880, ten more states 
followed New York by enacting statutes codifying physician-patient privilege. The 1880s and 
 
 
33 History of Medicine and Surgery in Chicago (Chicago: 1920), 111; Samuel T. Wiley, Biographical and Portrait Cyclopedia 
of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: Biographical Publishing Company, 1895), 585-604. 
 
34 Strock, “The Patient’s Secret,” 327-329. 
 
35 John Ridlon, “Medico-Legal Society of Chicago,” The Chicago Medical Recorder 12 (1897), 81. 
117  
1890s brought another flurry of legislative 
activity on this issue. Ohio, Washington, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Colorado, Pennsylvania, 
West Virginia, Hawaii, Utah, Alaska, and the 
District of Columbia all enacted statutes. In 
1899, Arkansas became the first state to extend 
the privilege to trained nurses. By the turn of 
the century, twenty-six states or territories had 
extended privileged communications to medical 
practitioners. In the early twentieth century, 
Mississippi and the District of Columbia 
adopted physician-patient privilege as did the 
newly acquired territories of the Philippines and 
Puerto Rico. Additional lobbying campaigns 
successfully placed bills before the state 
legislature in Illinois, Connecticut, and New 
Jersey.36 
 
 
Table 2: Physician-Patient Privilege 
(1850-1875) 
 
State/Territory Date Enacted 
Iowa 1851 
Indiana 1852 
California 1853 
Kansas 1855 
Nebraska 1858 
Dakota, Oregon 1862 
Arizona 1864 
Minnesota 1866 
Nevada, 
 
Wyoming 
 
1869 
Montana 1871 
Idaho 1875 
 
 
Still, legislative victories continued to prove elusive in the South and Northeast. With 
the exception of New York, and later Pennsylvania, states in the West claimed the majority 
of statutes into the twentieth century. Moreover, when compared to earlier legislation, many 
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of these new statutes had limited applications. 
Pennsylvania’s law limited physician-patient 
privilege to civil suits. Washington D.C.’s 
statute did not apply to “evidence in criminal 
cases in which the accused is charged with 
causing the death of or inflicting injuries upon a 
human being.” The North Carolina Statute 
included a provision that allowed the judge to 
“compel [a physician’s] disclosure [of medical 
secrets] if in his opinion [the information] is 
necessary to a proper administration of 
justice.”37 
David Cheever, a renowned surgeon 
 
 
Table 3: Physician-Patient Privilege 
(1880-1906) 
 
and Harvard professor, sought to extend 
physician-patient privilege to previously 
resistant New England. In 1903, he stood 
before the Massachusetts Medical Society and    
offered “A Plea for a Change in the Massachusetts Law.” His speech, part of a panel on 
privileged communications, marked the culmination Cheever’s two-year lobbying effort to 
enact a statute guaranteeing medical confidentiality. Cheever’s rhetoric echoed the successful 
appeals of earlier advocates of physician-patient privilege. He linked medical confidentiality 
to ancient traditions, invoking the Hippocratic Oath and Roman law. In his address, Cheever 
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State/Territory Date Enacted 
Ohio 1880 
Washington 1881 
North Carolina 1885 
Oklahoma 1890 
Colorado 1891 
Pennsylvania 1895 
West Virginia, 
 
Hawaii 
 
1897 
Utah 1898 
Alaska 1900 
District of 
 
Columbia 
 
1901 
Mississippi 1906 
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passionately argued that the state’s current laws placed the physician in a precarious 
situation. To Cheever, medical men were entrusted with great secrets; betraying these secrets 
under any circumstances would damage the welfare of their patients and the honor of their 
profession. Physicians’ dual obligations to their patients and to the courts, Cheever argued, 
meant that “the doctor in a court of law is in a false position—false in proportion to his 
sense of honor.” By invoking a physician’s gentlemanly honor, Cheever suggested that 
physicians were bound to a code of ethics that placed them above the law, maintaining that 
“some [physicians] would go to prison rather than betray a confidence.”38 To Cheever, the 
only solution to this problem was the adoption of a new privilege statute that would protect 
medical practitioners from the need to reveal their patients’ secrets. 
Cheever was optimistic that such legislation was within reach. In his eyes the United 
States fell into two camps with respect to privilege: states like Massachusetts that followed 
English common law, forcing practitioners to testify and betray their honor; and others that 
followed New York by privileging communications between physician and patient.39 For 
Cheever and other physicians who came of age during the Civil War, the list of states 
protecting the physician in the courtroom had doubled over the course of their practice. 
Even more promising, similar legislative victories appeared attainable in Illinois and several 
other states.40 With Cheever’s advocacy and the promise of similar victories elsewhere, the 
Journal of the American Medical Association stated hopefully that “this [would] be the beginning 
of a change in the laws of Massachusetts.” If Massachusetts were to enact a statute, many 
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physicians hoped this legislative victory would set the stage for similar legislation across the 
Northeast. 41 
Cheever seemed to be on the verge of successfully securing a new statute. Two years 
had passed since he first read his paper to the State Medical Society. During that time, he 
had managed to convince the councilors of the society to compile a panel of medico-legal 
experts to discuss and potentially draft a new law. Cheever knew that physicians in Illinois 
had executed similar strategies to great effect, using medical and medico-legal society 
meetings to successfully draft new legislation. At the Illinois conference, the few legal 
scholars in the room acquiesced to physicians’ demands, and the new bills were quickly 
ushered to the state legislature.42 Cheever’s proposal—a bill that would allow physicians to 
divulge medical secrets only with the patient’s consent, in malpractice suits, or to “expose 
crime”—mirrored this recent legislation by offering several amendments to lessen the 
perceived negative effects of these laws.43 
The panel’s final two speakers, however, were unimpressed by this proposal. 
 
Following Cheever, Walter Soren, a Brookline attorney, gave a speech on “The Workings of 
the New York Law.” The paper charted the evolution of court rulings on New York’s 
medical confidentiality law, highlighting several legal dilemmas brought about by the statute. 
Through a detailed and extensive list of court cases, Soren demonstrated that the New York 
courts—seventy years after the law’s adoption—were still unclear regarding whose 
communications were protected by the statute and what communications were considered 
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“necessary” to prescribe to patients. Furthermore, while Cheever had framed his discussion 
around the law’s relation to a physician’s honor, Soren stated that “the statute has been 
considered [by the courts] as passed solely for the protection of the patient and has been 
construed liberally in his favor.” Instead of a crucial protection of physicians’ honor, Soren’s 
analysis of recent New York court rulings depicted the proposed statute as a morally 
ambiguous law that could both protect and harm physicians.44 
While Soren’s paper challenged Cheever’s assertion that the proposed law would 
serve primarily to protect physicians, the panel’s final speaker challenged the notion that a 
new statute would provide practical utility to any parties. In a paper titled “Privileged 
Communications to Physicians,” Frederick Stimson, a Dedham attorney, outlined the 
differences between the laws of various states. Rather than addressing the matter as a 
medical issue, Stimson recast the debate as a contest between statutory law and common 
law. Common law, Stimson argued, was preferable for all parties because it gave judges the 
discretion to judge each case individually. Speaking “for [his] profession,” Stimson promised 
the assembled physicians that, under common law jurisdictions, there been no—or at least 
very few—instances where physicians had been compelled to testify. Judges were flexible in 
relation to the specifics of each case, often relieving physicians of their duty to testify. 
Instead of a challenge to physicians’ honor, Stimson recast the malleability of the common 
law system as a benefit to physicians.45 
At the conclusion of the panel, the Medical Society of Massachusetts declined to 
draft a new statute. The decision—won through the successful challenges of the attorneys, 
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Soren and Stimson—marked a landmark victory for a new cadre of legal scholars who 
challenged the utility of medical confidentiality laws. A few years earlier it had seemed as 
though lawyers and judges were largely content to yield to physicians, allowing the medical 
profession to enact laws and to regulate medical ethics. In Illinois, for example, a judge had 
been willing to support physician Daniel Brower’s proposed privilege statute, even though 
he believed that “no one felt the necessity for a law making communications to physicians 
privileged.”46 The arrival of a new generation of legal scholars, however, upset the 
cooperative relationship between doctors, lawyers, and judges. These new legal scholars 
would become the most vociferous critics of the privilege, railing against it at any 
opportunity.47 Their literature and its effects on medico-legal discourse will be discussed in 
the next two chapters. 
Yet Cheever’s failure to change Massachusetts law also revealed the deepening of a 
schism within the medical profession. A few decades earlier, the medical profession’s failure 
to rally around one of its own in the face of criticism from outsiders would have been 
unthinkable. By the turn of the century, however, it had become clear that doctors were no 
longer united in their support of physician-patient privilege. Cheever, the ardent regular 
never wavered. To him, physician-patient privilege and codified medical ethics served as a 
means to distinguish the regular practitioner from the quack. As scientific medicine took 
hold of the profession in the early twentieth century, however, these distinctions became less 
important. Increasingly popular, the laissez-faire medical ethics of J. Marion Sims and his 
followers led many physicians to question the utility of physician-patient privilege and 
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medical ethics. 
 
Cheever never accepted these changes. He had come of age in an era in which 
regular physicians united against common foes—irregular practitioners and quacks. Until the 
end of his career, Cheever always identified himself as “a follower of the old leaders who 
allowed the term ‘regular,’ but scorned all other appellations.” By the twentieth century, 
however, these distinctions no longer seemed relevant. Upon his retirement in 1907, the 
elderly physician took the opportunity to address his colleagues one last time. Cheever 
acknowledged that his views on irregular practitioners and medical ethics made him a “fossil,” 
yet he cautioned his peers to remember him “as an enduring reminder of what is past.”48 As 
Cheever and his peers retired, the medical profession lost its most vocal advocates of 
physician-patient privilege. Over the next two decades, professional journals and society 
meetings would continue to host heated debates between physicians and lawyers over the 
utility of physician-patient privilege. These gatherings, however, often brought diminishing 
returns. In the face of powerful criticism from legal scholars and with dwindling support 
amongst the medical ranks, the spread of physician-patient privilege slowed substantially in 
early twentieth century. 
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CHAPTER VII: PRIVILEGE IN THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 
COURTROOM 
 
As to the policy of the privilege and extending it, there can only be condemnation. 
The chief classes of litigation in which it is invoked are actions on policies of life 
insurance, where the deceased’s misrepresentations as to health are involved; actions 
for corporal injuries, where the plaintiff’s bodily condition is to be ascertained; and 
testamentary actions where the testator’s mental condition is in issue. In all of these 
cases, the medical testimony is ‘the most vital and reliable,’ ‘the most important and 
incisive’ and is absolutely needed for purposes of learning the truth. In none of them 
is there any reason for the party to conceal the facts except to perpetrate a fraud upon 
the opposing party, and in the first two of these classes the advancement of fraudulent 
claims is notoriously common… In wills, policies and personal injuries, the privilege, 
where it exists, is known in practice to be a serious obstacle to the ascertainment of 
truth and a useful weapon for those interested in suppressing it. Any extension of it to 
other jurisdictions is to be earnestly deprecated. 
 
John Henry Wigmore, Greenleaf’s A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, 1899 
 
 
Until the mid-1870s, physician-patient privilege remained an obscure and seldom- 
used rule of evidence. Legal records show—in spite of the rapid spread of new privilege 
statutes throughout the mid-nineteenth century—that privilege was rarely invoked in the 
courtroom. Beginning in the mid-1870s, however, three simultaneous developments 
transformed physician-patient privilege into an important and controversial legal doctrine: 
first was the growth of life insurance; second was a sudden spike in the number of industrial 
accidents along with a corresponding increase in tort actions for personal injury or wrongful 
death; and third was an increase in the application of privilege in contested will cases. 
According to one twentieth-century legal commentator these three categories comprised as 
much as ninety percent of the litigation in which privilege was invoked.1 
Collectively, these three developments transformed the meaning of the law: privilege 
was no longer an arcane rule of evidence that occasionally appeared in divorce proceedings 
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and criminal abortion trials, but rather a high stakes matter that had important implications 
for American business. As a result, over the final decades of the nineteenth century, privilege 
came under increasing scrutiny. At first courts offered a broad reading of physician-patient 
privilege. Privilege statutes were celebrated as valuable protections of patients’ deepest 
secrets and construed to cover a wide range of communications between doctor and patient. 
In time, however, as the problematic applications of physician-patient privilege in insurance, 
injury, and will cases became more apparent, legal scholars came to see privilege as an 
impediment to the judicial process. Eventually, these legal scholars would emerge as the 
foremost critics of physician-patient privilege. 
No development drastically altered the history of physician-patient privilege as much 
as the rapid growth of life insurance in the late nineteenth century. Life insurance was hardly 
a new enterprise in 1870s—the first American insurance companies dated back to the late 
eighteenth century, growing out of the more established fields of fire and marine insurance. 
Efforts to create a profitable insurance industry had foundered, however, in the early 
nineteenth century, as companies struggled to get accurate actuarial data and to reach 
enough customers to cover the risks inherent to the enterprise. But beginning in the 1840s, 
improvements in actuarial calculations along with the development of mutual life insurance 
companies based on new business models that enabled companies to start up with lower 
amounts of capital facilitated small-scale growth. Still, legal regulations tethered the growing 
insurance industry under a large, complicated bureaucracy. With the exception of several 
Southern companies that specialized in underwriting slaves, growth remained limited 
through the 1850s.2 
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The staggering loss of life sustained in the Civil War transformed Americans’ 
attitudes toward death—and also toward life insurance.3 The once foundering insurance 
industry boomed in the aftermath. Over one hundred new life insurance companies were 
established between 1865 and 1870. In 1862, the cumulative value of American life insurance 
in force totaled $160 million. By 1870, the total was $1.3 billion (in 1860 dollars).4 Financial 
collapse in the 1870s led to a slight decline in the insurance industry as many of the smaller 
companies founded in the preceding decade went bankrupt. Renewed growth in the 1880s 
was led by a few massive firms—New York Life, Equitable, and Mutual—and, in the 1890s, 
the “big three” were joined by Prudential and Metropolitan. By 1900, these five firms 
effectively dominated the insurance market. Together, they commanded $5 billion worth of 
insurance while the next largest twenty companies combined commanded only $2 billion.5 
As these massive firms rose to the top of the insurance industry, they gradually 
expanded the role of the insurance company in law and politics. According to historian 
Morton Keller, these giant firms formed “a unique corporate group,” one whose “managers 
were more inclined to think in political and ideological terms than other executives of the 
time. They claimed for themselves and for their companies a trustee-like, quasi-public 
function; they entered into intricate financial alliances with banks, trust companies, and 
investment banking houses; and they participated actively in state and national politics.”6 
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With all of this activity came increased demands on these companies’ legal counsel. 
 
At first, in the smaller insurance firms of the 1860s, legal services had been provided by 
external, part-time consultants. Beginning in the mid-1880s, however, the biggest firms 
started to hire their own specialized lawyers, and, as a result, these companies became 
increasingly litigious. In the final decades of the nineteenth century, these firms became 
more inclined than ever “to contest suits to their judicial conclusion” and the number of 
insurance cases before state courts skyrocketed. One expert counted only about one hundred 
insurance trials before 1870. Between 1888 and 1910, the big five alone accounted for as 
many as 750 cases.7 
This litigation opened new avenues for medical testimony in the courtroom. 
 
Insurance companies regularly employed medical questionnaires and physical examinations 
as a means to identify and avoid the riskiest individual investments. To remain profitable, life 
insurance companies weighed individuals’ medical histories against actuarial tables. The 
company gambled that they would receive more by investing premiums over the life of the 
insured than they would eventually be required to pay out when the insured died. Individuals 
with greater risk factors such as chronic ailments were often faced with higher premiums or 
denied access to insurance altogether. When life insurance companies suspected that they 
had been defrauded by individuals who had refused to disclose some pre-existing illness, the 
companies refused to pay out, leading the beneficiary to file suit against the company. The 
resulting litigation led to a series of cases that repeatedly tested physician-patient privilege in 
the late nineteenth century.8 
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As a result of this litigation, life insurance attorneys became the first experts on 
physician-patient privilege. While most evidence manuals from the 1870s and earlier offered 
at best an erratic and incomplete record of the various statutes protecting medical 
communications in the courtroom, lawyers representing life insurance corporations in state 
courts gradually compiled more complete lists of relevant statutes and cases. In the 1882 
case Gartside v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., lawyer Jacob Klein offered the first 
comprehensive list of statutes enacted in the United States.9 This list was then cited in 
several evidence manuals, greatly expanding the information available on physician-patient 
privilege. At the same time, insurance lawyers studied and catalogued the numerous 
precedents governing the applications of privilege in the courtroom. In another case, the 
presiding judge opined that attorneys for life insurance companies “[have] probably collected 
all of the decisions that have an immediate bearing upon [physician-patient privilege].”10 By 
the mid-1880s, this information was readily available to any practicing lawyer and most legal 
treatises featured lengthy examinations of the various statutes protecting medical 
communications in the courtroom. 
As information on physician-patient privilege became more accessible, the privilege 
found increasing use in other classes of litigation—most frequently tort actions for injuries 
or wrongful death.11  Through the first-two thirds of the nineteenth century, powerful forces 
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limited tort actions, especially on the part of employees.12 The continuation of an eighteenth- 
century culture of deference and paternalism led many would-be tort actions to be settled 
outside of court. Rather than suing employers, injured workers were more likely to ask for 
assistance often in the form of less strenuous work as watchmen or clerks. Second, factory 
owners were loath to hire prospective employees who seemed litigious or in any way 
troublesome—“in isolated Northern mill towns, suing an employer often meant jeopardizing 
not only one’s employment prospects, but one’s housing, church membership, and even 
access to town poor relief.”13 The combination of these two factors was especially powerful 
in the mining industry—one of the most dangerous trades in nineteenth-century America— 
where a few companies controlled much of the labor market and “often collaborated among 
themselves on hiring practices.”14 
On top of these challenges, the law itself posed significant obstacles to any 
successful accident case. In early accident litigation, nineteenth-century courts held the 
plaintiff to an almost impossibly high burden of proof. The standard assumption was that 
accidents were a part of everyday life and that “any loss from accident must lie where it 
falls.”15 In order to recover damages litigants were required to prove that fault rested 
 
Kansas City, 27 Mo. 231 (1887); Feeney v. Long Island Railroad Co., 71 Sickels 375 (1889); Munz v. Salt Lake 
R.R., 25 Utah 220 (1902); Noelle v. Hoquiam Lumber & S. Co., 47 Wash. 519; Green v. Terminal R.R., 211 
Mo. 18 (1908); Hilary v. Minneapolis Street Railway, 104 Minn. 432 (1908). 
 
12 On the history of tort law, this chapter relies upon G. Edward White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); John Fabian Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen, 
Destitute Widows, and the Remaking of American Law (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2004), 
especially 22-70; and Barbara Young Welke, Recasting American Liberty: Gender, Race, Law and the Railroad 
Revolution, 1865-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), especially 81-124. See also, John Fabian 
Witt, “From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort 
Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century Family,” Law and Social Inquiry 25 (2000), 717-755. 
 
13 Witt, The Accidental Republic, 55. 
 
14 Ibid. 
 
15 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law (Boston, 1881), 94-95. 
130  
completely on the defendant and not on chance or on any negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff. As one judge stated, the defendant was liable for damages only if the plaintiff had 
exercised “extraordinary care, so that the accident was inevitable.”16 At the same time, 
prevailing standards of courtroom procedure further stacked the deck against prospective 
litigants. The rules of evidence, as administered in many nineteenth century courtrooms, 
“barred testimony from precisely those most likely to know what had happened: the parties, 
any real parties in interest, any interested witnesses, and the husbands and wives of these 
parties.”17 This meant that, in many cases, the injured worker, “unable to testify on his own 
behalf, relied by necessity on the testimony of his fellow employees, all of whom would 
presumably be reluctant to testify against their employer if they wished to keep their jobs on 
good terms.”18 Finally, a scarcity of lawyers in the geographical regions most beset by 
industrial accidents—mining towns in the West and mill towns in the East—limited the 
potential for accident litigation throughout most of the nineteenth century.19 
All of this had the cumulative effect of preventing injury litigation. Throughout 
much of the nineteenth century, lawyers and judges “paid little attention to the problem of 
unintentional injury” and tort law continued to lag behind the more established fields of 
property law and the law of contracts. 20 In fact, it was not until 1859, when Francis Hillard 
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published the first treatise on the law of torts, that any legal text covered the subject in 
detail.21 Beginning in the late 1860s, however, several important changes brought the law of 
torts to the fore. 
The first development was a surge in the number of practicing attorneys. Between 
1870 and 1900, “the number of lawyers jumped by almost 150 percent… and the ratio of 
lawyers to individuals in the paid workforce increased from 1 in 307 to [1 in] 256.”22 Many of 
these new attorneys came from second generation immigrant families, creating “new cadres 
of lawyers with close connections to the kinds of working-class communities from which 
personal injury plaintiffs were disproportionately likely to come.”23 Growth within legal 
profession fueled increased competition and lawyers increasingly turned toward accident 
litigation as novel means to eke out a living. Between 1870 and 1890, “the number of 
accident suits being litigated in New York City’s state courts grew almost eightfold; by 1910, 
the number had grown again by more than a factor of five.” Elsewhere, the shift was even 
more staggering. In Cook County Illinois, one legal commenter reported and eight hundred 
percent increase in injury litigation between 1875 and 1896. By the early twentieth century, 
the rise in injury litigation was so great that some feared it might completely “block [courts’] 
calendars” and “impede administration in all other branches of law.”24 
The second major development was the rapid expansion of American railroads. Few 
developments so radically reshaped American life during this period as the proliferation of 
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railroads and streetcars. These new modes of transport fundamentally altered the national 
landscape and new towns and settlements emerged along transportation networks. At the 
close of the Civil War American railroad networks were patchy and incomplete. Many lines 
in the South had been destroyed by the Union army, and only a handful of railways extended 
beyond the industrial North. By contrast, in 1890, railways crisscrossed the entire nation. 
Between 1880 and 1890, “total railroad mileage in the United States had almost doubled 
from 87,801 miles to 163,3562 miles. In those same years, the number of passengers carried 
more than doubled from just under 241 million in 1881 to over 498 million in 1890.”25 
Likewise, railroads and streetcars enabled the separation of home and work. By 1890, 
streetcars carried over two billion passengers per year, which meant that the average urban 
American took more that 100 streetcar rides per year. By 1917, inhabitants of American 
cities took over 260 streetcar rides per year.26 Perhaps the first big business, railroads 
transformed American financial institutions as well as the relationship between government 
and corporate interests. Railroad companies were not tethered to specific towns or cities. 
Rather, like insurance firms, they were large often-faceless corporations that hired scores of 
accountants, lawyers, and lobbyists to do their bidding in courts and government. 
More than anything else, however, railroads fundamentally transformed Americans’ 
attitudes toward the risks and dangers of everyday life. By their very nature, early railroads 
were inherently unsafe. Trains ran on along an immense web of tracks that spanned the 
entire nation. For many stretches, a single track carried trains in both directions. Any failure 
in communication between oncoming trains was certain to end in catastrophe. Likewise, 
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tracks were seldom protected by any sort of barrier, and, as a result, wildlife, livestock, and 
passerby were sometime struck by passing trains. Entering and exiting railcars brought 
another set of dangers as it was common practice for passengers to jump from moving trains 
as their destination approached. These dangers led to myriad injuries and deaths. In 1901, 
5,270 passengers as well as 12,707 “other persons” were injured or killed on American 
railways. Railway accidents “peaked in 1913, with 16,942 passengers and 19,198 ‘others’ 
injured or killed.”27 
If railroads were dangerous, streetcars were even more deadly. The combination of 
fast speeds, cross traffic, and the unpredictability of city streets led to numerous accidents. In 
the year 1899 alone, Massachusetts streetcars injured or killed as many as 1,616 passengers 
and 800 bystanders. In 1902, more than 43,000 Americans were injured or killed in streetcar 
accidents.28 As railroad and streetcar accidents became more common, so did personal injury 
litigation. In 1880, Boston had no more than “a dozen or so suits filed in superior court 
alleging damage caused by negligent operation of a horsecar.” Two decades later, “however, 
[Boston had] 800 personal injury cases involving streetcars in personal court.”29 
As Americans turned to the courts in search of redress for injuries and lost wages, 
physicians were increasingly called to testify to the scope and scale of various injuries and 
ailments. This created numerous avenues for the use of physician-patient privilege in the 
courtroom. In fact, the privilege was so frequently invoked in railroad and streetcar injury 
cases, that railroad lawyers—like their peers in the field of life insurance—became experts on 
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the applications of physician-patient privilege and how to evade it. Several railroad attorneys 
even published articles in the largest medical journals of the day where they offered 
physicians detailed descriptions of the state of the law regarding privileged 
communications.30 
Altogether, as a result of these developments the number of privilege cases before 
state courts ballooned. More privilege cases were decided in the 1870s and 1880s than in the 
previous five decades combined. Moreover, as privilege became a common feature of 
insurance cases and tort actions, it was also used with increasing regularity in other classes of 
litigation—most frequently contested will cases.31 In these trials, physicians were often called 
to testify to the mental competency of the deceased testator.32 Such cases were hardly new. 
Contested wills were a constant in nineteenth-century courtrooms and the subject of wills 
had long been a staple of medical jurisprudence.33 For much of the nineteenth century, 
however, the medico-legal literature on the subject of wills and insanity made little note of 
physician-patient privilege.34 It was not until the 1880s that privilege was used with any 
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frequency in will cases. This suggests that the prevalence of privilege in these trials was more 
likely a byproduct of the widespread use of privilege in other classes of litigation and a 
growing awareness of privilege in general. Nevertheless, the use of privilege in numerous will 
cases in the 1880s and 1890s led to several important precedents that helped to shape the 
emerging consensus surrounding physician-patient privilege.35 
As privilege cases grew in number and frequency in the final decades of the 
nineteenth century, courts were repeatedly asked to weigh in on the applications of various 
privilege statues. Among the first of the numerous life insurance cases to flood state courts 
in the 1870s and 1880s, Edington v. Mutual and Edington v. Aetna illustrate the ways in which 
these cases raised new questions about physician-patient privilege. In 1867 and 1868, Wilbur 
Diefendorf purchased multiple life insurance policies—one from the Mutual Life Insurance 
Company of New York and another from the Aetna Life Insurance Company. Before 
signing a contract with either company, Diefendorf was required to fill out a questionnaire 
documenting his medical history and to undergo a medical exam. In each application, 
Diefendorf was asked whether he had suffered from any severe sickness or disease within 
the last seven years. In one application, Diefendorf admitted to an “attack of rheumatism 
years ago” and to some “nervous difficulty and diarrhea.” In the other application, 
Diefendorf simply answered, “No.” These irregularities went unnoticed at the time and 
Diefendorf signed a contract with each company, regularly paying his premiums. In 1871, 
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Diefendorf died. The cause of death was listed as “nervous apoplexy,” thought to be “the 
result of some disease or diseases of long standing, and not any sudden cause.” Believing 
that they had been defrauded, both Mutual and Aetna refused to pay. Diefendorf’s 
beneficiary, William Edington filed lawsuits to recover from each company. 36 
The ensuing legal drama took eight years to resolve as each suit found its way to the 
New York Supreme Court. The crux of each trial was whether the insurance companies 
could summon Diefendorf’s physicians to testify. By the mid-1870s, physician-patient 
privilege had been affirmed in several New York cases and it was widely accepted that 
physician-patient privilege could be invoked by the patient to protect medical secrets. But 
what happened when the patient died? Did the protections of physician-patient privilege 
confer to the patients’ heirs or beneficiaries? In each trial, the New York courts were forced 
to weigh in on these and other questions as the life insurance companies called multiple 
doctors to the stand. 
The conclusions reached in each trial highlighted lingering uncertainties surrounding 
New York’s privilege statute. In Edington v. Mutual, the first case to come before the New 
York Supreme Court, the court greatly limited the testimony that Diefendorf’s physicians 
were allowed to give. The court ruled that “the protection which the law gives to 
communications made in professional confidence does not cease upon the death of the 
party.” Accordingly, the court barred Diefendorf’s long-time physician from revealing any 
confidential information about his one-time client. Moreover, the court celebrated physician- 
patient privilege as “a just and useful enactment.” To limit the applications of the privilege, 
the presiding justices argued, would “destroy confidence between the physician and the 
patient, and… might tend very much to prevent the advantages and benefits which flow 
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from this confidential relationship.” Accordingly, they continued, the privilege “should 
receive a liberal interpretation and not be restricted by any technical rule.”37 
Three years later, in Edington v. Aetna, however, the same justices reversed course, 
arguing that the privilege ought to be limited in scope. When Aetna’s attorneys called two 
physicians to testify, the court overruled objections from Edington’s counsel. One physician 
was allowed to testify that Diefendorf “did not appear like a well man; that he was sick, 
weak, and had the appearance of debility; that his step was slow and languid, and his voice 
low and feeble; that he appeared like a feeble man, a man out of health; that at times he 
appeared better, and at other times worse, and that on the whole his progress was 
downward, to the time of his death; and that from time to time he discovered eruptions and 
pimples upon his face, which he described.” This information, the justices argued, was 
readily apparent to any and all who came across Diefendorf. Privilege, they argued, should 
be limited to the “confidential communications of a patient to his physician, and also such 
information as a physician may acquire of secret ailments by an examination of the person of 
his patient.” They pointed out that the privilege did not exist under common law and, 
accordingly, argued that “it should not, therefore, be made broader by construction than the 
language of the statute plainly requires.” Given too liberal a reading, the justices cautioned, 
privilege had the potential “to embarrass the administration of justice.”38 
As these two cases demonstrate, numerous questions about the potential applications 
of physician-patient privilege remained into the 1870s and it was possible for the courts to 
take widely divergent views on the subject. In time, however, as more cases came before the 
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courts, lawyers and judges gradually came to a consensus as to how privilege was to be 
interpreted in courts of law. The judicial decisions reached in these early cases were 
important in establishing the potential applications of physician patient privilege. In many 
cases, the rulings of states courts were every bit as important as the statutes themselves. As 
one legal commentator noted, “the law is well settled that when the highest court in the state 
construes a statute of that state, the construction so placed thereon becomes as much a part 
and parcel of the statute as if specifically incorporated therein, and when the legislature re- 
enacts the statute, it adopts the construction so made by the courts.”39 
Moreover, the numerous similarities between various privilege statutes meant that 
rulings in one jurisdiction were often interpreted and applied in myriad other jurisdictions— 
the same legal scholar noted, “where the legislature of one state adopts literally the statute of 
another state, the courts of the adopting state will likely feel constrained to follow the 
decisions of the highest court in the parent state construing such statute.”40 Because the vast 
majority of privilege statutes were modelled after New York’s 1828 statute, the rulings of the 
New York Supreme Court often set precedent for much of the United States. Edington v. 
Mutual Life Insurance Co., for example, was cited in over one hundred later cases and at least 
nineteen different jurisdictions.41 
While individual statutes varied slightly, these insurance cases over time produced 
definite patterns in states that had privilege statutes on the books. Courts in those states 
almost universally agreed on three important principles: that the privilege belonged to the 
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patient (and not the physician); that the privilege was intended to protect the physician- 
patient relationship; and that this purpose required a broad range of communications 
between physician and patient to be protected. 
In most cases courts were unwilling to severely limit the applications of various 
privilege statutes. From the earliest cases, courts overwhelmingly agreed that the privilege 
belonged to the patient and not the physician. This was the ruling the courts reached in 
Johnson v. Johnson and, from the 1830s, this interpretation was upheld whenever the privilege 
was invoked in court. Even in Wisconsin, where the state’s privilege statute merely stated the 
no physician or surgeon “shall be compelled” to testify—language that some interpreted as 
evidence that the statute protected the physician—the courts repeatedly ruled that the law 
was intended solely to protect patients.42 Such protections did not require patients to know 
about the privilege or have any expectation that their secrets would remain confidential even 
in courts of law.43 
Likewise, courts repeatedly ruled that the intent of privilege statutes was to protect 
medical secrets and that this was a worthwhile goal. In 1880, for example, the influential 
Court of Appeals of New York ruled that the purpose of the privilege “was to enable a 
patient to make known his condition to his physician without the danger of any disclosure 
by him; which would annoy the feelings, damage the character, or impair the standing of the 
patient while living or disgrace his memory while dead.”44 To this end, the courts generally 
protected a broad range of communications. Some courts “held that all information obtained 
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by the physician in course of his professional employment is privileged, however 
unimportant it may have been in enabling the physician to render his service.”45 In the 1877 
case Mott v. Consumers’ Ice Co., for example, New York courts had refused to allow doctors’ 
financial records (“the bare record of the number of patients visited by the doctor and the 
number and amount of fees received by him”) to be admitted as evidence.46 In general, most 
state courts “were extremely liberal in their decisions involving the interpretation and 
application of [physician-patient privilege].”47 In general, the courts in the statute states took 
privilege seriously and resisted arguments to limit its applications. In a particularly forceful 
statement of that position, a New York judge asserted that any narrowing of the statute’s 
meaning would “annul the statute and permit it to be evaded”48 
In time, however, it became apparent that privilege had the potential to act as a 
shield for various acts of fraud and deception. In one case, a woman who had fallen in the 
street sued the Village of Oneida for damages including umbilical hernia, prolapse of the 
uterus, as well as numerous bruises. Representatives of the village called the plaintiff’s 
physician of ten years who testified that the hernia predated the accident. This information 
was excluded from the record, however, and the village was ordered to pay $2,500 in 
damages.49 In another Michigan case, a nurse sued her former charge, winning $1,500 
compensation for injuries allegedly inflicted by her violent patient. On appeal, however, the 
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court learned that the plaintiff had confessed these injuries to her physician before she took 
care of the defendant. This testimony, initially barred from the courtroom under the guise of 
privileged communications, prompted the Michigan Supreme Court to reverse the earlier 
decision, ordering a new trial. In doing so, the court issued a word of caution, admonishing 
courts “to see to it that the statute [privileging communications between physician and 
patient] is not used as a mere guard against exposure of the untruth for a party, and that the 
rule intended as a shield is not turned into a sword.”50 
The early-twentieth-century legal critic Zechariah Chafee cited numerous other cases 
in which the enforcement of physician-patient privilege seemed to hamper the judicial 
process. In one case, a drunk accident victim was able to fraudulently recover damages 
because his attending physicians were unable to testify. In another, a widow sought to 
receive an insurance claim for the wrongful death of her husband, but because her husband’s 
physician—the only witness who could attest to the cause of death—was barred from 
testifying, she was unable to recover damages.51 
Gradually, courts began to call for a stricter interpretation of their privilege statutes. 
 
In 1887, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that it was the responsibility of the party 
invoking the privilege “to bring the case within the provision.” Parties that wished to bar 
communications on grounds of privilege needed to prove that 1) “the information which he 
seeks to exclude was acquired by the witness in attending the patient in a professional 
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capacity” and 2) that this information “was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity.”52 
In 1889, the New York courts ruled that an objection needed to be voiced to bar 
testimony.53 
At times, the courts’ broad interpretation of physician-patient privilege bordered on 
farce. On June 28, 1893, an Iowa man awoke to find his horse Bravo suffering from 
pneumonia. At eight AM, the man telegraphed for Dr. Miller, the local veterinarian. The 
veterinarian received the message at one PM, and, by four thirty arrived at the stables where 
he was unable to save the ailing horse. The horse owner then sued the telegraph company 
arguing that the delayed message was to blame for Bravo’s death. On cross examination, the 
company’s counsel asked Dr. Miller what information was conveyed in that telegram. 
Objection to this line of questioning was sustained on grounds of physician-patient privilege, 
“but on appeal it was held that the privilege conferred by the Iowa code on communications 
by patient to physician does not apply to communications made by a horse, or more fairly 
speaking, to veterinarians.”54 
Throughout the late nineteenth century, courts were repeatedly asked to consider 
whether various specialists were covered by physician-patient privilege. In 1877, Missouri 
courts denied claims that pharmacists were covered by the privilege.55 Likewise, in 1893, 
Missouri courts denied dentists’ claims to privileged communications. This decision was later 
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54 Henderschott v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 106 Iowa 529 (1898). Quote: Purrington, “An Abused 
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confirmed by rulings in Iowa, Michigan, and Mississippi.56 Courts repeatedly ruled that 
Christian scientists were not considered physicians under various privilege statutes.57 Over 
time, courts would reject claims to privileged communications by chiropractors, x-ray 
operators, undertakers, hospital dieticians, army corps sergeants in prophylaxis, interns, 
medical students, laboratory technicians, gymnasts, naturopaths, electrotherapists, 
mechanotherpaists, physiotherapists, osteopaths, and masseuses.58 With each of these 
decisions the courts narrowed the potential applications of physician-patient privilege. In 
time, 
the Michigan Supreme Court explicitly limited the privilege to “general practitioners, and to 
those whose business as a whole comes within the definition of ‘physician’ or ‘surgeon.’”59 
To this end, 
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island defined a physician as someone “who practices the art 
of healing disease and preserving health; a prescriber of remedies for sickness and disease. 
He is presumed to be familiar with the anatomy of the human body in its entirety; to 
understand the science of physiology and the laws of hygiene, and to be able to minister, as 
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far as may be, to the relief of pain, disease, and physical ailments of all sorts and kinds 
whatsoever.”60 
While insurance suits, injury litigation, and testamentary actions made up the bulk of 
legislation in which privilege was invoked, other, more sensational cases often captured the 
headlines. Critics of physician-patient privilege were quick to point to instances in which 
privilege protected the most disreputable criminals. In one case, a Nevada man tried and 
convicted for the attempted rape of a seven-year-old girl sought to use physician-patient 
privilege as a means to get his conviction overturned. He argued that the testimony of a 
physician who had examined the victim and confirmed that she had sustained injuries as a 
result of the attempted rape should be thrown out under Nevada’s privilege statute as the 
doctor had prescribed for and treated her as a patient. While unsuccessful in overturning the 
conviction, this argument managed to elicit a dissenting opinion from Nevada Supreme 
Court Justice J. Bigelow and horrified many legal commentators.61 William Archer 
Purrington, the barrister for the New York State and County Medical Societies and 
vehement critic of physician-patient privilege, cited this case as evidence that privilege 
protected “ravishers” from justice.62 
The 1880 New York case Pierson v. People raised even more grave concerns about the 
potential uses of physician-patient privilege. At trial, William Pierson, accused of murder, 
appealed to the court to bar the testimony of the poisoned victim’s physician on the grounds 
that these communications were privileged by the New York statute. The judge was 
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unsympathetic, however, stating, “the purpose for which the aid of this statute is invoked in 
this case, is so utterly foreign to the purposes and objects of the act, and so diametrically 
opposed to any intention which the Legislature can be supposed to have had in the 
enactment, so contrary to an inconsistent with its spirit, which most clearly intended to 
protect the patient and not to shield one who is charged with his murder, that in such a case 
the statute is not to be so construed as to be used as a weapon of defense to the party so 
charged, instead of a protection to his victim.”63 The judge was not merely dissatisfied with 
Pierson’s attempted use of physician-patient privilege. Instead, he took aim at the privilege 
itself, stating, “there has been considerable difficulty in construing this statute, and yet it has 
not been under consideration in many reported cases. It was more fully considered in the 
Edington case than in any other or all others. It may be so literally construed as to work great 
mischief, and yet its scope may be so limited by the courts as to subserve the beneficial ends 
designed without blocking the way of justice. It could not have been designed to shut out 
such evidence as was here received, and thus protect the murderer rather than to shield the 
memory of his victim.”64 
As criticism from the bench mounted in the final two decades of the nineteenth 
century, even in states that protected physician-patient communications by statute, the legal 
profession increasingly united in opposition to physician-patient privilege. In non-statute 
states, physician-patient privilege remained a contentious issue. In jurisdictions that remained 
beholden to common law tradition, courts continually refused to privilege medical 
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communications.65 The position of those states was bolstered by a series of cases in Britain 
that repeatedly affirmed the (albeit misunderstood) precedent established in the Duchess of 
Kingston’s trial for bigamy.66 Moreover, where statutes did exist, critics of physician-patient 
privilege argued in favor of a narrow interpretation of the privilege that limited its 
applications to a few select cases.67 
Legal treatises, which had once treated the privilege with ambivalence or not at all, 
were now united in condemnation. The sixteenth and final edition of Greenleaf’s A Treatise 
on the Law of Evidence, published in 1899, captured the emerging legal consensus: 
As to the policy of the privilege and extending it, there can only be condemnation. 
The chief classes of litigation in which it is invoked are actions on policies of life 
insurance, where the deceased’s misrepresentations as to health are involved; 
actions for corporal injuries, where the plaintiff’s bodily condition is to be 
ascertained; and testamentary actions where the testator’s mental condition is in 
issue. In all of these cases, the medical testimony is ‘the most vital and reliable,’ ‘the 
most important and incisive’ and is absolutely needed for purposes of learning the 
truth. In none of them is there any reason for the party to conceal the facts except 
to perpetrate a fraud upon the opposing party, and in the first two of these classes 
the advancement of fraudulent claims is notoriously common. In none of these 
cases need there be any fear that the absence of the privilege will subjectively 
hinder people from consulting physicians freely (which is, as we have seen, the true 
reason for maintaining the privilege for clients of attorneys); the injured person 
would still seek medical aid, the injured person would still submit to a medical 
examination, and the dying testator would still summon physicians to his cure. In 
wills, policies and personal injuries, the privilege, where it exists, is known in 
practice to be a serious obstacle to the ascertainment of truth and a useful weapon 
for those interested in suppressing it. Any extension of it to other jurisdictions is to 
be earnestly deprecated.”68 
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With this came one of the most important turning points in the history of physician-patient 
privilege. The problematic applications of privilege in insurance cases, injury litigation, and 
testamentary actions in the late nineteenth century courtroom transformed the legal 
consensus regarding physician-patient privilege—what had once been a minor and 
inconsequential rule of evidence was now seen as an unnecessary impediment the legal 
process and, in many cases, it was considered a grave injustice. In the ensuing decades, this 
legal criticism would become the foremost obstacle to the further spread of privilege 
statutes. Throughout the twentieth century, legal scholars, outraged by the applications of 
privilege in the courtroom, would work to limit the spread of new statutes and, in time, to 
revise or repeal the statutes already on the books. 
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CHAPTER VIII: CRITICISM AND REFORM IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 
 
Certain it is that the practical employment of the privilege has come to mean little but 
the suppression of useful truth, —truth which ought to have been disclosed and 
would never have been suppressed for the sake of any inherent repugnancy in the 
medical facts involved. 
 
John Henry Wigmore, On Evidence, 1904 
 
There are occasions… when a physician must determine whether or not his duty to 
society requires him to take definite action to protect a healthy individual from 
becoming infected because the physician has knowledge obtained through the 
confidences entrusted to him as a physician of a communicable disease to which the 
healthy individual is about to be exposed. 
 
American Medical Association, Principles of Ethics, 1912 
 
 
In retrospect, the nineteenth-century evolution of physician-patient privilege was 
relatively steady and constant. Between 1828 and 1905, thirty-one different jurisdictions 
adopted privilege statutes. Physicians, at first largely uninvolved in the spread of privilege, 
eventually came to appreciate privilege laws as powerful indicators of their own professional 
status, and they successfully lobbied for the adoption more privilege statutes. During the 
closing decades of the nineteenth century, a series of court cases transformed privilege from 
an arcane and seldom-used legal doctrine into a high-stakes legal matter. Even as most of the 
nation’s physicians came to embrace the privilege, members of the bar and bench began to 
resent it. What began as a minor offshoot of legal codification reforms came to be regarded 
by many lawyers as a pernicious obstruction of the legal process. 
By contrast, the twentieth-century history of physician-patient privilege took fewer 
twists and turns. As medico-legal developments brought more new legislation and more 
kinds of cases to which the privilege could not be easily applied, the legal profession 
increasingly united in opposition to the privilege. Legal critics, led by John Henry Wigmore, 
the era’s preeminent expert on the law of evidence, fashioned novel means to test the 
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efficacy of various evidentiary privileges. To these legal scholars, all privileges represented 
dangerous impediments to the courts’ search for truth. Such privileges could be justified only 
if the public good created by the privilege outweighed the damage of refusing necessary 
evidence. Physician-patient privilege, they argued, needed to be limited and perhaps even 
abolished because it failed that test. 
At the same time, some doctors continued to push for new statutes. And yet, as 
many physicians embraced laissez-faire medical ethics in the early twentieth century, these 
efforts proved largely unsuccessful. To the new generation of physicians who emerged in the 
early twentieth century, privilege was no longer a powerful indicator of the status and 
influence of the medical profession, but rather an unnecessary and dangerous check on 
doctors’ professional autonomy. To these doctors, physician-patient privilege and, more 
broadly, the AMA’s Code of Ethics increasingly seemed like antiquated relics of the nineteenth 
century. 
The evolution of physician-patient privilege in the twentieth-century was profoundly 
shaped by these two developments. Legal criticism, when combined with the ambivalence of 
the medical profession, effectively stopped the spread of physician-patient privilege, and new 
statutes became increasingly rare. At the same time, numerous states—prompted by criticism 
emerging from bench and bar—began to rewrite their civil codes. Nearly every state that had 
adopted physician-patient privilege in the nineteenth century amended their privilege statute 
to include new waivers and clauses that limited the privilege to specific classes of litigation. 
Finally, over the course of the twentieth century, legal reformers led efforts to systematize 
and standardize the law of evidence. In doing so, they incorporated the legal critiques of 
noted scholars and staunch critics of physician-patient privilege into new policies—most 
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notably the Federal Rules of Evidence, which was adopted in 1975 and did not include 
physician-patient privilege. 
The nineteenth-century statutes that granted physicians privileged communications 
had been enacted in response to specific medico-legal problems—doctors’ conflicting 
loyalties to their patients and the law, uncertainty over the admissibility of specific pieces of 
testimony in the courtroom, and a desire for a more precise and proscriptive legal code. A 
period of rapid change, the early-twentieth century brought numerous developments that 
challenged those nineteenth-century trends. Large corporations such as railroads, mining 
companies, and insurance corporations increasingly hired their own physicians, creating new 
ethical dilemmas—did these companies have any legal right to patients’ medical records? 
These discussions frequently found their way into the courtroom, where physicians and 
lawyers were often uncertain as to how to apply physician-patient privilege.1 
Likewise, the transformation of hospitals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries profoundly shaped discourse over medical confidentiality. Throughout much of 
the nineteenth century, hospitals had served as houses of last resort, where the poor and 
destitute received palliative care. By the turn of the century, however, the advent of 
professional nursing and antiseptic surgery had remade the hospital into the primary locus of 
both treatment and medical research.2 In a hospital setting, medical confidences were no 
longer shared between physicians and patients alone. Rather, such secrets became known the 
myriad nurses and medical students who carried out many of the day-to-day tasks involved 
 
1 Becker, “Observations Concerning the Law of Privileged Communications;” Bell, “The Duty and 
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in hospital care. Moreover, a shift from the nineteenth-century norm of one-to-one relations 
between physician and patient toward more team-oriented therapeutics necessitated the 
creation and preservation of more extensive medical records. In this way, the reorganization 
of the hospital brought new ethical dilemmas that doctors had to confront, creating 
exceptional cases where “the professional honor and the legal obligation… to preserve the 
patient’s secrets” no longer applied. By entering the hospital, physicians argued, “the 
patient… necessarily and properly assumed to waive all claim to privacy so far as the 
purposes of clinical instruction and hospital administration are concerned.”3 
Most of all, however, the application of physician-patient privilege to injury lawsuits 
and contested life insurance claims continued to provoke unwanted complications. 
By the early twentieth century, the potential injustices posed by the applications of privilege 
in injury litigation were readily apparent to all parties. On such cases, William Archer 
Purrington, a lawyer representing the New York State and County Medical Societies, 
remarked, “It needs no argument to show the unfairness, if not dishonesty, as a general rule, 
of those who bring actions to recover damages for their physical injuries, yet will not permit 
the best evidence of the nature and extent of those injuries to be put before the jury.”4 Few 
were as critical as the presiding judges in these cases. In one Missouri case, the presiding 
judge called attention to “the [numerous, well-known] scandals in beating down the truth 
arising from too harsh and literal interpretation [of privilege statutes].”5 Another Utah justice 
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decried privilege as “a perversion of justice, if not an absolute travesty.”6 As criticism 
mounted from bench and bar, many began to call for sweeping reforms of the various 
privilege statutes in effect.7 
Few scholars influenced this discourse as much as John Henry Wigmore. Born in 
1863, Wigmore rose to prominence in the early twentieth century as the nation’s foremost 
expert on the law of evidence. Described by peers as a “simple-minded man who combined 
exceptional industry with a clear mind, broad interests and a methodical approach,” 
Wigmore had a gift for classification and organization.8 As a young scholar writing in the 
1890s, he had tried his hand at editing an edition of Greenleaf’s A Treatise on the Law of 
Evidence—long viewed as the standard text on American evidence law. In doing so, Wigmore 
worked to retain Greenleaf’s original language as much as possible and to ensure the long- 
running text, which was first published in 1842, remained up-to-date with notes of the most 
recent cases and statutes. In the margins, however, Wigmore diverged from the standard fare 
of nineteenth-century legal treatises. Here, he offered numerous editorial comments and 
suggested avenues for the future of American evidence law.9 
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Wigmore’s magnum opus, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law, first published in 1904 and 1905, followed through on this promise. In the text, 
Wigmore sought to compile the “warring masses of judicial precedents” that made up the 
law of evidence into one comprehensive work. In doing so, he sought “to expound the 
Anglo-American law of evidence as a system of reasoned principles” and “to furnish all the 
materials for ascertaining the present state of the law in the [United States’] half a hundred 
independent jurisdictions.”10 To Wigmore, the need for a new, modern take on the law of 
evidence was most glaring when it came to the law of privileges. Long a harsh critic of all 
privileges, Wigmore found physician-patient privilege especially loathsome.11 
With sarcasm and cutting wit, On Evidence argued vehemently against physician- 
patient privilege. Wigmore laid out the most important arguments in favor of the privilege— 
the notes of the revisers to the New York code, which offered the original justification for 
physician-patient privilege, and the more recent judicial decision in Edington v. Aetna. 
Accepting these sources as the best evidence that medical communications ought to be 
privileged, Wigmore then set out to deconstruct and dismiss each piece of evidence one-by- 
one.12 In doing so, Wigmore fashioned novel means to test the efficacy of various 
evidentiary privileges. To Wigmore, privileges, which by definition impeded courts’ ability to 
ascertain the truth, could only be justified if they met four criteria: 1) the privileged 
communication needed to originate in confidence; 2) this confidentiality had to be absolutely 
necessary for the relationship in question; 3) the protected relationship had to be performing 
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a public good; 4) and the damage inflicted by disclosing privileged information needed to be 
greater than the injury caused by denying this information to the courts. If a privilege failed 
to meet any one of these criteria, then the privilege could not be justified.13 
In regard to the first criteria, Wigmore argued that most medical secrets did not 
really “originate in confidence.” If patients did not view their medical conditions as secrets, 
then there would be no need to maintain medical confidentiality in the courtroom. To this 
point, Wigmore argued that most diseases and injuries were readily apparent. With the 
exception of venereal diseases and criminal abortions, he asserted, there “is hardly a fact in 
the categories of pathology in which the patient himself attempts to preserve any real 
secrecy.” As these laws had never been intended to protect abortionists and other criminals, 
Wigmore reasoned, their application in the courtroom constituted an unjust and unnecessary 
impediment to the legal process.14 
Likewise, to the second point, Wigmore argued that privilege was hardly necessary to 
protect the physician-patient relationship. Here, he reasoned that if doctors were capable of 
treating patients without the trust engendered by physician-patient privilege, as physicians 
did in all states without a privilege statute, then surely there was no need for privilege at all. 
Moreover, Wigmore argued, “even where the disclosure is actually confidential, it would 
none the less be made though no privilege existed.” To Wigmore, it was absurd to suggest 
that a patient might endanger his or her own life out of fear that any information confided in 
a physician could be used as testimony in a court of law. Patients would always seek medical 
attention whether they knew their communications were privileged or not. To this point, 
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Wigmore concluded with a sarcastic quip, “Is it noted in medical chronicles that after the 
privilege was established in New York, the floodgates of patronage were let open upon the 
medical profession and long-concealed ailments were then for the first time brought forth to 
receive the blessings of cure?”15 
To the third point, Wigmore asked, “Is the [physician-patient] relation one that 
should be fostered?” Here, Wigmore gave an unequivocal yes— “that the relation of 
physician and patient should be fostered, no one will deny.” Yet the privilege could be 
justified only if the injury caused to the physician-patient relationship by disclosure of 
medical secrets was greater than the “injury to justice” caused by non-disclosure. On this 
fourth point, Wigmore suggested that physicians’ arguments for the privilege fell apart. Like 
Mansfield more than a century before him, Wigmore acknowledged that medical 
confidentiality had long been an important part of the physician-patient relationship and that 
to disclose medical secrets outside of the courtroom would be wrong. Revealing these 
secrets in the courtroom was another matter and would never be held against a physician— 
“the physician, being called upon only rarely to make disclosures, is not consciously affected 
in his relationship with the patient. “In truth,” Wigmore concluded, each of these criteria 
except the last “may justly be answered in the negative…There is nothing to be said in favor 
of the privilege, and a great deal to be said against it.” He suggested that states should 
remove physician-patient privilege from the statute books and that “the adoption of it in any 
other jurisdictions is earnestly to be deprecated.”16 
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In the decades following the publication of On Evidence, both legal and medical 
scholars frequently cited Wigmore as the definitive authority on the law of evidence. To this 
day, many legal scholars have accepted Wigmore’s four instrumental criteria as the best test 
for whether specific communications should be privileged, and the United States Supreme 
Court has repeatedly cited Wigmore’s four criteria as a means to test the use of various 
evidentiary privileges at the federal level.17 
Wigmore’s critique was so forceful that anyone who continued to advocate for 
physician-patient privilege felt the need to confront his arguments. In 1913, for example, 
William Chandler, a physician from South Orange, New Jersey, urged his state’s medical 
society to push for the legislative recognition of physician-patient privilege, as so many of his 
nineteenth-century counterparts had done. Chandler urged his peers to “refer the matter 
back to [the society’s] legislative committee.” With “a united effort… by the [medical] 
profession,” Chandler hoped “to place New Jersey with those other States, which have 
decided to protect professional honor, conserve the confidence necessary to obtain health or 
preserve life, and above all to secure the dispensation of justice with the least injury and the 
greatest beneficence to the whole commonwealth.”18 
Even in this impassioned speech, however, Chandler was forced to acknowledge the 
new challenges facing his cause in the wake of Wigmore’s treatise. Legislators increasingly 
rejected physician-patient privilege because “it makes physicians a privileged class”—one of 
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Wigmore’s harshest critiques of the privilege—and because “it would in too many instances 
defeat the ends of justice.”19 Unwilling to completely reject the arguments of “Dean 
Wigmore,” however, Chandler repurposed Wigmore’s four criteria in his speech. To 
Chandler, physician-patient privilege was justified because it met all four criteria necessary to 
justify privileged communications. But Chandler’s plea fell upon deaf ears, and New Jersey 
failed to enact a new statute. 
By early twentieth century, moreover, many physicians themselves were beginning to 
agree with Wigmore. Dating back to the 1880s, there had long been doctors opposed to 
physician-patient privilege and, more broadly, codified medical ethics. By 1900, however, 
dissatisfaction with the AMA’s Code of Ethics had reached a boiling point. The most vocal 
critics of the Code took issue with the consultation provision, a clause that prohibited 
cooperation with irregular practitioners. Yet when John Allen Wyeth, the AMA president, 
called upon the organization to repeal the provision in 1902, reformers seized the 
opportunity to make wholesale revisions to the Code. The following year, a committee 
appointed to revise the Code of Ethics produced a new document, titled Principles of Medical 
Ethics. While the 1903 revision retained much of the original language of the 1847 Code, 
Principles removed several of the more offensive provisions. The new document removed the 
controversial consultation provision, omitted any mention of the public’s obligations to 
physicians, and relaxed restrictions on the use of patent medicines and proprietary drugs.20 
More importantly for the politics of medical confidentiality, Principles stripped the 
code of any regulatory mechanisms. In the Preface to the new code, the revisers noted that 
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they “deemed it wiser to formulate the principles of medical ethics without definite reference 
to code or penalties.” Accordingly, they maintained that the new Principles of Medical Ethics, in 
stark contrast to the old AMA Code, would be merely “suggestive and advisory.” The 
policing of ethical infractions was “thus left to the respective state and territorial societies.” 
These societies were free to “form such codes and establish such rules for the professional 
conduct of their members as they may consider proper, provided, of course, that there shall 
be no infringement of the established ethical principles of this Association.”21 Supporters of 
the new Principles of Medical Ethics argued that the new document was preferable to the old 
Code of Ethics because it left individual physicians free to make decisions in accordance with 
their own standards of medical ethics. “Character must be the foundation upon which 
ethical action is to be built,” a Colorado physician declared. “Proper conduct among men 
and affairs must be left to the man, his tact, his judgment, his education and his 
experience.”22 
Yet this sentiment did not completely resonate throughout the medical profession. 
Despite support for some of the revisions incorporated into Principles of Medical Ethics, many 
physicians felt the new document erred too far in favor of laissez-faire medical ethics. As a 
series of high-profile quarrels rocked the medical profession, critics of the new code began 
to rail against its lack of disciplinary authority. In 1909, when Frank Lydston, a Chicago 
gynecologist, openly challenged the integrity of George H. Simmons, the AMA Secretary- 
General, many physicians began to call for a second revision of the code. Led by Simmons, 
this group of physicians successfully lobbied for a second revision of the AMA code, and, in 
 
 
21 AMA, Principles of Medical Ethics (1903), Preface. 
 
22 Denver Medical Times, quoted in the Journal of the American Medical Association 45:1263 and Konold, 69-70. 
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1912, the AMA adopted a new version of Principles of Medical Ethics that restored the society’s 
capacity for ethical enforcement.23 Yet the second batch of revisions did not abandon 
laissez-faire ethics altogether. Rather than merely relax the standards of ethical policing, the 
1912 Principles incorporated laissez-faire ethics into many of the code’s provisions. 
The treatment of confidentiality was a case in point. Compared to earlier ethical 
codes, the 1912 Principles offered a merely tepid endorsement of medical confidentiality. 
While the 1847 Code of Ethics had praised the protection of patients’ secrets as one of the 
basic tenets of the physician-patient relationship, the laissez-faire medical ethics of the early 
twentieth century found these restrictions increasingly onerous. Accordingly, the revisers 
who authored the 1912 Principles tempered the proscriptive language of the old Code of Ethics. 
While the 1847 document had mandated that “secrecy and delicacy… should be strictly 
observed” and that “no infirmity of disposition or flaw of character observed during 
professional attendance, should ever be divulged by him except when he is imperatively 
required to do so,”24 the 1912 Principles read: 
There are occasions… when a physician must determine whether or not his duty to 
society requires him to take definite action to protect a healthy individual from 
becoming infected because the physician has knowledge obtained through the 
confidences entrusted to him as a physician of a communicable disease to which the 
healthy individual is about to be exposed. In such a case the physician should act as he 
would desire another to act toward one of his own family under like circumstances. 
Before he determines his course, the physician should know the civil law of his 
commonwealth concerning privileged communications.25 
 
Like earlier versions, this new clause acknowledged the physician’s need to maintain the 
confidences of his patients. Yet the 1912 Principles also introduced new ethical duties that 
 
 
23 Konold, 68-75; Baker, Before Bioethics, 220-223. 
 
24 AMA, Code of Ethics (1847). 
 
25 AMA, Principles (1912), Chapter I, Section 2. 
28 Baker, Before Bioethics, 221. 
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superseded the physician’s obligation to his patient, allowing the physician to exercise his 
own judgment on a case-by-case basis. 
The wording of the 1912 revision revealed a dramatic underlying shift in the AMA’s 
position on privileged communications. The 1847 Code had praised privileged 
communications as a powerful indicator of the importance of professional ethics and 
medical confidentiality, stating, “the force and necessity of [physicians’] obligation [to 
maintain their patients’ secrets] are indeed so great, that professional men have, under certain 
circumstances, been protected in their observance of secrecy by courts of justice.”26 By 
contrast, the 1912 Principles urged physicians to be familiar with “the civil law of his 
commonwealth regarding privileged communications” as means of self-protection, implying 
that privileged communications were a negative duty that could, and often did, conflict with 
a physician’s obligation to society and impinge upon a his ability to act ethically. This 
stemmed from a shifting of priorities. The authors of the 1912 Principles championed 
physicians’ “service to humanity” rather than their obligations “exclusively to the patient… 
without exception,” as the nineteenth-century champions of medical ethics had done.27 
Thus, “the 1912 concept of professionalism created conceptual space for a professional duty 
to report infectious diseases to health authorities and even to identify carriers by name.”28 
This change in priorities and ethical practices reverberated throughout all levels of 
the medical profession. Just as the AMA relaxed its policies on medical confidentiality, 
individual physicians across the country became more willing than they had been to violate 
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patients’ secrets in service of other, conflicting ethical duties. Increasingly, these relaxed 
practices brought physicians into conflict with their patients. In 1920, for example, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court convened to adjudicate a dispute between a doctor and his 
disgruntled patient. Simonsen v. Swenson caught national attention as the first time a court was 
“called on to determine a physician’s liability for voluntarily revealing out of court a patient’s 
confidences.”29 The trouble began when Simonsen, an employee of a telephone company, 
stopped in Oakland, Nebraska along with several colleagues. In his hotel room one night, he 
noticed sores across his body. Alarmed and fearing the worst, he sought the counsel of 
Swenson, a local physician, but the doctor’s visit did little to allay Simonsen’s fears. After a 
brief examination, Swenson informed the travelling telephone employee that his sores were 
most likely indications of syphilis. There was still some cause for optimism, however, as the 
doctor’s hasty examination called for more tests before the diagnosis could be confirmed. 
Nevertheless, the doctor worried that Simonsen’s condition might be contagious and 
strongly urged the traveler to vacate his hotel room.30 
Though the diagnosis was distressing, Simonsen elected to ignore the doctor’s 
advice. Instead, he opted to finish his business in town before seeking a second opinion at 
home. Returning from work the following day, however, Simonsen was alarmed to find his 
bags packed and waiting in the hall. His room was under quarantine and in the process of 
being fumigated. When Simonsen sought out the hotel’s proprietor to ask what was going 
on, he was instructed to leave immediately. The telephone employee was distraught. On its 
own, the diagnosis was enough to cause concern, but his expulsion from the hotel brought 
 
29 “Liability of a Physician for Revealing out of Court His Patient’s Confidences,” Harvard Law Review 34:3 
(January 1, 1921): 312–14. 
 
30 Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224 (1920). 
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even more problems: where would he stay as he finished his work? How would he explain 
these events to his colleagues? The court records fail to indicate how Simonsen managed to 
negotiate these dilemmas. He did, however, seek a second opinion, later learning that his 
sores had been nothing more than a false alarm.31 
In the resulting lawsuit, Simonsen called the physician into court, asking Dr. 
 
Swenson to answer for the embarrassment and hardship caused by his mistaken diagnosis. 
The physician’s story did not contradict that of his patient. Both agreed on the same 
sequence of events, yet the doctor vehemently attested that his actions were justified. Dr. 
Swenson had long served Mrs. Bristol, the hotel’s proprietor, and Mrs. Bristol would 
frequently refer ailing guests to Swenson. Accordingly, when Simonsen first noticed the 
symptoms of a mysterious ailment, the proprietor had referred him to the “hotel doctor.”32 
Upon examining Simonsen, Swenson immediately feared the worst: the patient was quite 
probably suffering from syphilis. At that time, physicians believed that the disease was “very 
readily transmitted in its early stages, and could be carried through drinking cups, eating 
utensils, and other articles handled or used by the diseased person.” To the doctor, therefore 
Simonsen’s condition was not just a personal matter, for his presence at the hotel risked 
exposing other guests to this loathsome disease. That was why the doctor had pleaded with 
his patient to leave the hotel and return home.33 
When Dr. Swenson returned to the hotel the next day, he was dismayed to hear that 
Simonsen had not left. Concerned, the doctor informed his friend, Mrs. Bristol, that 
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Simonsen was “afflicted with a ‘contagious disease.’” The doctor instructed Mrs. Bristol “to 
be careful, to disinfect [Simonsen’s] bedclothing, and to wash her hands in alcohol 
afterwards.” Acting on this information, Mrs. Bristol immediately gathered Simonsen’s 
belongings and expelled him from the hotel. Though Simonsen’s embarrassment was 
regrettable, the doctor argued, urgent action had been needed in order to prevent further 
spread of disease.34 
When the justices of the Nebraska Supreme Court assembled to adjudicate the 
dispute, they heard each of these narratives. First Simonsen presented his case, arguing that 
the doctor acted unethically and that the patient was entitled to damages. Simonsen’s 
attorneys directed the justices toward a Nebraska statute that mandated the revocation of a 
physician’s license upon the “betrayal of a professional secret to the detriment of a patient.” 
The court was unmoved, however. After hearing Swenson’s account, the justices ruled in 
favor of the doctor. In their decision, the justices stated, “no patient can expect that if his 
malady is found to be of a dangerously contagious nature he can still require it to be kept 
secret from those to whom, if there was no disclosure, such disease would be transmitted.”35 
To both doctors and lawyers, Simonsen v. Swenson was a landmark case. By establishing 
a precedent through which physicians’ legal obligations could be overruled in the name of 
public health, as one legal scholar remarked, “the case [stood] for the triumph of medical 
altruism over legal duty.”36 In many ways, the case demonstrated the twentieth-century 
evolution of American medical ethics and physicians’ changing commitment to 
confidentiality. During this time period, doctors did not completely retreat from their 
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obligations to medical confidentiality. Rather, by mid-twentieth century, what had once been 
one of several central tenets of the physician-patient relationship became merely one of 
many often-conflicting moral duties that physicians were expected to maintain. 
Moreover, by the early twentieth century, medical ethics and physician-patient 
privilege no longer served the same functions that they once had. In the mid-nineteenth 
century, doctors had championed medical ethics and physician-patient privilege as one of 
few powerful indicators of their own professional status. A century later, owing to the 
myriad changes that had cemented physicians’ control over the medical profession, such 
efforts were no longer necessary. By the 1920s, the sectarian battles of the nineteenth 
century were ancient history. Physicians had managed to secure stronger licensing laws, 
reformed medical education, and, all the while, maintained control over the medical 
profession—weathering incursions from corporations and mutual aid societies. The 
development of antibiotics and other technological advances in the mid-twentieth century 
further bolstered the reputation and standing of physicians.37 
As physicians became less dogmatic in their support for a strict code of medical 
ethics, they opened space for the critics of physician-patient privilege to dictate policy. The 
combination of staunch legal criticism, as systematically spelled out in Wigmore’s treatise, 
and the increasing ambivalence of the medical profession, as signaled in the ethical revisions 
of 1912, had three profound effects on the policy of privilege going forward through the rest 
of the twentieth century: 1) the spread of privilege stalled and few new statutes were 
adopted; 2) many states revised their privilege statutes to limit the applications of physician- 
patient privilege; and 3) legal reformers pushed for uniformity between state and federal legal 
 
 
37 Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 198-232. 
165  
codes and, in doing so, championed sweeping reforms that threatened to get rid of 
physician-patient privilege altogether. 
As legal scholars railed against physician-patient privilege and the medical profession 
increasingly embraced laissez-faire medical ethics, the spread of the physician-patient 
privilege that gained ground throughout the nineteenth century against the precedent 
established in the Duchess of Kingston’s trial slowly came to a halt. With the exception of 
the territories of Puerto Rico (1911) and the Virgin Islands (1920), no new jurisdictions 
adopted physician-patient privilege between 1906 and 1925.38 While the law continued to 
evolve though judicial interpretation and occasional amendments to these codes, most legal 
commentators agreed that the spread of privilege effectively stopped by about 1930.39 Only 
Kentucky, New Mexico, and Louisiana adopted weak privilege statutes in the mid-twentieth 
century, but these laws, which applied only to the recording of births and deaths (in the case 
of Kentucky), to venereal disease and workers’ compensation cases (in the case of New 
Mexico), or to criminal but not civil actions (in the case of Louisiana), bore little resemblance 
to the strong privilege statutes of the nineteenth century.40 
At the same time, many states revised their laws in ways that made the privilege less 
absolute. To judges and legal scholars, the ideal solution to the problematic applications of 
privilege in life insurance and accident cases was a complete and total repeal of privilege 
statutes. In most cases, however, it proved far easier to amend and limit the various statutes 
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DeWitt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient, 455, 460-461. For an accurate list of statutes in the 
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in effect.41 Over the course of the early-twentieth century, numerous jurisdictions amended 
their statutes, limiting the applications of physician-patient privilege to specific classes of 
litigation. 
In 1900, almost every privilege statute on the books existed in its original form. In 
general, these statutes were simple, one-sentence provisions that stated clearly and 
unambiguously that medical secrets could not be revealed in the courtroom.42 California’s 
statute, first adopted in 1853, was representative of these early laws: 
A licensed physician or surgeon cannot without consent of his patient, be examined in 
a civil action as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was 
necessary to enable him to act for the patient.43 
 
By the turn of the century, many legal scholars had come to see this statute, along with 
the myriad others in effect throughout the United States, as woefully outdated. 
Accordingly, in 1901, the California legislature passed an amendment to the statute that 
prevented the use of privilege in cases “in which the treatment of the patient by the 
physician or surgeon is in issue”—an obvious response to the abuse of privilege in 
malpractice cases. In 1917, the state legislature again amended the statute, adding a waiver 
that could be executed by deceased patients’ spouses or children in addition to provisions 
barring the privilege from wrongful death and personal injury suits. By 1917, California’s 
privilege statute had evolved from a single sentence that guaranteed physician-patient 
privilege to read as follows: 
A licensed physician or surgeon cannot without consent of his patient, be examined in 
a civil action as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was 
 
41 For a clear and forceful example of this legal argument, see: Purrington, “An Abused Privilege.” See also: 
Bach, “The Medico-Legal Aspect of Privileged Communications;” and Purrington, “A Recent Case of Patient’s 
‘Privilege.’” 
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necessary to enable him to act for the patient. Provided, however, that after the death 
of a patient, the executor of his will or the administrator of his estate of the surviving 
spouse of the deceased, or, if there be no surviving spouse, the children, of the 
deceased personally, or, if minors, by their guardian, may give such consent, in any 
action proceeding brought to recover damages on account of the death of the patient; 
provided, further that where any person brings an action to recover damages for 
personal injuries, such action shall be deemed to constitute a consent by the person 
bringing such action that any physician who has prescribed for or treated said person 
and whose testimony is material in said action shall testify; and provided, further, that 
the bringing of an action to recover the death of a patient, by the executor of his will, 
or by the administrator of his estate, or by the surviving spouse of the deceased, or if 
there be no surviving spouse, by the children personally, or if minors, by their 
guardian, shall constitute a consent by such executor, administrator, surviving spouse 
or children or guardian, to the testimony of any physician who attended said 
deceased.44 
 
While the new law severely limited the applications of physician-patient privilege, it also 
created a tangled mess of legalistic jargon and effectively rendered the earlier statute 
illegible to all but the savviest legal scholar.45 
The evolution of privilege in California was hardly exceptional. Over the course 
of the early-twentieth century, every jurisdiction amended their privilege statute in some 
form. By mid-century, nearly every state had adopted some form of a waiver through 
which patients could allow their secrets to be divulged in the courtroom. Some states 
included implied waivers that were activated in certain classes of litigation or whenever 
patients made passing reference to their medical records. For example, in 1909, the 
Michigan legislature passed an amendment to the state’s privilege statute, barring the use 
of privilege in malpractice suits. Likewise, most states added qualifying language that 
limited privilege to specific kinds of litigation. Many states barred physician-patient 
privilege from criminal trials. Others adopted provisions that enabled doctors to testify 
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to specific facts. In 1923, for example, Minnesota amended its statue to allow a 
physician to testify to “the pregnancy of his patient without her consent.”46 
The cumulative effect of all of these changes was to severely limit the 
applications of physician-patient privilege. At the same time, the fractured nature of 
these numerous reforms meant that state laws gradually diverged from one another. 
While the many statutes adopted in the nineteenth century all shared similar language— 
some were identical to one another—the privilege statutes of the twentieth century 
often bore little resemblance to one another. 
In this way, the evolution of physician-patient privilege mirrored other developments 
in the history of American law. In general, the statutes and precedents governing courtroom 
procedure were cobbled together over the course of several centuries in response to 
disparate factors—codification and other reform movements, landmark cases and novel 
interpretations of longstanding precedent, as well as the more mundane realities of everyday 
legal practice. The result was a complicated and varied legal landscape. Standards of legal 
practice varied between federal and state jurisdictions as well as from state to state. As with 
physician-patient privilege, the laws of one jurisdiction were often incompatible or at odds 
with the laws of another. 
The lack of uniformity between different jurisdictions had long troubled lawyers and 
legal reformers alike. Beginning with codification movements in the mid-nineteenth century 
and continuing through various other schemes and measures, legal scholars had long sought 
to impose uniformity on courtroom procedure and the law of evidence. More often than 
not, however, such measures succeeded only in introducing further confusion. All the while 
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the number of statutes and precedents governing various aspects of courtroom procedure 
continued to grow. Between 1885 and 1914, “the number of volumes of appellate court 
cases increased from about thirty-five hundred… to almost nine thousand… thus making 
the sheer bulk of case law almost overwhelming.”47 
In the mid-twentieth century, legal scholars led a series of reform movements 
intended to bring order to the sprawling mass of precedents and statutes that comprised the 
law of evidence. First, in the 1940s, the American Law Institute (ALI)—an organization of 
progressive attorneys, judges, and law professors—assembled to create a model code of 
evidence. The stated goal was to examine the laws in effect in every state and to compile a 
uniform code that blended the diffuse and contradictory statutes of each into a singular 
volume. The ALI hoped that every state would eventually adopt its Model Code of Evidence as 
its new evidentiary code. 
Led by Harvard Law Professor Edmund Morgan, the ALI committee that drafted 
the Model Code was vehemently opposed to the expansion of evidentiary privileges. On the 
subject of privileged communications, Morgan stated bluntly, “We are hoping to make the 
rules which deal with the exclusion of evidence as narrow as possible.”48 To this end, the 
committee used Wigmore’s instrumental criteria as a means to test various evidentiary 
 
47 Beginning in 1879, the West Publishing Company began cataloging and distributing literature on the various 
precedents and rules in effect, but “its National Reporter system only made contradictory precedents more 
available to both sides in a dispute.” Likewise, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, which was founded in 1892, “convinced some states to adopt several uniform statutes, but these 
measures barely touched the great bulk of the common law.” Nor did a standing committee founded by the 
American Bar Association in 1888 fare any better. Hall, The Magic Mirror, 268. 
 
48 American Law Institute, Proceedings 66 (July 1, 1940-June 30, 1941), 66-100. Quote at p. 76. On Morgan’s 
opposition to privilege, see also: Edmund M. Morgan, “Some Observations Concerning a Model Code of 
Evidence,” University of Pennsylvania Law Register 89:2 (December 1940), 145-165; Edmund M. Morgan, 
“Privileged Communications: Law vs. Ethics,” Professor Morgan’s Address, Edmund M. Morgan Jr. Papers, 
Special Collections, Jean and Alexander Heard Library, Vanderbilt University. In fact, Morgan’s opposition to 
privileges was so well known as to be included in his obituaries: Charles E. Wyzanski Jr., “Edmund M. Morgan, 
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privileges, hoping to exclude as many as possible. Though physician-patient privilege was 
deliberately omitted from every draft, a weak privilege was added before the final document 
was promulgated “probably to placate the medical profession.”49 The document had little 
effect on the policy of physician-patient privilege however, as the authors of the ALI’s 
model code could not convince states to adopt the Model Code as law. 
In the wake of the ALI’s failure to initiate substantive reform of the rules of 
evidence, legal critics became increasingly vocal. Morgan and his peers turned to law journals 
to champion the Model Code and to call for other reforms that might lend some semblance of 
order to the nation’s many separate, often uneven, and sometimes contradictory evidentiary 
codes.50 Finally, in the late 1950s, the American Bar Association successfully pressured the 
United States Judicial Conference to take up the issue. Over the ensuing years, multiple 
committees of judges, lawyers, and law professors convened to “to study the advisability and 
feasibility of uniform rules of evidence for use in Federal courts” and, ultimately, to draft a 
new Federal Rules of Evidence.51 
The Judicial Conference Committee, like the ALI committee before it, regarded 
privileges as “hindrances which should be curtailed.”52 Citing John Henry Wigmore’s “view 
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that many statutory privileges were largely the product of effective lobbying by special 
interest groups that wanted the prestige of a privilege, Professor Edward Cleary, the 
committee’s reporter, argued that ‘privileges often operated as ‘blockades’ to the quest for 
truth… and stated that the effective functioning of the courts required ‘invasions of privacy’ 
in the form of judicial rulings rejecting privilege claims.”53 Accordingly, when the Judicial 
Conference Committee submitted its proposal to Congress, the proposed Federal Rules 
limited the applications of various privileges: 
Rule 5-01: Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or 
provided by act of Congress, and except as provided in these rules and in the Rules of 
Civil and Criminal procedure, no person has a privilege to: 
a) Refuse to be a witness; or 
b) Refuse to disclose any matter; or 
c) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or 
d) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing and matter or producing 
any object or writing.54 
 
Congress disapproved of the draft’s proposed rule on privilege, however, and sent the 
committee back to the drawing board. 
The committee returned with a second proposal that defined nine privileges that 
would remain protected in federal courts. In their nine exceptions, the committee included 
privileges between lawyer and client, psychotherapist and patient, husband and wife, as well 
as a privilege that protected communications to clergy. The committee’s second draft also 
included a rule that expressly prevented the creation of any non-specified privileges. The 
committee intentionally omitted physician-patient privilege.55 
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This too proved unsatisfactory to Congress. Each house of Congress then drew up 
its own revisions to the proposed Federal Rules. In June of 1973, the House put forward its 
proposal which included struck out the Judicial Conference Committee’s proposed rule on 
privilege and replaced the nine enumerated privileges with a single rule that essentially left 
privilege law untouched. The Senate followed, largely endorsing the House’s bill, and the bill 
went to Committee to iron out the minor differences between the House and Senate 
versions of the bill. When the Federal Rules of Evidence were signed into law in 1975, the final 
version of Rule 501 read: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided 
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme court pursuant to 
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or 
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common 
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of 
reason and experience: Provided, That in civil actions with respect to a claim or 
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a 
witness, person government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be 
determined in accordance with State law.56 
 
Thus, the nation’s federal courts remained where they had been since the Constitution 
went into effect: common law precedents, following judicial interpretations of the 
Duchess of Kingston case, would continue to bar any parties from invoking a physician- 
patient privilege. 
Since 1975, the status of physician-patient privilege has remained relatively stable. 
 
Federal courts, governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, continue to deny all claims to 
privilege in criminal cases on the grounds of centuries of legal precedent. Most states, on the 
other hand, observe some form of physician-patient privilege—most often a reworked 
version of the state’s original nineteenth-century legislation that limits the potential 
applications of privilege to specific classes of litigation. 
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Nevertheless, doctors, lawyers, and sometimes patients continue to debate the merits 
of physician-patient privilege. Those in favor of the privilege continue to argue that it serves 
as a necessary guarantee of patients’ privacy and that it facilitates a healthy doctor-patient 
relationship. Critics of the privilege, on the other hand, maintain that physician-patient 
privilege constitutes an unnecessary impediment to the judicial process. And yet, neither side 
can be content with the current state of the law. The numerous and often contradictory laws 
that govern the admissibility of medical evidence in different jurisdictions make physician- 
patient privilege at best a weak protection of patients’ medical secrets. These laws— 
unenforceable in federal courts—do not do enough to ensure patients feel secure that their 
medical secrets will remain confidential. Yet, as many legal critics assert, the numerous 
statutes guaranteeing physician-patient privileges still constitute a considerable obstacle to an 
efficient judicial process. 
These conflicts make understanding how and why these laws first came about all the 
more important. In tracing the evolution of physician-patient privilege over the course of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this dissertation shows that the laws that govern medical 
testimony in the courtroom were cobbled together in response to numerous contradictory 
impulses—including the advocacy of numerous physicians and medical societies on one 
hand and the criticism of prominent doctors and legal scholars on the other—and never 
intended as an ironclad protection of patients’ right to privacy. Perhaps for these reasons, 
policymakers ought to consider reframing the law of privilege not as a matter of 
professionalization—as these laws have so often been framed—but rather as valuable tool 
that can be used to safeguard patients’ privacy. 
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